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A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax
Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the
Rethinking of a Collective Identity
Anthony C. Infanti
Abstract
Critical tax theory, much like its non-tax critical counterparts, has been consis-
tently marginalized by mainstream tax academics. To date, tax crits have accepted
and acquiesced in this marginalization. In this article, I question the idea that tax
crits are outsiders as well as the notion that critical tax theory is a marginal form
of tax policy literature. My primary purpose in questioning this conventional wis-
dom is to get tax crits to think critically about the collective identity of the critical
tax movement.
I question the outsider status of critical tax theory by essentially turning the main-
stream into the marginal (or the marginal into the mainstream, depending upon
your perspective). I accomplish this by reconceptualizing a quite mainstream tax
concept - tax expenditure analysis - as an application of critical (and, more par-
ticularly, deconstructionist) techniques to the Internal Revenue Code. Once the
mainstream (i.e., tax expenditure analysis) has been recast as the marginal (i.e., de-
constructionist analysis), the distinction between the two essentially deconstructs
itself, calling into question the justification for attaching significant weight to the
distinction between the mainstream and the marginal. This opens the way for tax
crits to think critically about their marginality and what role it should play in the
collective identity of the critical tax movement.
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A TAX CRIT IDENTITY CRISIS?
OR TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE
RETHINKING OF A COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Anthony C. Infanti1
“There is nothing unusual about the appearance of deconstructive arguments
in the texts of non-deconstructionists . . . .”
– J. M. Balkin2
I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  Once upon a Time . . . 
How to begin?  A story to set the tone seems to work well,  but my usual story line simply
won’t do the job this time.  You see, I’ve recently begun my articles by tracing the thought process
that led me to the topic on which I am writing.3  Normally, I arrive at a topic after reading something
that gets me thinking in a new or different direction.4  This t ime, however, the initial idea just came
to me, rendering my customary introduction impossible.  So, I will have to set the tone here with a
different type of story—a story about my sister’s commitment ceremony.  
But, in the interest of full disclosure, I’d like to make a few things clear before I share this
story with you.  First, for those of you who don’t know me and haven’t read my previous work, I’m
an openly-gay man.  Second, I’ve never been a big proponent of same-sex marriage, mostly because
I’ve been skeptical about the wisdom of gays and lesbians imitating heterosexual marriage.  In my 35
years, I’ve been lucky enough to have fallen in love twice.  My first relationship lasted some nine
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5. For a discussion of the desexualized euphemisms used in referring  to the members of a same-sex couple,
see Infanti, Sodomy Statute, at 776–77, 783–84 & n.44.  As was the case in that article, I will use the term “partner”
here because, in my experience, it the most commonly-used term in everyday speech.
6. Marriage was not a possibility in the United States or Canada during our relationship.
7. Right  now you must be thinking, “what are the odds of both children being gay?”  But you don’t know the
half of it—my sister  and I were both  adopted and have different biological paren ts.  While she was alive, my mother
played the lottery every week, but never won big.  I guess she won a lottery of a different sort.
8.  I even accompanied them to the initial session with the hair an d make-up people where they did a “dry run”
so that Cindy and Elyse could get an idea of h ow they would look on the day of the ceremony.
years, and the second has lasted two years and counting (I will speak more about my current partner5
later).  Neither my former partner, Michael, nor I had any interest in having a public commitment
ceremony.6  Nonetheless, we openly held ourselves out as a couple, and were generally accepted as
such by our friends and families.  After a few years, we began to wear rings as a symbol of our
relationship.  We always joked that we did have a commitment ceremony; it  was just a small
one—comprised of the two of us and the woman at Tiffany who sold us our wedding rings (the rings
were, in fact, two identical men’s wedding rings).
Needless to say, I was a bit skeptical when my sister Elyse decided to  have a commitment
ceremony  about two years ago (although I never told her this, because I didn’t want to dampen her
excitement and enthusiasm).7  She had met her partner, Cindy, a few years before (and had been
exclusively in heterosexual relationships prior to meeting Cindy).  They had already purchased a
house together and had been living in it for a while when Cindy proposed to Elyse in a rather
romantic setting.  Cindy even gave Elyse an engagement ring. 
The two planned what would have been a rather traditional wedding, had it occurred between
a man and a woman.  The ceremony was held outdoors at a hotel near where my sister and I had
grown up, which also happened to be located not too far from where Cindy’s family lives.  The
ceremony took place at the end of an outdoor pier that extended over the river that ran behind the
hotel.  The river, boats, and luxury homes on the opposite shore formed a rather nice backdrop for
the ceremony.  A minister officiated at the ceremony, and two of Cindy’s nieces served as
bridesmaids.  Cindy’s sister stood up for her, and I stood up for my sister.  I also escorted my sister,
who was wearing a rather elegant wedding dress, down the aisle because my father had passed away
before the ceremony took place (my mother had passed away before my sister had even met Cindy).
Cindy and Elyse exchanged vows, lighted a unity candle, and released doves into the air at the end
of the ceremony.  It was all quite moving.  The ceremony was followed by a wedding reception at
the hotel that was not unlike the many heterosexual wedding receptions that I have attended.
As I said, I was a bit skeptical at the outset because it seemed that Elyse and Cindy were
imitating heterosexual marriage in every particular—from the engagement ring to picking the place
for the ceremony and reception to choosing the invitations to registering at department stores to
buying a wedding dress to choosing just the right people to do hair and make-up and, finally, to
honeymooning in Hawaii.8  But, as is so often the case, looks can be deceiving.  
After the ceremony, the wedding party exited first and went back to the hotel lobby.  The
guests remained outside for a cocktail hour on the pier.  While we were waiting to go out  to the
cocktail hour, Cindy’s sister and I sat down in the hotel lobby and were chatting when two elderly
women came up to ask us about the wedding.  By our attire, they could tell that we were in the
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9. Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C.
L. REV. 1729, 1729 (1998) (“The foregoing critiques tend to validate Professor Zelenak’s thesis that critical tax
scholarship betrays a ‘whiner’ mentality:  (1) critical tax scholarsh ip obsesses over tax provisions it does not like while
ignoring the larger  context, and (2) it is weak on plausible solutions.”).
Realizing that some of you may be unfamiliar with the work that tax crit s do, I would offer as a general
description the following passage from Karen Brown and Mary Louise Fellows , which explains how critical tax theory
can be though t of as filling a gap in  the traditional tax discourse:
What is missing from both the polit ical and academic debate about taxes is a serious consideration
of how the tax system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against  tradit ionally subordinated
groups.  With dramatic and far-reaching tax reform always a possibility, the purpose of this
anthology[, which forms part of the “Critical America”  series,] is to change the tax discourse to
include issues of disability discrimination, economic exploitation, heterosexism, sexism, and racism.
Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING AMERICA at 1S2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise
wedding party.  They had been a bit confused when the first two people they saw come back from
the ceremony were two women.  They had been watching the ceremony, which you could observe
from inside the hotel; however, because the ceremony took place out on the edge of the pier, several
hundred feet behind the hotel, it had been difficult for these two elderly women clearly to see who
was participating in the ceremony.  
After exchanging pleasantries, the two elderly women asked why two women had come back
from the ceremony first, when a bride and groom would normally have left first.  Cindy’s sister
answered that two women had gotten married.  “How nice,” they replied, “are they sisters?”  Cindy’s
sister and I gave each other a knowing glance.  “No,” Cindy’s sister said, “two women got married.”
“Oh, are they friends?”  “No, two women got married.”  Finally, it began to sink in.  “Ohhhhh,” they
said simultaneously with a tone of manifest disapproval and a complete lack of understanding or
empathy.   They then unceremoniously turned and walked away.
Cindy and Elyse had done everything possible to mirror a heterosexual wedding, but the one
thing that they could not do was change the fact that they are two women.  This one detail, which I
had thought had been buried in the overwhelming heterosexuality of the affair, wasn’t really buried
at all.  It clearly wasn’t lost on these two elderly women, because it was the first and only thing that
struck them about the ceremony.  Seeing the ceremony from their perspective led me to rethink the
value and desirability of same-sex marriage.  This experience drove home for me how same-sex
marriage, no matter how much it’s disparaged by some in the gay community as a drowning of our
differences from the heterosexual majority, is really a radical act that simultaneously demonstrates
our similarity to the mainstream and our differences from it.
B.  The Tale and the Title
After you read the title of this article, I’ll bet that you didn’t expect to be reading about my
sister’s lesbian commitment ceremony or about my epiphany on the question whether the gay rights
movement should actively pursue the right to marry.  It’s more likely that some of you (if you’ve
gotten this far) were probably thinking that it’s bad enough that you have to put up with all of the
whining that tax crits do,9 why should you now have to put up with their angst too?10  
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Fellows eds., 1996) [hereinafter Brown & Fellows, Introduction]. 
10.  If you fall into this category, I hope that you will stick it out because you will find very little angst, and
you may just benefit from a new way of looking at a relatively old idea.
11. Tax crits, their critics, and bystanders have all referred to critical tax theory as a “movement,” even though
all tax crits may not share all of the views that are associated with critical tax theory.  E.g., Michael A. Livingston,
Putting “Critical Tax Scholarship” in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1813 (1998) [hereinafter Livingston,
Perspective]; Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233, 243 n.50 (1999); Nancy
E. Shurtz, Critical Tax Theory:  Still Not Taken Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1837, 1878 (1998);  Lawrence Zelenak,
Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1566, 1578, 1580 (1998); Elisabeth S. Clemens, Good
Reasons to Stop Avoiding Taxes, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 517, 518S19 (1999) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER HOWARD,
THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE:  TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), and EDWARD
J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997)); see also Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law:  An
Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 626 n.15 (1984) (in dicating that “Llewellyn described Realism as a
movement though he would not say that any single participant  shared  all the views whose ‘sum [wa]s Realism.’”
(quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222,
1234S35 (1931))) [hereinafter Tushnet, Essay in Deconstruction]; Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:  A Political
History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Political History ] (recounting th e awkwardness that
he feels when referring to critical legal studies as a “movement” or a “school” because of his disagreement with the
statements of others who are also identified with critical legal studies).
The sociologist Alberto Melucci, some of whose work is briefly discussed below in Part IV, has despaired the
use of “the term social movement . . . in a naïvely descriptive manner  to refer to a supposedly unified ‘subject’, such
as the ‘youth movement’, the ‘women’s movement’ or the ‘ecological movement.’” ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF
THE PRESENT:  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 29 (1989); see also id. at
24 (“Contemporary American authors seem to call every form of non-institutional political action a social movement,
to the extent that the word ‘movement’ is in danger of becoming synonymous with everything in motion in society.”).
Melucci instead essays a more precise definition of the term “social movement”:
In my view, this concept  design ates a specific class of collective phenomena which contains three
dimen sions.  First, a social  movement is a form of collective action which involves solidarity, that
is, actors’ mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit.  A second character istic of a
social movement is its engagement in conflict, and thus in opposition to an adversary who lays claim
to the same goods or values.  Conflict is analytically distinct from the idea of contradiction as used,
for instance, with in the Marxist tradit ion.  Conflict presupposes adversaries who struggle for
something which they recognize as lying between them.  Third, a social movement breaks the limits
of compatibility of a system.  Its actions violate the boundaries or tolerance limits of a system,
thereby pushing the system beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without altering its
structure.
Id.  It is worth noting that Melucci does not view social movements as a homogeneous phenomenon; rather, he sees
social movements as “a composite and heterogeneous phenomenon . . . that involve various levels of the social
structure.  They entail different points of view.  They belong to different historical periods.  We must seek to
understand, therefore, this mult iplicity of synchronic and diachronic elements.  Then we can explain how they combine
into the concrete unit of a collective actor.”  Alberto Melucci, A Strange Kind of Newness:  What’s “New” in New
Social Movements? , in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY 101, 105-06 (Enr ique Laraña et
al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY]; see also Carol Mueller, Conflict Networks and the Origins of
Women’s Liberation, in IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY, supra, at 234, 235-36.
For many of the rest of you, however, I suspect that your initial reaction may have been along
the lines of “what, already?”  The follow-up to this pithy reaction would probably be:  “Why is a
movement11 talking about an identity crisis when it’s still in its infancy—so new that it’s still early in
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Please bear in mind, however, that Melucci’s is only one among many definitions of the term “social
movement” that sociologists have proposed.  See Benita Roth, Select Definitions of Social Movements, at
http://womhist.binghamton.edu/socm/definitions.htm (last visited June 3, 2004) (published on  the women and social
movements website, which is a project of the Center for the Historical Study of Women and Gender at the State
University of New York at Binghamton).  Whether critical tax theory qualifies as a “movement” in one or more of these
sociological senses need not be considered here.  For purposes of this article, I will simply accede to the use of this
ostensibly agreed-upon label and, from time to time, refer to critical tax theorists collectively as the “critical tax
movement.”
12. See Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Preface to TAXING AMERICA, supra note 9, at viiSix
[hereinafter Brown & Fellows, Preface]  (describing the formation in the early- to mid-1990s of a “group of tax
scholars in which each of us who previously had felt isolated by the traditional tax analysis that dominated the legal
literature and the tax conferences now had found intellectual kinship”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through the Looking
Glass with Alice and Larry:  The Nature of Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1609, 1610 (1998) (“[c]ritical scholarship
is relatively new to the tax field”); Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1841, 1878 (“critical tax scholarship may be said to still
be in an embryonic state of development”; “the critical tax movement is young”); Zelenak, supra note 11, at 1521S23
(describing the recent growth of feminist tax policy analysis, critical race theory tax analysis, and articles discussing
the taxation of same-sex couples); Introduction to Symposium, Internal Revenue Code, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1519
(1998) (“In recent years, the Internal Revenue Code increasingly has become the focus of feminist and crit ical race
theorists.”).
A notable exception is Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code:  A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971).
13. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at  1610 ( liken ing the reception of critical tax theory to the reception of
critical scholarship more generally, which has been characterized by a trivialization of feminist scholarship and a
failure to integrate critical scholars into academic debate); id. at 1623 (“A primary virtue of critical tax theory is that
it, like any outsider theory, reveals the assumptions hidden behind established thought and institutions.” (see id. at
1611 n.12 for a  definition  of the term “outsider” as used by Kornhauser  in this article)); Livingston, Perspective, supra
note 11, at 1806 (“If critical tax scholars are sometimes too eager to identify bias in the tax system, traditional scholars
have an equal or grea ter tendency to downplay such evidence and to marginalize scholarship that crosses traditional
boundaries or refuses to play by traditional rules.  Traditional scholars tend to favor economic over non-economic
arguments and incremental solutions over radical reevaluations, often labeling those on the wrong side of these
dichotomies as unrealistic or incoherent.”); Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1845S50 (also likening the reception of critical
tax theory to that of critical scholarship generally, but further asserting that Zelenak’s piece “may be seen as a sign of
progress” because critical tax theory is no longer being completely ignored—it is now being addressed by mainstream
scholars,  albeit in an effort to discredit or dismiss it); id. at 1878 (“Though the critical tax movement is young, a
cursory glance at the pieces examined in this Article reveals a breadth of subject matter that points to the future
expansion of this endeavor  to the front iers of other outsider scholarship.); Zelenak, supra note 11, at 1579S80 (“Those
outside the [critical tax] movement have simply ignored it, while those within have mostly chosen support at the
expense of discussion and debate.  This is understandable, given the small size an d outsider status of the movement.”).
14. See generally Livingston, Perspective, supra note 11, at 1791 (“Tax scholars have long been both ahead
the process of exploring and forming its identity?”  Such a reaction would be quite understandable
given that tax crits and their critics often refer to the youth or newness of the critical tax movement12
as well as to the movement’s failure to break into the mainstream of tax thought.13  If the one thing
that everyone seems to agree on is the youth and outsider status of the critical tax movement, isn’t
talk of an identity crisis a bit premature?
Or is it?  In this article, I question the widely-held belief that critical analysis is new to the tax
policy literature as well as the correlative notion that critical work constitutes some form of marginal
literature.  I hope to displace this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that crit ical analysis
surreptitiously entered the tax mainstream decades ago14 and that it has been firmly ensconced there
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of and behind their peers in non-tax subjects.  Rhetorically they have always recognized the polit ical character  of
taxation and the difficulty of separating one’s views on tax matters from more general opinions about human nature
or the character of a just society.  In this r espect, tax scholars were ‘critical’ before the rest of the legal academy.”
(footnote omitted)).
15. Brown & Fellows, Introduction, supra note 9, at 2.
16. See, e.g., TAXING AMERICA, supra note 9; Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws,
1 LAW & SEXUALITY 97 (1991); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996).
17. As sometimes proves to be the case, this article “is as much an effort to do [critical thinking] as it is to
write about [it].”  Tushnet, Essay in Deconstruction, supra note 11, at 623 n.*.
since that time.  From this perspective, the recent spate of articles examining how the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) impacts “traditionally subordinated groups”15 (e.g., women, minorities, and
gays and lesbians)16 can be seen not as some attempt at a radical shift in the terms of the tax policy
debate, but instead as part of the natural progression of that debate.
My purpose in questioning the conventional wisdom is to do for tax crits and their critics what
the two elderly women at my sister’s commitment ceremony did for me:  I want to make them
reconsider their preconceptions by helping them to see things from a new perspective.  For tax crits,
I hope that this shift in perspective will trigger the identity crisis referenced in the title of this art icle
and spur them to  think more deliberately about the collective identity of the critical tax movement and
how “marginality” fits in with that ident ity (if at all).  At the same time, I hope to undercut the ability
of mainstream academics to ignore or trivialize critical contributions to the tax literature by blurring
the distinction between mainstream and marginal contributions to that literature and by calling into
question the validity of judging the worth of contributions on the basis of this categorization.
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts.  I explore the notion that the marginal
is really the mainstream in Parts II and III of the article.  To provide necessary background, Part II
contains an extended description of the tax expenditure concept, which is an idea that  entered the
mainstream of tax policy thought by the early- to mid-1970s and has been the subject of academic and
non-academic debate ever since.  Part III then considers how this mainstream tax policy concept,
which pre-dates the emergence of contemporary critical theory, can actually be viewed as an
application of critical—and, more particularly, deconstructionist—techniques to the Code.  By
reconceptualizing the tax expenditure concept as a form of deconstructionist analysis, Part III
implicitly challenges the distinction between the new and the old, the mainstream and the marginal,
and underscores the constructedness of these distinctions.17  For how can one label critical tax
thinking either “new” or “marginal” when deconstructionist analysis—a mode of analysis that is
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18. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:  LAW AND JURISPRUDE NCE AT CENTURY’S
END 116S22, 142S44, 179S80 (1995); J. M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career (1998), at
www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/deconstructionslegalcareer1.pdf (last visited June 3, 2004) [hereinafter  Balkin,
Legal Career] (“Critical scholar s in the feminist  and critical  legal studies movements made the most frequent and
familiar use of deconstruction in law.”); J. M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669 (1990) (reviewing
JOHN M. ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)) [hereinafter Balkin, Nested Oppositions] (“Deconstruction has
become a prominen t force in legal theory in the last few years, especially through its use by feminist scholars and
members of the Critical Legal Studies movement.”); Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U.  CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1483 (1994)   (descr ibing deconstruction as being at the “core” of
the critical legal studies attack on conventional legal scholarship); Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax Cases, 66
TEMPLE L. REV. 445, 446 n.3 (1993) [hereinafter Geier, Textualism] (“The abstruse movement in legal academia
known as ‘Critical Legal Studies’ is the legal branch of literary deconstruction.”); Livingston, Perspective, supra note
11, at 1792 (“Critical, and especially feminist, scholars likewise embrace a goal of consciousness-raising and
‘deconstruction’ of laws and institutions that  is altogether alien  to tax scholarship.”); Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1880
(“Deconstruction can, therefore, be a useful tool in the service of feminists, critical race theorists, queer legal scholars,
and other schools of outsider inquiry.”); Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium: A Hard Party to Crash for Crits,
Feminists, and Other Outsiders , 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 989, 989 (1996) (“Over the past ten years or so, outsider
scholarship has been proliferating.  Members of critical legal studies . . . have been exploring legal indeterminacy, the
structure of western capitalism, and deconstruction.”). 
19. E.g., James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Crits, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (1998) (“Recent
years have seen the spread of legal academia’s favorite obsession—sex and race as the origin of all of society’s ills—to
the tax law.  In my view, this is not a helpful development.  This Article will focus on just a few of the recent writings
to illustrate how little useful analysis there is in this body of writing.” (footnote omitted)); Dodge, supra note 9, at 1729
(“The foregoing critiques tend to validate Professor Zelenak’s thesis that critical tax scholarship betrays a ‘whiner’
men tality:  (1) critical tax scholarship obsesses over tax provisions it does not like while ignoring the larger context,
and (2) it is weak on plausible solutions.”).  That traditional tax scholars would react negatively to the advent of critical
tax thinking is to be expected—challenges to the established paradigm normally provoke a response from the
mainstream.  In fact, this is exactly what occurred when contemporary critical theory entered onto the scene.  MINDA,
supra note 18, at 208S23; Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited:  How to Marginalize Outsider Writing,
Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1992) (“My conclusion is that mainstream figures who control the
terms of discourse marginalize outsider writing as long as possible. . . . The continued marginalization of outsider
scholars, while perhaps distressing for the cause of social reform, should not come as a surprise.  It is what we might
expect from our studies of narrative theory paradigm shifting . . . .  Reform tends to be slow and incremental; new
knowledge strikes us as extreme, coercive, ‘political,’ or strange.”); see Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:
Reflections on a Review of Civil  Rights Literature , 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) (descr ibing the exclusion of minority
scholars from central areas of civil rights scholarship); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Book of Manners: How to Conduct
a Conversation on Race—Standing, Imperial Scholarship, and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 1051 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:  THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW
(1997)) (responding to a number of critics of critical race theory and setting out an etiquette for conducting discussions
closely associated with contemporary critical theory18—has been an accepted part of the mainstream
of tax policy thought for decades?
Which, in Parts IV and V, brings us back to the title of this art icle and the question that it
poses.  If the marginality of tax crits is not “real” but constructed, then it becomes necessary to
consider why tax crits accept their marginality and incorporate it so readily and unquestioningly in
their collective identity.  Why do tax crits, who devote much of their scholarly energies to ferret ing
out latent biases in the Code, acquiesce in branding themselves as “marginal” when that is tantamount
to inviting “mainstream” scholars to ignore or trivialize their contributions to the tax policy literature
and, therefore, to make them an academically subordinated group?19  In response to this question, I
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about race).
20. Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures:  From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REV. 491, 494 (1985)
(reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985)); see also STANLEY S. SURREY,
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM:  THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES, at vii (1973) [hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS];
Allaire Urban Karzon, Tax Expenditures and Tax Reform, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY
S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985)).
21. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 1S6; Wolfman, supra note 20, at 491; see also Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue:  Re-Imagining the Income Tax, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 289, 313 n.54 (2002)
(describing Surrey as the father of the tax expenditure concept); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes:
The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978 (1986) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Efficiency] (indicating
that the tax expenditure concept was “original ly propou nded” by Surrey);  DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, RETHINK ING TAX
EXPENDITURES AND FISCAL LANGUAGE 1 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch . Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 72,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=444281 (describing Surrey as the original  American proponent of the tax
expenditure concept).
Tax expenditure analysis was not, however, a new concept.  Others had earlier spoken in similar
terms—including Surrey himself.  See Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National
Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244, 244S45 (1969); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income
Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 343 n.3 (1989); Wolfman, supra note 20, at 493S94; SHAVIRO, supra, at 25S26.
Furthermore, Germany had been preparing “a type of tax expenditure budget” even before Surrey’s seminal speech on
this topic.  Compare SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 3, with STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 180 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES], and Stanley S. Surrey & Paul
R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of  1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 679,
679 n.3, 692 n.38 (1976) [hereinafter Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act]; see also SHAVIRO, supra, at 23.
22. E.g., SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21;
Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with
Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform];
Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:  A Comparison with Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives]; Stanley S. Sur rey &
William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget—A Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 528 (1969)
[hereinafter Surrey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker]; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note
21;  Sta nley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept:  Current Developments and Emerging
suggest that tax crits undertake a deliberate and purposeful re-examinat ion of this aspect of their
collective identity.  Along with this suggestion, I offer some food for thought based on my personal
experience in thinking through both my own individual identity as a gay man and my small part in the
collective identity of the gay rights movement.  More specifically, I analogize the several options that
tax crits face in addressing their marginality to my personal experience of living life in the “closet”
as well as to my thinking through the debate over gay marriage, which, in the end, brings us back to
the story with which this article began.
II.  TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
During his lifetime, Stanley Surrey was the most vocal proponent of the tax expenditure
concept in the United States.  He began publicly to consider and speak about the concept—and even
“coined the term ‘tax expenditure’”20—while he was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy during the 1960s.21  Over an approximately fifteen-year period, Surrey produced a
voluminous amount of writing on the subject of tax expenditures, both alone and with co-authors.22
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Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225 (1979) [hereinafter Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues]; Stan ley S. Surr ey & Paul R.
McDaniel, Tax Expenditures: How to Identify Them; How to Control Them, 15 TAX NOTES 595 (1982) [hereinafter
Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control].
For a more complete listing of the works of Stanley Surrey, see Bernard Wolfman, Statesman, Scholar,
Mentor, 98 HARV. L. REV. 343 app. (1984).
23. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 3, 202, 301, 308,
88 Stat. 297, 299, 304, 306, 313 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602, 622, 632, 639) (1974); see also Surrey & McDaniel,
Budget Reform Act, supra note 21 (discussing the Act).  
A number of states also publish tax expenditure reports.  For a list of states that compile tax expenditure
reports along with an indication whether those reports are available on the Internet, see John L. Mikesell, Tax
Expenditure Budgets, Budget Policy, and Tax Policy:  Confusion in the States, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 34, 38S40,
tbl. 1 (2002), available at http://urban.csuohio.edu/budget/taxexpend.pdf (last visited June 3, 2004).
24. E.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 401S12 (5th ed. 1999); JOSEPH M.
DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX:  DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 27S29 (2d ed. 1999); JAMES J.
FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 32, 477S78 (12th ed. 2002); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ
& DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 39S53 (rev. 4th ed. 2002); WILLIAM
A. KLEIN ET AL ., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 9S10 (13th ed. 2003); JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 135-36 (2d ed. 2002); see Griffith, supra note 21, at 350; Wolfman, supra note
20, at 494; Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch:  A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165 (1993) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Public Choice].
25. Wolfman, supra note 20, at 497; see also Brown & Fellows, Introduction, supra note 9, at 8 (“[T]he tax
expenditure budget has become the primary arbiter of which tax provisions are considered structural and free from
scrutiny and which provisions are considered tax subsidies and subject to continuing reexamination for modi fication
or repeal.”); Griffith, supra note 21, at 349S52 (describing the ways in which “[t]he tax expenditure model has had
a significant impact on the formulation of tax policy”).
In addition to being a rather prolific writer on the subject, Surrey proved to be quite
persuasive in pressing the case for adopting tax expenditure analysis.  In 1974, Congress mandated
the use of tax expenditure analysis in the annual budget process.23  Tax expenditure analysis has also
become a staple in the textbooks used in basic federal income tax courses in law school, ensuring that
each new crop of tax lawyers will be exposed to, and become familiar with, the concept.24  In a review
of Surrey’s last published work on the subject, Bernard Wolfman described the general acceptance
of tax expenditure analysis in the following terms:
Writers have not generally used quotation marks around the term “tax expenditure”
since 1974, when Congress, spurred by Surrey, adopted the first tax expenditure
budget.  A rather broad spectrum of people now understand that the income tax
system is used extensively to confer monetary benefits as real and as preferential as
those conferred by direct expenditure, and that tax expenditures may be less open to
debate, to scrutiny, and to review because they are tucked away in the 3,000-page tax
code.25
A.  The Basic Notion
As articulated by Surrey and his main collaborator, Paul McDaniel, the tax expenditure
concept bifurcates tax provisions into two categories:  (i) structural provisions and (ii) tax preferences
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26. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 6S7; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21,
at 3; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note
22, at 227S28.
27. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 26S29, 155; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra
note 21, at 233S39;  Sur rey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker, supra note 22, at 534S35; Surrey & McDaniel,
Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 610.
28. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3;  Sur rey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act,
supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 20, at 6.
29. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 17.
30. Id.; see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 186S94.
31. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3.
32. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION:  THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS  A PROBLEM OF FISCAL
POLICY 50 (1938).
33. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 187S88; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging
Issues, supra note 22, at 228S30.
34. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 188; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues,
supra note 22, at 228.
35.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 188; see also Surrey & McDaniel,
Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
36.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 188; see also Surrey & McDaniel,
Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
or tax penalties.26  Although the tax expenditure concept can be applied to any broad-based tax,27 the
income tax is most often used as an example by Surrey and McDaniel (as well as other
commentators).  In keeping with this practice, the income tax will be employed as the prime example
of the operation of the tax expenditure concept in the discussion below.
1.  The Normative Tax Base and Departures from It—The structural provisions of a tax
“compose the revenue-raising aspects of the tax.”28  For example, the structural provisions of an
income tax would include both the normat ive provisions of an income tax (i.e., items that would “be
treated in much the same way by any group of tax experts building the structure of an income tax”29)
and the provisions that, even though not normative, are necessary to build an income tax.30  Tax
preferences and penalties constitute “departures from [this] normal tax structure.”31
For Surrey and McDaniel, the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income, which posits that
income is equal to “the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the
period in question,”32 served as the starting point for determining which provisions in the income tax
are structural in nature and which are tax preferences or penalties.33  This economic definition of
income was, however, “tempered . . . by also referring to ‘the generally accepted structure of an
income tax.’”34  In making this modification,  Surrey and McDaniel’s purpose was to “exclude from
classification as tax expenditures certain items of income that . . . historically had not been viewed
as income in the United States.”35  For example, this modification excluded from tax expenditure
classification “unrealized appreciation (during a person’s lifet ime) in asset  values and imputed income
from homes or other durable consumer assets.”36
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37. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3; see also Surrey & McDaniel, Budget
Reform Act, supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
38. E.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21,  at 2-6;  Surrey & McDaniel, Identify
and Control, supra note 22, at 597.
39. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at  3; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act,
supra note 21, at  680; Surr ey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 20, at 6.  Tax preferences are discussed in more detail below.  See infra Part II.B.  A brief discussion of tax
penalties is provided infra note 60.
40. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 25; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra
note 20, at 6S7.
41. See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 7; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note
21, at 25.
42. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 25.
43. Id. at 99; SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 129; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note
22, at 354; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 713S14.
44. I.R.C. § 213 (2004).
45. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 21S23.
Using this modified version of the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income, Surrey and
McDaniel identified the following as examples of the structural provisions of an income tax:  “the
definition of net income, the specification of accounting rules, the determination of the entities subject
to tax, the determination of the rate schedule and exemption levels, and the application of the tax to
international transactions.”37  Together, these structural provisions compose what Surrey and
McDaniel referred to as the “normal” or “normative” income tax.38
In contrast, tax preferences and penalties constitute a residual category and include all
provisions that are not considered to be structural in nature.39  Because tax preferences and penalties
depart from the normative tax structure, they have the effect of either (i) providing governmental
assistance to taxpayers by reducing their normative tax burden or (ii) exacting a penalty from
taxpayers by increasing their normative tax burden.  Proponents of the tax expenditure concept reach
this conclusion by separating tax preferences and penalties into their component parts.
Under tax expenditure analysis, each taxpayer can be viewed as paying to the government the
tax due under the normative income tax.40  Then, taxpayers who are entitled to tax preferences can
be viewed as having received a payment from the government equal to the amount of the preference,
and taxpayers who are subject to tax penalties can be viewed as having been required to make an
additional payment to the government equal to the amount of the penalty.41  In the case of tax
preferences, these two payments are, in practice, simply netted out for the sake of expediency (i.e.,
the tax payment from the taxpayer is simply reduced by the amount that the government owes the
taxpayer).42  Thus, under tax expenditure analysis, tax preferences and penalties are the equivalent
of direct expenditure programs and penalties, respectively.43
2.  An Example—To take a concrete example, consider the deduction for extraordinary
medical expenses.44  Surrey argued that  this deduction is not part of the normative income tax because
it is not “theoretically necessary” for the calculation of an individual’s net income; rather, it represents
no more than one of the ways in which that income can be consumed.45  Surrey asserted that “most
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46. Id.
47. See Sur rey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 369; Sur rey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22,
at 722.  For  a discussion of contrary viewpoints, see infra notes 282S301.
48.  Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 369; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20,
at 202.
49. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 333 (1972).
50. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 22.
51. Id.; see also ANDREWS, supra note 24, at 23 (“a deduction only reduces taxes by the amount of the
allowable deduction multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate”).
52. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
53. See infra Part II.C.2.
54. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 197, 225; Surrey, Federal Income Tax
economists would classify these items as tax expenditures.”46  Accordingly, Surrey viewed the
deduction for medical expenses as no more than a government health insurance program47—a stop-
gap measure to fill the void created by the “absence of comprehensive medical care programs,”48
albeit a rather “perverse”49 choice of stop-gap measure.
To pursue this example further, if all tax preferences (including the deduction for medical
expenses) were eliminated from the Code, each taxpayer would pay the tax due under the normat ive
income tax.  For individuals who had previously availed themselves of the medical expense deduction
(or any other tax preference in the Code), this would result in an increased income tax payment to
the government.  If the government still wished to provide financial assistance to individuals with
extraordinary medical expenses as a means of relieving hardship, the government could simply use
the additional revenue raised by eliminating the medical expense deduction to fund a spending
program that would provide direct grants to reimburse extraordinary medical expenses.  When viewed
in this light, the medical expense deduction can be seen as the equivalent of a direct government
health insurance program.
Nonetheless, Surrey observed, it would be rather unlikely for Congress to adopt a direct
spending program with the same distribution as the medical expense deduction.50  Because the extant
tax expenditure health insurance program is cast  in the form of a deduction, the amount of
government financial assistance varies according to the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.51  Consequently,
under an equivalent direct expenditure health insurance program, wealthier individuals would receive
greater financial assistance than poorer ones.  For the same $100 in medical expenses, an individual
in the 35% tax bracket would receive a government reimbursement of $35 (35% x $100), an
individual in the 10% tax bracket would only receive a government reimbursement of $10 (10% x
$100), and an individual who is too poor to pay income tax would receive no government financial
assistance to mitigate her hardship (0% x $100).  This is what Surrey referred to as the “upside-
down”52 effect of many tax expenditures—in other words, when cast as an exclusion or a deduction,
tax preferences provide greater assistance to the wealthy than they do to the poor.  As we will explore
in more detail below,53 this inequity is one of the reasons why Surrey and McDaniel at times
advocated the repeal of nearly all tax preferences and their replacement (if deemed appropriate as a
policy matter) with appropriately-designed direct expenditure programs.
3.  Making the Distinction—Surrey and McDaniel contended that, in most cases, it will not
be difficult to differentiate between structural provisions and tax preferences or penalties.54  Normally,
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Reform, supra note 22, at 355; Surrey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker, supra note 22, at 533; Sur rey &
McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 236S38.
55. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 28, 49; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 707; Sur rey &
Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker, supra note 22, at 537; Sur rey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note
21, at 685; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228; see also Charles Davenport, Tax Expenditure
Analysis as a Tool for Policymakers, 11 TAX NOTES 1051, 1052 (1980).
56. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 196S97; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 20, at 18S19; Surrey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker, supra note 22, at 531S32.  For  a discussion
of some of the borderline issues, see SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 197S222.
57. See infra Part II.D.
58. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 197.
59. Id.; SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 13S14, 19S20; see also Davenport, supra note 55, at 1052
(“[T]here has been a broad consensus about the items that are appropriately on the tax expenditure budget.  There have
been mild disagreements over five or six items in a li sting of 85 or more. . . . The only people who think there is a
serious definitional problem are academics.”); Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 609 (“[A]ny
classification system has its borderlines.  The entire Congressional budget process depends in part on the alloca tion
of all government outlays among a limited number of budget functions.  Obviously, this process entails many borderline
judgments, yet the process operates.”).
60. For the sake of completeness, a short discussion of tax penalties will be included in th is footnote for those
interested in more information.  Tax penalties are the converse of tax preferences.  Rather than departing from the
normative income tax in order to provide government assistance to a taxpayer by lowering her tax burden, a tax penalty
departs from the normat ive income tax “by requi ring a  greater  tax payment  than would occur under  the normative net
income base,” thereby increasing the taxpayer’s tax burden.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note
the arguments made in support of a provision will identify it either as structural in nature or as a tax
preference or penalty.55  Classification based on these arguments will not, however, be conclusive.
Surrey and McDaniel contemplated that the lists of structural provisions and of tax preferences and
penalties would not be etched in stone.  They anticipated an evolutionary process that entails
continual analysis and refinement of the list of tax preferences and penalties:
The tax expenditure concept requires a dynamic and continuing analysis of the
provisions in a tax system.  As the tax expenditure concept compels closer
consideration of the role of a specific tax provision (or nonprovision) in the overall
tax system, new studies are undertaken, new data are developed, and continual
rethinking of positions is required.56
Countering their critics,57 Surrey & McDaniel argued that this need for continual analysis and
refinement is, in actuality, a strength of the tax expenditure concept because “the debates and analyses
are themselves important contributions to the continuing improvement of a country’s tax and
spending structures.”58  In any event, they downplayed the magnitude of these borderline issues and
their impact on the utility of the tax expenditure concept.59
B.  Tax Preferences 
In their writings, Surrey and McDaniel focused primarily on identifying and analyzing tax
preferences, and did not engage in an extended discussion of tax penalties.60  Tax preferences “are
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21, at 29; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 242; see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 222.  The purpose of this increase in  the tax burden is to render “more expensive
either the continuance of present conduct where the conduct is contrary to a desired policy goal or a change to conduct
inconsistent with the policy goal.”  SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 155; see also SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 29.  Accordingly, just as tax preferences can be viewed as government spending
programs for selected taxpayers, tax penalties can be viewed as “the functional equ ivalents of direct government
regulatory or financial penalty rules.”  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 222; see also id.
at 29; SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 155S56; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 243.
Examples of tax penalt ies in the income tax include “the various ‘public policy’ p rovisions that deny
deductions for certain business expenses involving lobbying, bribes, or fines.” SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 29; see also id. at 223S24; SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 155S56; Surrey
& McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 242.  In  addition, the denial of deductions with respect to, and excise
tax imposed on, golden parachute payments constitutes a tax penalty.  I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2004).  There are a
number of other excise taxes in the Code that also serve regulatory purposes.  See, e.g., id. §§ 4001, 4064,
4401(concerning luxury passenger automobiles, gas guzzling automobiles, and wagering, respectively); see also
SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 155S56; Surr ey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 246S52.
Given the equivalence of these tax penalties to direct government regulatory or penalty provisions, Surrey and
McDaniel  urged policymakers to make an educated decision when choosing the means for implementing government
regulation.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 223.  They advocated an analysis in both
cases of the regulation’s “necessity, effectiveness, and correspondence to other direct penalty programs.”  Id.  Although
they did not develop their discussion of tax penalties to the same extent as their discussion of tax preferences, Surrey
and McDaniel did speculate that tax penal ties shar e some of the negative aspects of tax preferences, see infra pp.
15S16; for example, tax penalties also have an upside-down effect (i.e., the amount of the penalty increases with
income), and they entail the same problems with regard to tax administr ation an d the legislative process as tax
preferences.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at  223; Surr ey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues,
supra note 22, at 251S52.  Building on Surrey and McDaniel’s work, Eric Zolt has further analyzed tax penalties and
has attributed to them many of the same nega tive aspects that Surrey and McDaniel attributed to tax preferences.  Eric
M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation:  A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 374S76
(1989).
61. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act,
supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
62. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note
20, at 93S100; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 353S54; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform
Act, supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
63. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3; see also Surrey & McDaniel, Budget
Reform Act, supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
64. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 126S27; see also Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 711.
65. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2004).
66. Id. § 170.  For an argument that the deduction for charitable contributions in many cases is no more than
designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”61  They can “take many forms,
such as permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities, credits against tax,
or special rates.”62  As described above, under tax expenditure analysis, tax preferences are the
equivalent of “government spending for favored activities or groups, effected through the tax system
rather than through direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.”63  
Some tax preferences were expressly enacted with the idea of “induc[ing] action which the
Congress considered in the national interest,” while others have “cloudy” origins but are now
“defended on incentive grounds.”64  The deductions for accelerated depreciation65 and charitable
contributions66 are examples of income tax provisions in the former category, and the deductions for
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a refinement of an ideal income tax base and not a departure from it, see Andrews, supra note 49, at 344S75.  For a
response to this argument,  see SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 19S23, and SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 205 n.32.
67. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2004).
68. Id. § 164.
69. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 127.
70. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 126S28; see also Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 711S12.
In some situations, these provisions may also have incentive effects (e.g., the deduction for extraordinary medical
expenses may induce the purchase of health insurance).  SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 126S28.
71. I.R.C. § 213 (2004).
72. Id. § 63(f)(2).
73. E.g., id. §§ 174 (research and experimental expenditures), 613 (percentage depletion); see SURREY,
PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 127; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 712.
74. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 126S28; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 712S13.
75. See supra note 43.
76. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 99, 114S15; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 20, at 129S30; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 287S88.
77. Wolfman, supra note 20, at 491.
78. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 114.
79. Id. at 100S03; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 130S34, 138S39;  Sur rey, Tax Incentives,
supra note 22, at 715S20, 725S26.
80. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 103S07; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS,
supra note 20, at 134S38, 141S46; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 720S25, 727S32. 
81. Surrey and McDaniel suggest, however, that the upside-down effect may be mitigated by employing
refundable and taxable credits in place of exclusions or deductions.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 21, at 108S11.
home mortgage interest67 and state and local taxes68 are examples of income tax provisions in the
latter category.69  Yet other preferences were not enacted to “induce[] certain activities or behavior
in response to the monetary benefit available,” but were generally intended to relieve hardships.70
These hardships could be either personal (e.g., extraordinary medical expenses71 or blindness72) or
administrat ive (e.g., complex tax computat ions73) in nature.74
Because any tax preference can be drafted as either a tax expenditure or a direct expenditure
program,75 Surrey and McDaniel urged policymakers to make an educated decision when choosing
the means for implementing government expenditure programs.76  They devoted nearly an entire
chapter of their 1985 book Tax Expenditures, which was published several months after Surrey’s
passing,77 to explaining that “most perceived differences between tax and direct expenditure programs
are not inherent in the two approaches.  Instead, they generally reflect differences in program
design.”78  Surrey and McDaniel contended that some of the justifications for choosing tax over direct
expenditure programs do not hold up under scrutiny, and that some of the disadvantages of tax
expenditure programs are also shared by direct expenditure programs.79  
Nevertheless, Surrey and McDaniel did identify a number of differences—both positive and
negative—between tax and direct expenditure programs.  They included in the negative column:80
! Upside-down Effect of Exclusions and Deductions.  The benefit provided by
exclusions and deductions is proportional to each taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, with
the highest rate taxpayers receiving the most benefit.81
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82. For an in-depth discussion of tax shelters in volving tax preferences, see SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note
20, at 100S19.
83. Surrey and McDaniel suggest ways in which a tax expenditure program might be structured in order to
allow the Int ernal  Revenue Service (or the congressional tax committees)  to take advan tage of the expertise of the
executive branch agency (or congressional committee) with jurisdiction over the substantive area implicated by the
program.  SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 111S12.
! Exclusion of Non-taxpayers.  Non-taxpayers are automatically excluded from any
program effectuated through the Code.  Persons may be non-taxpayers for a number
of reasons:  because they are low-income, in a loss situation, or exempt from tax.
! Dependence on the Tax Rate Structure.  If a program is effectuated through the Code,
then a change in the tax rates will result in a concomitant change in the benefits
provided by the program.
! Lower Visibility of Tax Expenditures.  Tax expenditure programs are less visible than
their direct expenditure counterparts, which results in a lesser level of scrutiny for tax
expenditure programs.
! Inability to Ensure that Tax Expenditures Will Be Used for Their Intended Purpose.
For example, in the individual tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s, the intended
recipients of the tax benefits afforded by tax expenditure programs repackaged and
sold those benefits to  high-income persons who were not the intended recipients of
the benefits, but who wanted to shelter income unrelated to the purpose of the tax
expenditure program.82
! Administrative Concerns.  Tax expenditure programs increase the complexity of the
tax laws for non-tax reasons, and also require the Internal Revenue Service to devote
administrative resources to non-tax programs.
! Responsibility for the Program.  A tax expenditure program is under the jurisdiction
of the Department of the Treasury, which generally does not have any particular
expertise in the substantive areas implicated by the program.  In contrast, an
equivalent direct expenditure program would be under the jurisdiction of the
executive branch agency that (i) has expertise in the substantive area implicated by the
program and (ii) would be more likely to monitor the effectiveness of the program.
A similar critique was made concerning the allocation of jurisdiction among
congressional committees (i.e., tax expenditure programs are controlled by the tax
committees, while direct expenditure programs would be controlled by the committee
with jurisdiction over the substantive area implicated by the program).83
! Perception of Unfairness.  Because tax preferences single out certain taxpayers for
a reduction in their tax burdens, they create the perception that the tax system is
unfair in the allocation of the overall tax burden.
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84. Id. at 107S08; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 147S48.
85. E.g., SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 30S40 (setting forth this version of the tax expenditure
concept, but peppering it with statements that reflect the absolutist version of the concept described in the text below);
Sur rey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 360S62 (same); Surrey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor
Bittker, supra note 22, at 530 (articulating th e in trospective version of the tax expenditure concept);  Sur rey &
McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 684S85, 692S93 (setting forth the introspective version of the tax
expenditure concept, but peppering it with statements that reflect the absolutist version of the concept described in the
text below); see Karzon, supra note 21, at 1413 (“In his original work, Surrey adopted a dual stance, that of a tax
technician and a tax moralist, and condemned most tax expenditure items.  . . .  His value judgments on  the wisdom
of eliminating certain tax expenditures that he found objectionable sometimes obscured the value of the technique he
had devised.”).
86. See, e.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 99S117.
87. Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 606S09.
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
Surrey and McDaniel included the following differences in the positive column:  (i) the fact that tax
expenditures are more palatable to taxpayers because they do not view them as government subsidies
and (ii) the ability to take advantage of an existing and effective administrat ive framework (i.e., the
Internal Revenue Service).84
C.  The Import of Tax Expenditure Classification
1.  Introspective Version—Surrey and McDaniel gave conflicting signals—even within the
same piece—about the import of classifying a provision as a tax preference or a tax penalty.  At
times, they seemed to describe the tax expenditure concept in a neutral fashion, as no more than an
informational tool for policymakers.85  Under this view, the tax expenditure concept was intended to
highlight, and then fill, a previously unrecognized information gap in the formulation of budgetary and
tax policy.  Tax expenditure analysis first makes clear the equivalency of tax preferences and penalties
on the one hand and their direct spending and direct penalty counterparts on the other; then, it
attempts to clarify the relevant factors that policymakers should consider when choosing between
these two means to the same end.86  In later years, Surrey and McDaniel also discussed the
importance of the tax expenditure concept  as a tool for policymakers to identify all forms of
government spending when tough economic times motivate them to try to control government
spending.87  The ultimate goal of the introspective version of the tax expenditure concept appears,
therefore, to  be the fostering of educated decisionmaking by policymakers.88
In 1976, Surrey and McDaniel articulated this introspective version of the tax expenditure
concept in a footnote responding to their critics:
There appears in some quarters to  be misconcept ion regarding the significance to be
attached to the presence of an item in the tax expenditure list.   Some assume that this
listing is an automatic statement that the tax expenditure is bad per se and a
“loophole” in the popular usage.  The listing, however, is not pejorative, but only
descriptive of the included items as “spending” and not “taxing” provisions.  The
spending programs embodied in the listing may be helpful or harmful, necessary or
unnecessary.  The answers to these queries, however, lie not in the listing but in a
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89. Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 685 n.22.
90. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 5S6.  Karzon contends that this statement
“reflects that the tax expenditure concept has matured,” and “evidences a separation  of political va lue judgments from
professional tax craftsmanship.”  Karzon, supra note 21, at 1413.   Nevertheless, a careful review of Tax Expenditures
uncovers a number of these “poli tical  value judgmen ts” (or  what I refer to in the text below as the “absolut ist” version
of the tax expenditure concept) in later portions of that book.  See infra text accompanying notes 114S116.
91. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 208; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 726S27.  See
SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 175S208, for a review of all of the items in the 1972 tax expenditure budget,
and see id. at 8S11 to determine which could simply be jettisoned,  which  could be removed from the Code and replaced
with direct expenditure programs, and which should be retained in the Code.  It is worth noting that, of all of the items
in the 1972 tax expenditure budget, Surrey only identified one (the investment  credit for machinery and equipment)
as a potential candidate to remain in the Code.  Id. at 206S07.  In a similar review of the 1969 tax expenditure budget,
Surrey did not identify a single item as a potential candidate to remain in the Code.  See Surrey, Federal Income Tax
Reform, supra note 22, at 361S62, 364S71.
92. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 155; see also id. at 148; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22,
at 734.
93. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 179; see also id. at 179S80, 198; Surrey, Federal Income Tax
Reform, supra note 22, at 360; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 697S98.
94. See generally Davenport, supra note 55, at 1052.
careful analysis of the programs represented in the items listed.  This is of course
equally the situation for each item listed in the direct budget.89
Later, Surrey and McDaniel went so far as to incorporate the introspective version of the tax
expenditure concept into their general description of the concept  in the first chapter of Tax
Expenditures:
The classification of an item as a tax expenditure does not in itself make that item
either a desirable or an undesirable provision; nor does it indicate whether the
inclusion of the item in the tax system is good or bad fiscal policy.  The classification
of an item as a tax expenditure is purely informative, just as the presence of an item
in the direct budget of a government is informative; it is simply a way of announcing
that the item is not part of the normative tax structure.  This being so, it is appropriate
to ask whether the presence of those items in the tax system is desirable or
undesirable, given the existing budget policy, tax policy, and other relevant criteria.90
2.  Absolutist Version—At other times, however, Surrey and McDaniel seemed to view tax
expenditure analysis as a nearly pointless endeavor because it will almost invariably lead to the same
conclusion; namely, that almost all tax preferences should be eliminated from the Code and, under
appropriate circumstances, should be replaced with direct expenditure programs.91  Surrey contended
that a comparison of tax and direct expenditure programs would “favor[] resort to the direct
programs in nearly all cases as the method of providing the encouragement of governmental financial
assistance.”92  Direct expenditure programs would be favored because “many tax incentives will be
seen as either inequitable, often to the point of being so grossly unfair as to be ludicrous, or
ineffective.”93  Thus, this absolutist version of the tax expenditure concept was based on a
determination that inequity and inefficiency are endemic to tax expenditures.94
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art3
22-Jul-04] A TAX CRIT IDENTITY CRISIS? 19
95. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 68S72; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note
21, at 71S72; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 720S25; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note
21, at 693S95;  Sur rey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 254S56.  For a discussion of the horizontal and
vertical equity implications of individual tax preferences, see SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 60S68, and
SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 72, 77S80.
96. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 72; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22,
at 720; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 693.
97. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 68S69; Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 723.
98. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 69.
99. For an exploration of the definition of efficiency for this purpose as well as a defense of tax preferences
as potentially efficient under some circumstances, see Zelinsky, Efficiency, supra note 21.
100. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 82.
101. Id. at 83.
102. Id. at 83S87; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 106S07, 211, 238S44; Surrey, Federal
Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 372S73; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 704S05;
Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 256; Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22,
at 622.
103. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 91; see also Surrey & McDaniel, Budget
Reform Act, supra note 21, at 707; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 275.
104. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 91S92; see also Surrey, Tax Incentives,
supra note 22, at 731; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 707; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging
Issues, supra note 22, at 276.
105. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 92; see also Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra
note 22, at 731S32; Surrey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 707; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging
Issues, supra note 22, at 277.
Tax preferences are considered to be inequitable because they are distributed in an upside-
down fashion (i.e., taxpayers in the upper tax brackets receive the most  benefits while those in the
lowest tax brackets receive the least benefits).95  In addition, tax preferences that are fashioned as
deductions, exclusions, or exemptions automatically exclude nontaxpayers from receiving any benefits
whatsoever.96  This adversely impacts the vertical equity (i.e., progressivity) of the tax system.97  In
addition, tax preferences adversely impact the horizontal equity of the tax system by treating
taxpayers with the same level of income differently based on the uses to which they put their
income.98
Tax preferences may be considered inefficient99 for a number of reasons.  Some tax
preferences are inefficient because they do no more than “pay [taxpayers] for continuing to engage
in their activities.”100  Other tax preferences “are inefficient because the tax savings (subsidies) greatly
exceed the value of the activity induced.”101  Yet other tax preferences “are inefficient because they
provide tax savings to middlemen who deliver the government assistance to the targeted
beneficiaries.”102  
Under the absolutist version of the tax expenditure concept, simplification would be a
collateral benefit of eliminating these inequitable and inefficient provisions from the Code because
“tax preferences are a major source of complexity.”103  As it is, the normative income tax must track
the complexity of the myriad of economic arrangements that taxpayers create.104  Tax
preferences—when viewed as disguised spending programs—unnecessarily add to the required level
of complexity in the normative income tax, because they import into the Code “the complexities of
spending programs”105 and often later entail the addition of another layer of complexity “as tax
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106. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 93.
107.  Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 276.
108. See Karzon, supra note 21, at 1413 (indicating that Surrey’s “value judgments . . .  sometimes obscured
the value of the technique he had devised”); Wolfman, supra note 22, at 344 (stating that Surrey “may have carr ied
his tax expenditure thesis a bit too far, too obsessively—almost theologically”).
109. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 250; see also id. at 247 (“For the most part these courses are
indirect approaches in the sense that th ey assume the continuance of some tax expenditures but seek to modify the tax
benefits produced by the expenditures and thus reduce the tax abuses and inequities generated by those expenditures.”);
Sur rey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22, at 359 (“I have discussed elsewhere the comparison of these tax
expenditures, or tax incentives, with dir ect expenditures as devices for implementing government policies, and
concluded that the case is very strong against the use of the tax device.”); Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control,
supra note 22, at 625 (“many a tax expenditure has been approved that would never have survived for a moment if
structured as a direct spending program”).
110. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at  209.  Surr ey did admit,  however, that a few programs (e.g., the
exclusion of interest on state and local bonds and the deductibility of non-business state and local taxes,  the deduction
for chari table contr ibutions, and assistance for owner-occupied homes and renta l housing) would “requir e further
analysis”; namely, a tailoring of the alternative direct expenditure program to incorporate special requirements that
exist in the tax expenditure program.  Id.
111.  Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 600.
reformers seek to limit the adverse effects of the tax expenditure on tax equity.  The net result is a
tax system of ever-increasing complexity and financial assistance programs that are often irrational
and sometimes counterproductive.”106  Consequent ly, Surrey and McDaniel concluded that “[i]t is
clear that enormous tax simplification could be achieved by repeal of all tax expenditures in the
income tax.”107
Surrey’s art iculation of this absolutist version of the tax expenditure concept was at times
brusque.108  For example, in discussing the inability of nontaxpayers to reap the benefits of tax
preferences, he stated in Pathways to Tax Reform that, “[o]f course, this problem is really an
illustration of the lack of wisdom in ever turning to the tax expenditure route in the first place to grant
assistance rather than to a direct subsidy.”109  In another passage, Surrey stated that
[m]ost of the tax expenditure programs should either be scrapped because the federal
financial assistance they provide is not warranted by the nation’s priorities or be
replaced by direct assistance measures that can readily be devised.110
In a later article, Surrey and McDaniel warned that these replacement direct expenditure programs
would probably not look anything like their tax expenditure counterparts:
If faced with direct outlay programs having the same benefits as the tax expenditure
items, it is a fairly easy conclusion that Congress would not replace them as is.  The
programs would be expensive as outlay items; they would lack any cost-benefit
justification; they would, through the grossing-up, be clearly seen as upside-down
programs because the gross-up must, under progressive rates, produce higher outlays
for the well-off as compared to those below the income levels of the upper
brackets.111
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112.  Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 721S22; see also SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 136.
113.  Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22, at 722S23 (footnote omitted).
114. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 72; see also Surrey & McDaniel,
Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 255S56 (containing a similar statement).
In explaining the impact of tax preferences on horizontal and vertical equity, Surrey asserted
that
[i]t is thus clear that most  tax incentives have decidedly adverse effects on equity as
between taxpayers on the same income level, and also, with respect to the individual
income tax, between taxpayers on different income levels.  As a consequence of these
inequitable effects, many tax incentives look,  and are, highly irrational when phrased
as direct expenditure programs structured the same way.  Indeed it is doubtful that
most of our existing tax incentives would ever have been introduced, let alone
accepted, if so structured, and many would be laughed out of Congress.112
After setting forth a few examples to illustrate his point, Surrey then continued his withering criticism
of tax preferences:
This criticism—that tax incentives produce inequitable effects and upside-down
benefits—is valid as to the general run of tax incentives.  It demonstrates why tax
incentives make high-income individuals still better off and result in the paradox that
we achieve our social goals by increasing the number of tax millionaires.  The
marketplace does not work this way—for the individual who earns his profits, even
high profits, by meeting a need or desire of society, finds his rewards subject  to the
progressive income tax.  The economic system is thus functioning as it is intended it
should, and the tax system, which acts as a control, is also functioning as intended.
But when rewards are in the form of tax incentives, the latter control is eliminated,
and tax millionaires are produced.113
Although the rhetoric did soften somewhat by the time Surrey and McDaniel co-authored Tax
Expenditures, even that work is peppered with statements that evince the absolutist version of the
tax expenditure concept.  For example, in discussing the inequity of tax preferences, Surrey and
McDaniel stated that 
the overwhelming majority of tax expenditure programs disproportionately benefit the
upper-income groups.  Not only are the tax expenditure provisions the primary cause
of perceived tax inequity, but it also seems safe to say that they fail to achieve what
most Americans would perceive to be a fair distribution of funds, measured by criteria
applied to direct spending programs.114
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115. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 87.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Bittker, supra note 21, at 248; see, e.g., id. at 251 (“the Treasury’s ‘full accounting’ [of tax expenditures]
will have to select one ‘correct’ model against  which to measure existing law.  Because I see no way to select such an
‘official’ model for these structural provisions, I am not sanguine about the prospects for a ‘full accounting.’”); Boris
I. Bittker, The Tax Expendi ture Budget—A Reply to Professors Surrey & Hellmuth, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 538, 541 (1969)
(“At bottom, however, every tax structure, whether on the books or projected, is an assemblage of value judgments on
scores of issues that could plausibly have been decided differently.  To bestow the label ‘correct’ on any of these human
creations is to misuse the term.”); Douglas A.  Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1663  (1992) (“The
tax expenditure budget baseline . . . is ‘normative’ in the sense that it advances a particular moral or political claim.
It reflects a particular balance among the ideals of efficiency, equi ty, neutrality, administr ability, privacy, charity, and
pragmatism.  But, each of the six perspectives enumerated in the prior section is ‘normative’ in precisely the same
way.”); Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79
passim (1980) (acknowledgin g the cri tics’ forceful argument that the list of tax expenditures arrived at using the idea
of a “normative” or “ideal” income tax “has no serious claim of legitimacy,” and proposing an alternative means of
identifying tax expenditures that avoids the need to create a consensus list of structur al provisions); Walter  J. Blum,
Book Review, 1 J. CORP. TAX’N 486, 488 (1975) (reviewing SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM, supra note 20)
(indicating that tax expenditure analysis is “a very useful analytical tool,” but arguing that, by moving past those items
that are universally considered to be tax expenditures and relying on the concept of a normative income tax,  Surrey
has pushed the tax expenditure concept “beyond its defensible boundaries and assign[ed] it far too great a role”);
SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 41S42 (“In  sum, tax expenditure analysis can  be rescued from the vacuity of the distinction
between taxes and spending if we reinterpret it to identify provisions in the tax laws that Musgrave’s distributional
branch would be unlikely to employ when acting on the basis of broad equitable considerations. . . . [This approach]
When later discussing the inefficiency of tax preferences, they stated that 
[t]he conclusion to be drawn from all this evidence is that many tax expenditure
incentives or corresponding direct programs may have little justification.  Certainly
most existing studies on the efficiency of tax expenditure incentives indicate a low
response in relation to the funds involved.115
They also remarked that “[t]ax simplification will be impossible if these tax expenditures persist.”116
D.  Criticism of the Tax Expenditure Concept
Since being popularized by Stanley Surrey in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the tax
expenditure concept has been sharply criticized both within and without academic circles.  These
critiques of the tax expenditure concept—and, more particularly, its application to the U.S. federal
income tax—have taken a variety of forms.  I will first summarize the academic critiques and then
summarize the critiques made by non-academics (usually, politicians).
1.  Critiques Made by Academics—Many of the academic critiques revolve around the
distinction drawn by Surrey and McDaniel between (i) the structural provisions of a tax and (ii) tax
preferences and penalties.  Some commentators doubt  the possibility of dividing tax provisions into
these two categories because they question the existence of “an ideal or correct income tax structure,
departures from which will be reflected as ‘tax expenditures’ in the National Budget.”117  Others
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helps to show, moreover that Bittker’s critique of tax expenditure analysis was overstated, unless one confines the
critique (as Bittker perhaps intended) to rebutting overstated claims that one particular rendering of the ‘true’
distr ibution system is canonical.  Although we lack an  agreed conceptual model of exactly what the distribution branch
should do, we do not lack widely shared approaches to how we should think about what it is trying to do.”); see also
Davenport, supra note 55, at 1051; Zelinsky, Efficiency, supra note 21, at 978.
In a recent article,  a commentator pointed out that this baseline issue is not unique to the tax expenditure
budget (and the tax expenditure concept on which it is based), but also exists in the “regular” federal budget that it is
meant to supplement.  Julie Roin, Truth in Government:  Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 603,
615S17 (2003).
118. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 49, at 313S15 (contending that the ideal tax base should consist of
personal consumption and accumulation of goods and services, and arguing that, using this tax base, the deductions
for charitable contributions and medical expenses should not be classified as tax expenditures because they are
refinements of, rather than departures from, this ideal tax base); Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions—A Tax “Ideal”
or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L.  REV. MICH. ST. U.–DETROIT C.L. 1, 6S9 (2002) (assuming th e existence of an ideal
tax base and arguing that the deductions for medical expenses, charitable contributions, personal casualty losses, and
home mortgage interest should not be classified as tax expenditures); see also Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax
Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413, 416S17 nn.26S37 (2001) (ci ting a n umber of articles arguing
that certain provisions should not be considered departures from the normative tax structure).
119. Victor  Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures:  A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1155S56 (proposing the
identifica tion and listing of “substitutable tax provisions”—which ar e “tax law provision[s] whose purposes a non-tax-
based federal program can achieve at least as effectively”—as a more “workable” alternative to the tax expenditure
budget); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 2S3 (claiming that “taxes” and “spending” ar e not coherent categories,
but arguing that tax expenditure analysis may serve a useful purpose if recast “in terms of Richard Musgrave’s famous
distinction between the allocative and distributional branches of the fiscal system”).
120. Griffith, supra note 21, at 364; see also Gwen Thayer Handelman, Acknowledging Workers in Definitions
of Consumption and Investment, in TAXING AMERICA, supra note 9, at 119, 121, 122S24 (cr iticizing Surrey for
ignoring the perspective of workers “in accommodating theory to practice” in tax expenditure analysis).
121. See Bartlett, supra note 118, a t 414 (“Surrey clearly intended the term ‘tax expenditure’ to be pejorative,
undermining political support for tax preferences.”); Roin, supra note 117, at 612 (“The implicit assumption that all
tax expenditures are bad can also be distracting.” (footnote omitted)); Gene Steuerle, Some Thoughts on the Status of
Tax Expenditures, 68 TAX NOTES 485, 486 (1995) (“I have always been convinced that the tax expenditure budget is
a useful con cept for examining different programs within the income tax, but I do not adhere to the view that a ‘tax
expenditure’ is bad per se, any more than a direct expenditure is bad per se.”); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim,
The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958, 972S82 (2004) (describing the tax
expenditure concept and indicating that Surr ey “generally condemn[ed] tax expenditures”).
122. See, e.g., Kahn & Lehman, supra note 117, at 1663S64 (making the argument that “the special
deductions for the blind and the elderly . . . can be seen as rough adjustments to the standardized hypothetical utility
curve—a crude recognition  that those who are blind or aged must spend more to meet their basic needs than young,
sighted taxpayers must spend”); Zelinsky, Efficiency, supra note 21, passim (challenging the notion that tax
accept or assume the existence of an ideal income tax base, but disagree about its composition.118
One commentator has agreed with the idea behind tax expenditure analysis, but feels that Surrey’s
articulation of “a normative income tax [is] so inherently subjective that it deprives the tax
expenditure concept of its persuasive force.”119  Another commentator has faulted Surrey for failing
to justify and explain his choice of net income as the ideal tax base in terms of “an attractive principle
of distributive justice.”120 
Yet other commentators criticize or reject the pejorative connotation given the tax
expenditure label by the absolutist version of the concept.121  Some of these commentators argue that
tax expenditures may, in fact, be a useful policy tool under some circumstances.122  Two of them
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expenditures are inefficient); Zelinsky, Public Choice, supra note 24, passim (challenging the notion that the
Congressional committees and administrative agencies with jurisdiction over the substantive areas affected by tax
expenditures are superior vehicles for designing government programs than are the tax-writing committees and the
Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service); see also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence:
Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 687S90 (2002) (advocating the application of tax expenditure
analysis to payroll taxes, but acknowledging the utility of tax preferences and penal ties and arguing that Congress
should “restore some coherence to tax policy by restr ictin g the use of tax  subsidies to encourage activities with positive
externalities and the use of tax penalties to reflect the negative external costs associated with those activities”).
123. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 121, at 957S58, 980S82.
124. If the underlying policy is held constant, there are no effects of putting a program
into or taking a program out of the tax system even if doing so hurts or  enhances
traditional notions of tax policy.  Welfare is the same regardless of whether the
program is formally part of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the
government.  If we mistakenly look only at the tax system instead of overall
government policy, we will draw the wrong conclusions.  Putting a program into
the tax system makes the tax system look more complicated,  but there is unseen
simplificat ion elsewhere.  The tax system will seem less efficient, but the
efficiency of government policy is unchanged.
Id. at 958.
125. Griffith, supra note 21, at 366.
126. See, e.g., C. David Anderson, Conventional Tax Theory and “Tax Expenditures”:  A Critical Analysis
of the Life Insurance Example, 57 TAX NOTES 1417 (1992); Bartlett, supra note 118, at 419S20.
127. Zelinsky, Efficiency, supra note 21, at 979; see also Heidi Glenn, Bush Administration Questions Value
of Tax Expenditures List, 91 TAX NOTES 535, 535 (2001) (in explaining the Bush administration’s questioning of the
utility of the tax expenditure concept, indicating that “[s]everal economists suggested that a long-standing ideological
debate over the term tax expenditure is r eally what’s a t issue here.  ‘It  could be that their concern is that the rhetoric
[of the list] suggests it’s the government’s money and not the people’s money.’”); Thuronyi, supra note 119, at 1178
(“Politicians commonly attack the tax expenditure concept for assuming that our money belongs to the government
and that the government is doing us a favor by not taxing it.”).  
For examples of this argument, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1983:  SPECIAL ANALYSIS G:  TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1982)
criticize Surrey for focusing too narrowly on tax policy; they argue that he should instead have taken
a more holistic view of the institutional design of the government when considering how best to
implement government programs (i.e., through a tax expenditure or a direct spending program).123
For example, they contend that, even if a program may render the tax system more complicated, it
should still be implemented through the tax system if, on an overall basis, that program would better
achieve the stated object ives than a direct spending program.124  Another commentator questions the
assertion that “tax deductions and exclusions undermine the progressivity of the tax system because
they are worth a greater dollar amount to the rich than to the poor,” and argues instead that
“deductions and exclusions can reduce the relative tax burden of the poor and make the relative after-
tax distribution of income more equal.”125
2.  Critiques Made by Non-Academics—The tax expenditure concept has also come under
fire from non-academics.  Some non-academics reiterate or expand upon the arguments summarized
in the previous section. 126  Others assert that the tax expenditure concept “implicitly assumes that all
income belongs to the government.”127  This objection was rejected by Surrey (and even by certain
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[hereinafter 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G], Editorial, The $91 Billion Loophole, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1975, at 22, and
Notable & Quotable, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 30 (publish ing remarks made by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan in
an address to the National  League of Cities), as well as the sources cited in Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra
note 22, at 231 n.13.
128. See Sur rey & McDaniel, Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 687; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging
Issues, supra note 22, at 231S32; Thuronyi, supra note 119, at 1178;  Zelinsky,  Efficiency, supra note 21, at 979S80.
129. See supra notes 40S42 and accompanying text.
130. Zelinsky, Efficiency, supra note 21, at 980.
131. See Griffith, supra note 21, at 351 (“The reference law approach, then, is more appropriately viewed as
a rejection of the Surrey tax expenditure model than a refinemen t of i t.”); Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control,
supra note 22, at 595S97 (explaining how the reference law approach fails to comply with the requirements of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, supra note 23); see also Paul F. Harstad, Treasury and
OMB Clash on Tax Expenditure Concept, 13 TAX NOTES 1407 (1981)  (descr ibing the unexpected cancellat ion of
Treasury Under Secreta ry for Tax and Economic Affairs Norman B. Ture’s appearance before the Senate Budget
Committee  because “OMB officials could not accept Ture’s proposed test imony because they viewed it as both too
critical of the tax expenditure concept and politically risky”).
The Reagan administration’s rejection of the Surrey model has been described as politically motivated.  See
Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 595 (“These . . . strong criticisms . . . are also intended
to convey a note of sadness in finding what should be a document prepared with technical competence distorted into
a political tract that lacks both competence and reliability.”); Thuronyi, supra note 119, at 1184 (“The inclusion of
ACRS in the tax expenditure budget embarrassed the administration, which had supported this substantial
liberalization of depreciation allowances in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981”).
132. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 127, at 3.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 5.
136. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1985:  SPECIAL ANALYSIS G:  TAX EXPENDITURES,
at G-5 (1984) [hereinafter 1985 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G].
of his academic critics) as misinformed.128  As described above,129 the tax expenditure concept does
not contemplate that “the government has a preeminent claim on the society’s resources.”130  Rather,
the tax expenditure concept contemplates only that all taxpayers pay a normative tax (at rates
determined by Congress—whether high, low, or moderate), and that  the government then returns a
portion of that tax payment to taxpayers who benefit from tax preferences or demands a further
payment from taxpayers on whom tax penalties are imposed.
The tax expenditure concept has also been attacked by two Republican presidential
administrations.  First, in 1982, the Reagan administration essentially rejected Surrey’s tax
expenditure model.131  The administration criticized the term “tax expenditure” as “misleading in
several respects.”132  It also contended that “there are formidable difficulties in trying to define the
underlying concept”:133  “The standard of an ‘ideal’ income tax has often been suggested for
delineating tax subsidies.  However, there is no common agreement on the details of such a normative
standard and many would regard such a standard as an impractical tax base.”134  In place of the Surrey
model, the administration set forth its own “reference law” approach, under which a provision would
be classified as a “tax subsidy” if it is (i) “special” (i.e.,  “it applies to a narrow class of transactions
or taxpayers”135 such as “to permit the specification of a program objective that could be assigned to
an existing agency other than the IRS and be administered with appropriated funds”136) and (ii) a clear
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137. 1983 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 127, at 5.  For cr itiques of the “reference law” approach,  see TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 94S122; Surrey & McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 597S99,
601S06; and Thuronyi, supra note 119, at 1185S86.
138. 1985 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 136, at G-1; see also Bartlett, supra note 118, at 413 (“The
Reagan administration made a similar effort in 1982, only to backtrack in the face of criticism and continue with the
status quo henceforth.”).
139. 1985 SPECIAL ANALYSIS G, supra note 136, at G-5.
140. See Leonard E. Burman, Is the Tax Expenditure Concept Still Relevant?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 613, 626
(2003) (“One suspects, though, that the [Bush] Administration’s preference to shift the focus of analysis from an
income tax baseline to a consumpt ion tax baseline is part of a larger strategy to sneak a consumption tax in through
the back door.”); Grover Norquist, Step-by-Step Tax Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21 (laying out the Bush
Administration’s long-term plan to effect fundamental tax reform through annual tax cuts, which will eventually
replace our extant progressive income tax with a form of consumption tax (even though it is nominally referred to as
a flat-rate income tax)); Sheldon D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX NOTES 289 (2001) (tracing the
historical roots of Republican animus toward the taxation of income and wealth, and exploring its more fanatical
iteration  during the 1990s); see also David S. Broder, Tipping the Republicans’ Hand?, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003,
at A25 (indicating that Norquist’s article, supra, was written  in response to an invitation from the Washington Post’s
editorial page “to explain the Bush tax strategy”).
141. See Bartlett, supra note 118, at 413 (“In its 2002 budget, the Bush administration launched a stealth
attack on the concept of ‘tax expenditures.’”); Glenn, supra note 127, at 535 (“The new language seems to have caught
Washington economists by surprise.”); Patti Mohr, Economists Seek Clarification of Tax Expenditure Concept , 93 TAX
NOTES 42, 42 (2001) (“The Bush administration surprised some economists last April when it released its fiscal 2002
budget that questioned the analytical value of the [tax expenditure] reports.”); Roin, supra note 117, at 603 (“President
Bush sparked a minor fir estorm within the Beltway by including these words in his fiscal 2002 budget analysis.”);
Martin A. Sullivan, Administration Reignites Old Battle over Tax Expenditures, 91 TAX NOTES 701 (2001) (“Usually
dull as doornails, the text of the Bush budget jolted tax policy aficionados to attention. . . .”).
exception to some “general” provision in the tax code.137  Just two years later, however, the Reagan
administration partially reversed course and began to publish a tax expenditure budget that included
both tax expenditures determined under the Surrey model and tax expenditures determined under the
reference law approach.138  The reason given for this change was that neither the Congressional
Budget Office nor the Joint Committee on Taxation (who also compile tax expenditure budgets) had
adopted the reference law approach, and the failure of the three tax expenditure budgets to
correspond fully with each other created “a condition some . . . found confusing.”139
More recently, the tax expenditure concept has become a target of the Bush administration
in its war against the income, estate, and gift taxes.140  The Bush administration surprised observers141
when it included the following statement in the budget analysis for fiscal year 2002:
So-called tax expenditures may be defined as provisions of the Federal tax laws with
exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits deferrals [sic], or special tax rates.
Underlying the “tax expenditure” concept is the notion that the Federal Government
would otherwise collect additional revenues but for these provisions.  It assumes an
arbitrary tax base is available to the Government in its entirety as a resource to be
spent.  Because of the breadth of this arbitrary tax base,  the Administration believes
that the concept of “tax expenditure” is of questionable analytic value.  The discussion
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142. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002:  ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (2001).
143. Roin, supra note 117, at 603S04.
144. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003:  ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 95 (2002).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 96S97.
147. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004:  ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 130S40 (2003) [hereinafter FY 2004 ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES].  For a description  of how these changes further the Bush administration’s long-term tax reform agenda
(as described by Norquist, supra note 140), see Bartlett, supra note 118, at 421S22; Mohr, supra note 141, at 42S43;
and Sullivan, supra note 141, at 701.
148. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law:  A View from Century’s End, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1999) (“Fina lly, we come to a legal perspective, or a set of legal perspectives, that I shall call
‘contemporary critical theory.’”).
149. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
below is based on materials and formats developed and included in previous budgets.
The Administration intends to reconsider this presentation in the future.142
This language was interpreted as “the opening salvo in a battle to overturn the Congressional
requirement that . . . a [tax expenditure] budget be constructed and published as part of the annual
budget.”143
Nevertheless, the administration’s rhetoric softened considerably in its budget analysis for
fiscal year 2003.  In that analysis, the administration dropped the reference to “so-called” tax
expenditures, and affirmatively stated that “[t]hough imperfect, the tax expenditure budget has
expanded our understanding of policy programs operating through the Federal income tax and, more
generally, the workings of the Federal income tax.”144  The administration further stated its belief that
“the ‘tax expenditure’ presentation can be improved by consideration of alternative or additional tax
bases.”145  The contemplated changes included (i) defining tax expenditures by reference to a
comprehensive income tax base (as opposed to the modified version of such a base used in the Surrey
model and the reference law approach) as well as a consumption tax base and (ii) compiling a list of
tax penalties.146  In its budget analysis for fiscal year 2004, the administration included an appendix
containing an “initial presentation” of these changes.147
III.  DECONSTRUCTION
A.  Tax Expenditure Analysis and Critical Thinking
As a chronological matter, Stanley Surrey began to press the case for adopting tax
expenditure analysis—and achieved significant mainstream acceptance of the concept—before the
emergence of the academic movements that have been grouped together under the rubric
“contemporary critical theory.”148  Surrey began to speak about the tax expenditure concept in the
1960s while he was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,149 and,  by the early
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150. See, e.g., SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform, supra note 22;
Surrey, Tax Incentives, supra note 22; Surrey & Hellmuth, Response to Professor Bittker, supra note 22.
151. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part II.D.
153.  MARTHA CHAMALLAS , INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 35S36, 39 (2d ed. 2003); MINDA,
supra note 18, at 106, 128, 167, 196; Tushnet, Political History , supra note 11, at 1523.
154. Since the 1990s, critical race scholarship has . . . been marked by attention to
diversity among racial minor ity groups.  Breaking out of a white/black discourse,
Latin o, Asian-American, and Native American scholars have begun to articulate
how the effect of white supremacy differs with respect to particular ethnic groups
and to observe the lack of visibi lity of minori ty groups other than African-
Americans.
CHAMALLAS , supra note 153, at 137.
155. See id. at 135S72 (describing post-essentialist femin ism, cri tical race theory (which embraces LatCrit
theory), and gay and lesbian legal studies as “allied intellectual movements”); J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint,
43 STAN. L. REV. 43, 43S44 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES:  A LIBERAL CRITIQUE
(1990)) [hereinafter Balkin, Ideology as Constraint] (describing the failure of the book to discuss feminist legal theory
and crit ical r ace theory as a weakness because they “have thoroughly transformed CLS in the past decade”); Wetlaufer,
supra note 148, at 48 (“Contemporary critical theory includes critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, and critical
race theory.”).  For a description of the early relationship between critical legal studies on th e one hand and feminist
legal theory and critical race theory on the other, see Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.  L.
REV. 435 (1987), and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education
or “The Fem-Crits Go to Law School,” 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988).
156. See MINDA, supra note 18, at  107 (“Commentators have suggested that the intellectual component of
CLS  is difficult to characterize because Crits share only antipathy toward traditional views of law and do not advocate
a common method or approach to legal scholarship.”).
1970s, had already written a book and a spate of articles on the tax expenditure concept.150  Congress
clearly marked the concept’s entry into the mainstream of tax policy thought when it incorporated
tax expenditure analysis into the federal budget process in 1974.151  The lively, on-going debate over
the propriety, contours, and use of tax expenditure analysis—a debate that rages among academics
and non-academics alike—provides evidence of the continued acceptance of the concept as part of
the mainstream of tax policy thought.152
Contemporary critical theory did not, however, emerge until the mid- to late-1970s or
1980s153—after the tax expenditure concept had already achieved mainstream acceptance.  The
community of contemporary crit ical theorists is comprised of scholars engaging in work in the areas
of critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, critical race theory,154 and gay and lesbian legal
studies.155  While it is difficult to generalize about such a diverse group of scholars,156 their body of
work has been described as “seek[ing] to demonstrate the constructedness and the contingency of our
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157. Wetlaufer, supra note 148, at 54; see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 153, at 135 (“Most of the
contemporary scholars in these fields are social constructionists.  Their writings start from the premise that race,
gender, and sexual orientation are shaped by historical, cultural, and ideological forces.”).
158. Wetlaufer, supra note 148, at 54S55 (footnotes omitted); see also MINDA, supra note 18, at 111S12,
116S27; see, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984) (trashing); Tushnet, Essay in
Deconstruction, supra note 11 (deconstruction); Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class:  The Dilemma of Liberal  Reform,
90 YALE L.J. 1880 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980))
(unmasking).
159. Wetlaufer, supra note 148, at 57; see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 153, at 2S3, 4S5, 136, 165S67;
MINDA, supra note 18, at 130S33, 160S61, 172S73; see, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes:  A Critique from the
Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677, 683S89, 696S700 (2000) (using third person narratives); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist
Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 38 (1991) (proposing tha t feminist  legal scholars explain women’s exper iences
to those who are “stranger[s] to those experiences”); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:  A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (on the general value of stories told by outgroups); Infanti, Sodomy
Statute, supra note 3 (using first person narrative); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV.
607 (1994) (on the particular value of stories told by gays and lesbians).
160. See also J. M. Balkin, Deconstruction (1996), at www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/deconessay.pdf
(last visited June 3, 2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Deconstruction] (“Deconstruction has a broader, more popular, and a
narrower, more technical sense.  The latter r efers to a series of techniques for reading texts developed by Jacques
Derrida, Paul de Man, and others; these techniques in turn are connected to a set of phil osophical claims about
language and meaning.  However, as a result of the popularity of these techniques and theories, the verb ‘deconstruct’
is now often used more broadly as a synonym for criticizing or demonstrating the incoherence of a position.”).
settled understandings, including our understandings about the law.”157  Critical theorists go about
demonstrating the constructedness of our understanding of law in a number of ways:
Sometimes this is done by showing that “the belief structures that rule our lives are
not found in nature but are historically contingent.”  Sometimes it is done through
demonstrations of law’s indeterminacy.  And sometimes it is expressly disruptive and
oppositional, taking the form of arguments variously known as critique, debunking,
unmasking, unfreezing, trashing and—a term that has both a technical and a colloquial
meaning—deconstruction.
In all of these ways, proponents of contemporary critical theory seek to
demonstrate the constructedness and the contingency of those settled understandings
that hold in place, or perhaps that simply are, the existing order.   In all these ways
they seek to unmask the operation of power and politics within legal discourse and
to expose the existence and operation of illegitimate structures of domination.158
Additionally, many critical theorists “seek to expose . . . illegitimate structures of domination”
through consciousness-raising and narrative jurisprudence.159
B.  Tax Expenditure Analysis as Deconstructionist Analysis
 Tax expenditure analysis has a decidedly critical—and, more particularly, a
deconstructionist—flavor to it.  As indicated in the passage quoted above, the term “deconstruction”
has multiple meanings in the legal academic literature.160  In its colloquial sense, deconstruction
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161. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 743S44; see also Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, supra
note 155, at 1136 n.19 (“Altman’s use of ‘deconstruction’ corresponds roughly to a popular conception  of
deconstruction as linguistic nihilism coupled with assertions of complete individual freedom in the reading of texts.”);
Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1880 (“use of the term [‘deconstruction’] in its dimension of criticizing legal doctrine should
not be identified as a process of destruction”).
162. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law, 36 B.C. L. REV.
1, 4 (1994); see also Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160 (“Despite Derr ida’s insistence that deconstruction is not
a method, but an activity of reading, deconstruction has tended to employ discernable techniques.”); Balkin, Legal
Career, supra note 18 (“Derrida and his followers have always insisted that deconstruction is not a method, and that
it cannot be reduced to a set of techniques.  But  this asser tion is undermined by their  actual practices of reading and
argument.”); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 745S46 (“Because Derrida and h is followers insist that
deconstruction is not a philosophical posit ion but ra ther a practice, i t is neith er possible nor  desirable to sta te a
deconstructionist creed.”) (footnote omitted)); id. at 786 (“Deconstruction by its very nature is an analytic tool and not
a synthetic one.  It can  displace a h ierarchy momentarily, it can shed light on otherwise hidden dependences of
concepts, but it cannot propose new hierarchies of thought or substitute new foundations.”).  
Whether  deconstruction is a philosophical perspective or a methodology “is hotly contested by deconstruction’s
crit ics in  the legal field (as well as by some of its antifoundationalist proponents in the legal field).”  Curran, supra,
at 19 n.43; see also Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation:  Conflict, Indeterminacy and the
Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1990) (“Any attempt at defining
deconstruction is hazardous at best as there is disagreement over whether  deconst ruction is a method, a technique or
a process based on a particular ontological and ethical vision.”).  For the contrary viewpoint, see, for example, Pierre
Schlag, “Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”  The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1631 (1990) (arguing that deconstruction is neither a technique, a theory, a method, nor a tool).
163. Curran, supra note 162, at 6.
164. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 743; Curran, supra note 162, at 6 n.5.
165. Derrida’s description of his own analysis of one of Pascal’s pensées captures the flavor of the analysis
of the tax expenditure concept in the ensuing text:  “my analysis (or rather . . . my active and anything but non-violent
interpretation).”  Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” in DECONSTRUCTION AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3, 11 (Mary Quaintance trans., Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Derrida,
Force of Law].
166. See supra Part II.C.1.
167. See Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination:  On Adopting a Comparative Approach to
Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1105, 1113 (2002) (“The ensuing debate
signifies “stinging crit icism” and is used as “another expression for ‘trashing,’ that is, showing why
legal doctrines are self-contradictory, ideologically biased, or indeterminate.”161  In its technical sense,
deconstruction refers to “a methodology, an interpret ive tool”162 that “is the brainchild of Jacques
Derrida,”163 a French philosopher.164  As will be borne out by the discussion below, Surrey and
McDaniel’s exposition of the tax expenditure concept bears the hallmarks of deconstruction in both
its colloquial and technical senses.165
1.  Deconstructionist in the Colloquial Sense—To see how tax expenditure analysis can be
characterized as deconstructionist in the colloquial sense, one need only re-read the description of the
absolutist version of the tax expenditure concept found in Part II.C.2 above.  When Surrey and
McDaniel turn from art iculating the tax expenditure concept in the detached intellectual voice used
in the introspective version of the concept,166 they argue in a shriller political voice for the elimination
of nearly all tax preferences as inherently and invariably inimical to one or more of the triad of
concerns (i.e., efficiency, equity, and simplicity) that drive tax policy debate.167  One can aptly
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over how to reform the ailing U.S. international tax regime has largely been shaped by the tradit ional concer ns of
efficiency, fairness, and simplicity.”); SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 4 (“Unfortunately, Surrey, in promoting his  version
of tax expenditure analysis, undermined th is clarifying function by also enlisting the analysis as a weapon in battles
concerning what the government’s distribution policy should look like—in particular, his support for progressivity and
comprehensive income taxation.  Even those who share his distr ibutional views ough t to recognize by now that tax
expenditure analysis cannot be politically effective—even leaving aside the intellectual defensibility of the
enterpr ise—when it is fighting so many battles at once.”); see supra text accompanying notes 94S107 for a discussion
of the potential inefficiencies and inequities of, and th e complexity created by, tax preferences.
168. Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160; Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18; see also Balkin,
Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 744.  For  an histor ical perspective of deconstruct ion and its evolution,  see
Curran, supra note 162, at 5S24.
169. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 8; see also Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 18, at 1671
(“Properly understood and properly used, deconstruction offers theorists a set of techniques and arguments involving
the concepts of similarity and difference.  Because the logic of law is to a large degree the l ogic of similarity and
difference, these issues are of obvious concern to lawyers.”).
170. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2.  For an explanation of why Balkin refers to h is discussion
of Derrida’s ideas as a work of “translation,” see id. at 745S46.  See also Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18 (“To
be adapted to the needs and concerns of the legal academy, deconstruction had to be translated and altered in
significant ways, making it more flexible, practical, and attentive to questions of justice and injustice.”); Balkin, Nested
Oppositions, supra note 18, at 1671 (“[T]he form of deconstructive analysis that I advocate . . . is the type most suitable
for use by legal and political theorists.  It is also .  . . the interpretation that is most charitable to Derrida’s often obscure
texts and that makes the most sense of the type of arguments found within them.”); J. M. Balkin, Transcendental
Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1994) [hereinafter Balkin, Transcendental
Deconstruction] (“When I first began to write about deconstruction and law, I faced the task of translating
deconstruct ive argumen ts in philosophy and l iterature to the concerns of law and justice.  In the pr ocess, I proposed
an understanding of deconstruction  that enabled it  to be employed in a crit ical theory of law.  I fully recognized then
that, in translating the insights of deconstructionists to the study of law, I was also working a transformation—for to
translate is to iterate, and iterability alters.”).
Some argue that, “[a]lthough superficially faithful to the letter of deconstruction, Balkin’s accounts entirely
describe the absolutist passages from Surrey and McDaniel’s works (some of which are reproduced
at the end of Part II.C.2 above) as “stinging criticism” or “trashing” of the tax preferences found in
the Code.
2.  Deconstructionist in the Technical Sense—In the United States, deconstruction in the
technical sense first surfaced in the field of literary criticism, and only later made its way into legal
academic thinking.168  Despite this late arrival, Derrida himself has asserted that deconstruction is
probably more appropriately applied to law than to literature:
If, hypothetically, it had a proper place, which is precisely what cannot be the case,
such a deconstructive “questioning” or meta-questioning would be more at home in
law schools,  perhaps also—this sometimes happens—in theology or architecture
departments, than in philosophy departments and much more than in the literature
departments where it has often been thought to belong.169
In his article Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, J. M. Balkin translated Derrida’s
ideas for consumption by legal academics.170  In that article, Balkin focused on two deconstructive
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miss the spirit of Derrida’s work.”  Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85,
91 (2000); see also Schlag, supra note 162, at 1642S43 (describing Balkin’s view of decon struction “as an excellent
and sophisticated account of the dominan t paradigm of deconstruction practiced within crit ical legal  studies,” but  then
stating that this view “turns deconstruction on its head . . . [m]ore precisely, it sends deconstruction reeling back to
the eighteenth-century metaphysics of the individual and his reason as the origin of truth, morals, etc.”); Pierre Schlag,
The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1695 (1991) (after again citing Balkin’s view when describing the
“typical” depict ion of deconstr uction  in cr itica l legal thought , indicat ing that “[n]ow, of course, this is not Derrida, and
it is not deconstruction”).  What I find most interesting about these critiques of Balkin is that they themselves seem
to betray deconstruction and, more particularly, the idea of the free “play” of the text, which  is discussed infra Part
III.A.2.c.
As Vivian Curran has explained, “[t]he deconstructionist enterprise differs from the structuralist’s in that
deconstruction allows for more than one valid textual interpretation.”  Curran, supra note 162, at 16.  She goes on to
explain that
[w]here structuralism devalorizes the non-textual, deconst ruction valorizes the reader’s contribut ion
qua interpreter in creating the interpretation from the point of departure of the multitude of relations
of significat ion engendered by the text.  Both structuralism and deconstruction eschew authorial
intention; but, where structuralism views relevant context as finite, deconstruction views it as
boundless. Where structuralists believe that their methodology yields the truth of the text,
deconstructionists believe that their analysis yields a meaning which is interpretive in nature. Where
structuralism puts the self outside of the text, deconstruction places the self within it.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 56 (“If I do not answer questions that take
this form, it is only because I am not sure that such a thing as ‘Deconstruction,’ in the singular,  exists or is possible.
It is also because I think that deconstructive discourses as they present themselves in their irreducible plurality
participate in an impure, contaminating, negotiated way in all these filiations . . . of decision and the undecidable.”).
Given the notorious opacity of Derrida’s writing, Curran, supra note 162, at 18 (which you will experience first-hand
in the liberal sprinkling of quotations in the text and notes below), and even  acknowledging th e fact th at decon struction
does not “valorize[] all interpretations,” id. at 22, it seems that Sheehan and Schlag are the ones who have “turn[ed]
deconstruction on its head,” Schlag, supra note 162, at 1643, by claiming that Balkin has misunderstood Derrida and
that their views on deconstruction are the true or faithful interpretations of Derrida’s work.  See id. at 1647S73
(describing deconstruction as “maddening to the uninitiated”—a group in which Schlag apparently does not include
himself—and then  purporting to explain “the ways in  which  the deconstructive enterprise migh t be conducted” in law);
Sheehan, supra, at 92 (“To a surprising extent, the theoretical weaknesses of West’s feminist essentialism resemble
misunderstandings of Derrida’s work at large among ‘deconstructionists’ in the United States.  Part IV of this Article
will attempt to correct some of these misunderstandings, in particular identifying features of J.M. Balkin’s explanatory
work on deconstruction that have obscured its value for feminists . . . .”); id. at 101 n.76 (accusing Balkin of
oversimplifying Derr ida’s notion of “iterability”); id. at 120S27 (describing in detail a number of other ways in which
Sheehan believes that Balkin has misunderstood Derrida).  If iterability truly alters, see Balkin, Deconstructive
Practice, supra note 2, at 780, and texts are pregnant with meaning, Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160, then
neither the author nor  any subsequent interpreter  of a text  can claim to be its master, or, put another way, can claim
to have mastered or to have a monopoly on understanding its true spiri t or meaning.  As Derrida expla ins:
[T]he writer writes in a language and in a logic whose proper system, laws, and life his discourse by
definition  cannot dominate absolutely.  He uses them only by letting himself, after a fashion and up
to a point, be governed by the system.  And the reading must always aim at a certain relationship,
unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not command of the
patterns of the languages tha t he uses.  This rela tionship is not  a certain quantita tive distr ibution of
shadow and light, of weakness or of force, but a signifying structure that critical reading should
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produce.
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 158.  Later  in the same work, he states:
And Rousseau’s text must constantly be considered as a complex and many-leveled structure; in it,
certain propositions may be read as interpretations of other  propositions that we are, up to a certain
point and with certain precautions, free to read otherwise.  Rousseau says A, then for reasons that
we must determine, he interprets A into B.  A, which was a lready an interpr etation,  is reinterpreted
into B.  After taking cognizance of i t, we may, without leaving Rousseau’s text , isolate A from its
interpretation into B, and discover possibilities and resources there that indeed belong to Rousseau’s
text, but were not produced or exploited by him, which, for equally legible motives, he preferred to
cut short by a gesture neither witting nor unwitting.
Id. at 307.
In any event,  for purposes of this article, whether  Balkin, Schlag, or Sheehan is more faithful to Derrida is
irrelevant—what is relevant is that, as indicated by the quotes from Schlag above, Balkin’s view of deconstruction has
been the dominant one in critical legal studies.  See also Sheehan, supra, at 91 (referring to Balkin as “[o]ne of Derrida
and deconstruct ion’s most prolific self-appoin ted spokesmen in law”).   Thus, i f Surrey and McDaniel have employed
the deconstruct ive techniques described by Balkin,  then th ey will have been employing techniques closely associated
with the cri tical  legal studies movement and contemporary cri tical  theory more generally.
171. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 746; see also Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18;
Chibundu, supra note 18, at 1485; Curran, supra note 162, at 16S17, 22, 24.  Balkin illustrates the application of an
additional decon structive practice—etymological analysis—in  J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1626S27 (1990) [hereinafter Balkin, Tradition].  In that article, Balkin
deconstructs Justice Scalia’s and Justice Brennan’s opin ions in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,  491 U.S. 110 (1989), by
exploring the etymological link between the words tradition (which Justice Scalia cites and relies upon in his opinion)
and betrayal (which is what Justice Brennan essen tially accuses Just ice Scalia of doing to prior precedents).  Balkin,
Tradition, supra, at 1619S25.  For an example of an application of this technique in Derrida’s work, see JACQUES
DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEVER:  A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION (Eric Prenowitz trans.,  1995) [hereinafter  DERRIDA, ARCHIVE
FEVER], in which Derrida engages in a deconst ructive analysis of the concept of archiving through an exploration  of
the etymology of the word “archive.”
172. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 746; see also Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165,
at 21 (“Deconstruction is generally practiced in two ways or styles, although it most often grafts one on to the other.
One takes on the demonstrative and apparently ahistorical allure of logico-formal paradoxes.  The other, more
historical or more anamnesic, seems to proceed through readings of texts, meticulous interpretations and
genealogies.”).
practices:  (i) “the inversion of hierarchies” and (ii) “the liberation of the text from the author.”171
Balkin singled out these techniques because he believed that they “have the most relevance to what
legal thinkers do when they analyze legal texts.  They also have the most relevance to the study of
ideology and the social and political theories underlying our legal system.”172
Each of these deconstructive techniques will be discussed separately below.  First, by way of
background, the inversion of hierarchies will be described more fully.  Following the description of
the inversion of hierarchies, Surrey and McDaniel’s (wit ting or unwit ting) use of this technique will
be considered.  Second, and again by way of background, the liberat ion of the text from the author
will be described more fully.  Following the description of the notion of the liberation of the text from
the author, Surrey and McDaniel’s (witting or unwitting) use of this technique will be considered.
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173. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 747 (emphasis of the letters A and B added); see also
Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160.
174. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 747 (emphasis of letters A and B added); see also
Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160.
175. Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18.
176. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 747 (emphasis of letters A and B added).
177. Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18.
178. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 751; see also Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160.
179. See infra notes 302S307 and accompanying text.
a.  Inversion of Hierarchies:  Background—Hierarchical oppositions—the privileging
of one idea over another—are found all around us.  As Balkin explains:
For Derrida, hierarchies of thought  are everywhere.  They can be found in the
following assertions:  A is the rule and B is the exception; A is the general case and
B is the special case; A is simple and B is complex; A is normal and B is abnormal;  A
is self-supporting and B is parasitic upon it; A is present and B is absent; A is
immediately perceived and B is inferred; A is central and B is peripheral; A is true and
B is false; A is natural and B is artificial.  Indeed, my labelling of these ideas as A and
B involves a hierarchical move because the letter A precedes B in the alphabet.173
Deconstruction reverses these hierarchical oppositions and shows that what is true of A is also true
of B—that “A depends upon B as much as B depends upon A.”174  This reversal can be accomplished
in a number of ways.  Normally the privileging of A over B is justified by reasons,
either explicit or implicit.  So the deconstructor can ask whether the reasons why A
is privileged over B actually apply to B as well, or the reasons why B is thought
subordinate to A are actually also true of A.  Alternatively, one can try to show that
A is a special case of B, or that A’s existence or conceptual coherence depends on the
thing it excludes or subordinates, namely, B.175
By temporarily reversing the hierarchy of A and B, deconstruction reveals “A’s privileged status as
an illusion” and enables us “to see things about  both A and B that we had never noticed before.”176
Deconstruction allows us “to rethink the relationship between conceptual opposites and observe
similarities and conceptual dependencies that were previously hidden or submerged.”177  Moreover,
the inversion of hierarchies reminds us that “neither term of the opposition can be originary and
fundamental because both are related to each other in a system of mutual dependences and
differences.  Each is continually calling upon the other for its foundat ion, even as it is constantly
differentiating itself from the other.”178
The purpose of inverting a hierarchical opposition is neither to equate one term in the
opposition with the other nor completely to efface the distinction between the two terms in the
opposition.179  Rather, the purpose is to move us to question why the first term in the opposition is
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180. For there are two heterogenous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier
and the signified:  one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the
signifier, that is to say, ultimately in submitting the sign to thought;  the other, the
one that we are using here against the fir st one,  consists in  putting into question
the system in which the preceding reduction functioned:  first and foremost, the
opposit ion between the sensible and the intellig ible.  For the paradox is that the
metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing.  The
opposition is systematic with the reduction.  And what we are saying here about
the sign can be extended to all th e concepts and all the sentences of metaphysics,
in particular to the discourse on “structure.”
JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE
278, 281 (Alan Bass trans., 1978) [hereinafter DERRIDA, Structure].
181. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 755.
182. In a later article, Balkin re-cast  the deconstructive practice of inver ting hierarchies in terms of
reinterpreting conceptual oppositions as “‘nested oppositions’—that is, oppositions which  also in volve a relation of
dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed concepts.” See Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note
18, at 1671S78.




privileged over the second and then to consider whether that privileging is justified or justifiable.180
As Balkin has explained:
Deconstructive reversals show that the reasons given for privileging one side of an
opposition over the other often turn out to be reasons for privileging the other side.
The virtues of the first term are seen to be the virtues of the second; the vices of the
second are revealed to be true of the first as well. This undoing of justifications for
privileging is part of the deconstruct ionist aim of “ungrounding” preferred
conceptions by showing that they cannot act as self-sufficient or self-explanatory
grounds or foundations.181
 
Because this idea of inverting hierarchical oppositions is likely unfamiliar territory for most
tax academics, I will describe a few examples from Balkin and Derrida to illustrate the technique:
(i).  Example:  Identity/Difference—Balkin illustrates the inversion of hierarchies182
more concretely using, among other examples, the hierarchical opposition between identity and
difference.183  In Western philosophy, identity is considered to be the basic term in this pair, and
difference is considered to be “a derivat ive concept based upon identity:  Two things are different if
they are not identical.”184  However, Balkin asserts that, likewise, two things cannot be identical
unless they can be shown to “be different from something else.”185  Consequently, just as difference
can only be understood by reference to identity, identity can only be understood by reference to
difference.186  By inverting the hierarchy between these two concepts, one can show that the basic
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187. Id.
188. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 748.
189. Id. at 752 (footnote omitted); see also Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse, in JACQUES DERRIDA,
POSITIONS 1, 8 (Alan Bass trans., 1981) [hereinafter POSITIONS] (containing a similar description).
190. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 752.
191. Id.; see also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 46S47.
192. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 752.
[B]eyond and behin d what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, th ere has never
been anything but writing; there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive
significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the “real”
supervening and being added only while taking on meaning from a t race and from an invocation  of
the supplement, etc.  And thus to infinity . . . .
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 159.
But what disposes of it in th is way, we now know, is not  the origin, but that which takes its place;
which is not, moreover, the opposite of an origin.  It is not absence instead of presence, but a t race
which replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by means of which nothing has
begun.
JACQUES DERRIDA, Ellipsis, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 180, at 294, 295.
The presence of an element is always a signifying and substi tutive reference inscribed in a  system
of differences and the movement of a chain. . . .
Turned towards the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin, this str ucturalist
themat ic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, negat ive, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic
term is actually dependent upon the derivative term.187  “In doing so, we show that  what was thought
to be foundational (identity) is itself dependent upon the concept it was privileged over
(difference).”188
Derrida employs the term “différance” to capture this notion that a relationship of mutual
dependence and difference exists between the terms in a hierarchical opposition.  Balkin explains the
term as follows:
Différance is a pun based upon the French word différer, which means both to differ
and to defer.  Derrida replaces an “e” with “a” in différence to make it différance; the
two words sound exactly the same in French.  Différance simultaneously indicates
that (1) the terms of an oppositional hierarchy are differentiated from each other
(which is what determines them); (2) each term in the hierarchy defers the other (in
the sense of making the other term wait for the first  term); and (3) each term in the
hierarchy defers to the other (in the sense of being fundamentally dependent upon the
other).189
Closely associated with the idea of différance is “the idea of ‘trace.’”190  As part of their mutual
differentiation and deferral, “the terms in a hierarchical opposition rely for their coherence on the
differentiation between them”;191 it is thus said that each of the terms bears a “trace” of the other.192
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side of the thinking of play whose other side would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous
affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of
signs without fault , without t ruth,  and without origin  which is offered to an  active interpretation.
This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as the loss of the center.  And it  plays
without security.  For there is a sure play:  that  which is limited to the substitution of given and
existing, present, pieces.  In absolute chance, a ffirmation  also surrenders itsel f to genetic
indeterminat ion, to the seminal adventure of the trace.
DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 180, at 292.
193. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 753.
194. Id.; see also Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva, in POSITIONS, supra note 189,
15, 26 [hereinafter Semiology and Grammatology] (“Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is
anywhere ever simply present or absent.  There are only, everywhere differences and traces of traces.”).
195. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 753.
196. Id. at 752.
197. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2.  “Grammatology” is “the science of writing.”  Id. at 4.
198. Id. at 7S8; see id. at 6S26 (containing a discussion of how a number of phi losophers have privileged
speech over writing); id. at 101S40 (exploring the privileging of speech over writing in CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS,
TRISTES TROPIQUES (1955), in which writing is associated with violence and exploi tation while speech is associated
with innocence, non-violence, and freedom); id. at 141S57 (writing as the “dangerous supplement” for Rousseau).
For example, when one considers the idea of identity, one normally thinks of identity (and identity
alone) as being present in one’s mind.193  But, because of the relationship of différance between
identity and difference, one does not just have the idea of identity present in one’s mind; instead, one
has in mind both identity and difference—in other words, one has in mind identity as opposed to
difference.194  The idea of identity continues to bear the trace of the idea of difference,195 and it  is
“[t]he trace [that] makes deconstruction possible; by identifying the traces of the concepts in each
other, we identify their mutual conceptual dependence.”196
(ii).  Example:  Speech/Writing—To further illustrate how one inverts hierarchical
oppositions, let us consider what  is probably Derrida’s most famous examination of privileging—the
privileging of speech over writing.  In Of Grammatology,197 Derrida discusses how philosophers have
historically privileged speech over writing:
The privilege of the phonè does not depend upon a choice that could have been
avoided.  It responds to a moment of economy (let us say of the “life” of “history” or
of “being as self-relationship”).  The system of “hearing (understanding)-oneself-
speak” through the phonic substance—which presents itself as the nonexterior,
nonmundane, therefore, nonempirical or noncontingent signifier—has necessarily
dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the
idea of the world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from the difference between the
worldly and the non-worldly, the outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality,
universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical, etc.198
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199. In other  words, speech is “present.”  Derr ida later expla ins his project in the following terms:
To make enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words “proximity,” “immediacy,”
“presence” (the proximate [proche], the own [propre], and the pre- of presence), is  my final intent ion
in this book.  This deconstruction of presence accomplishes itself through the deconstruction of
consciousness, and therefore through the i rreducible notion of the trace (Spur), as it appears in both
Nietzschean and Freudian  discourse.
Id. at 70.  Also consider in this regard the following excerpt from Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the
Human Sciences:
This is why one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology, like that of any
eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts
to conceive of structure on the basis of a full pr esence which  is beyond play.
If this is so, the entire history of the concept of structure,  before the rupture of which we are
speaking, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of
determinations of the center.  Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different
forms or names.  The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these
metaphors and metonymies.  Its matrix—if you will pardon me for demonstrating so lit tle an d for
being so elliptica l in order  to come more quickly to my principal theme—is the determination  of
Being as presence in all sense of this word. . . . 
. . . Henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no center, th at the center
could not be thought in the form of a present-being, that the center had no natural site, that it was
not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions
came into play.  This was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the
moment when,  in the absence of a center or or igin,  everything became discourse—provided we can
agree on this word—that is to say, a system in which the centr al signified, the original or
transcendental signified,  is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.   The absence of
the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of signification  infin itely.
DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 180, at 279S80.
As this passage hints, this privileging, or hierarchical opposition, stems from the view that speech is
primary (or closer to the signified)199 and writing is secondary (or farther removed from the signified):
As has been more or less implicitly determined, the essence of the phonè would be
immediately proximate to that which within “thought” as logos relates to “meaning,”
produces it, receives it, speaks it, “composes” it.  If, for Aristotle, for example,
“spoken words (ta en t phon) are the symbols of mental experiences (pathmata tes
psychs) and written words are the symbols of spoken words” . .  . it is because the
voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential and immediate
proximity with the mind.
. . . In every case, the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined
strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as thing.  All signifiers, and first
and foremost the written signifier, are derivat ive with regard to what  would wed the
voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified sense, indeed to the
thing itself . . . .  The written signifier is always technical and representative.  It has
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200. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 11; see also, e.g., id. at 14 (“Thus, within this epoch,
reading and writing, the production or in terpretation of signs, the text  in general as fabric of sign s, allow themselves
to be confined with secondariness.  They are preceded by a truth, or a meaning already constituted by and within the
element of the logos.”); id. at 20 (“There has to be a transcendental signified for the difference between signifier and
signified to be somewhere absolute and irreducible.  It is not by chance that the thought of being, as the thought of this
transcendental signified, is man ifested above all in the voice:  in a language of words [mots].  The voice is heard
(understood)—that undoubtedly is what is called conscience—closest to th e self as the absolute effacement of the
signifier:  pure auto-affection that necessarily has the form of time and which  does not  borrow from outside of itself,
in the world or in ‘reality,’ any accessory signifier , any substance of expression foreign to its own spontaneity.  It is
the unique experience of the signified producing itself spontaneously, from within the self, and nevertheless, as
signified concept, in the element of ideality or universality.”).
201. See id. at 30S44 (contain ing a detailed description  of the ways in which Saussure privileged speech over
writing).  For example, Derrida states:
On the one hand, true to the Western tradition that controls not only in theory but in practice (in the
principle of its practice) the relationsh ips between speech and writing, Saussure does not recognize
in the latter more than a narrow and derivative function.  Narrow because it is nothing but one
modality among others, a modality of the events which  can befall a language whose essence, as the
facts seem to show, can remain forever  uncontaminated by writing.  “Lan guage does have an . . . oral
tradition that is independent of writing” . . . .   Derivative because representative:  signifier of the
first signifier, representation of the self-present voice, of the immediate, natural, and direct
signification of the meaning (of the signified, of the concept, of the ideal object or what have you).
Id. at 30.
202. Derrida’s deconstruction, while ostensibly targeting Saussure’s work, was not aimed only at Saussure:
“When I say this, my quarr y is not primarily Ferdinand de Saussure’s intent ion or motivation, but rather the entire
uncritical tradition which he inherits.”  Id. at 45S46.
203. Id. at 44.
204. Id. at 56S57; see also id. at 70 (“If the trace, arche-phenomenon of ‘memory,’ which must be thought
before the opposition of nature and culture, animality and humanity, etc., belongs to the very movement of
signification, then signification is a priori written, whether inscribed or not, in one form or another, in a ‘sensible’ and
‘spatial’ element that is called ‘exterior.’  Arche-writing, at first the possibility of the spoken word, then of the
‘graphie’ in the narrow sense, the birthplace of ‘usurpation,’ denounced from Plato to Saussure, this trace is the
opening of the first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living to its other and of an inside to an
outside:  spacing.”).
no constitutive meaning.  This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the
“signifier.”200
Derrida also detects this privileging in the work of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.201
Using Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale, Derrida proceeds to deconstruct the speech/writing
hierarchical opposition.202  Derrida deconstructs this privileging by showing that what is true of
speech is also true of writing; he argues that “[t]he thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign . . . must
forbid a radical distinction between the linguistic and the graphic sign.”203  
For Derrida, both speech and writing are forms of signification or “arche-writing”204 that share
this quality of arbitrariness.  According to Saussure, “[w]ithin the ‘natural’ relationship between
phonic signifiers and their signifieds in general, the relationship between each determined signifier
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205. Id. at 44.
206. See DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 52 n.17 (“‘The signs used in writing are arbitrary; there
is no connection, for example, between the letter t and the sound that it designates.’” (quoting FERDINAND DE
SAUSSURE, COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE 165S66 (1916)).
207. Id. at 45; see supra note 206 for an example of this ar bitrariness.
208. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 46.
209. See id. at 52 (“Henceforth , it is not to the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign that I shall appeal dir ectly,
but to what Saussure associates with it as an indispensable correlative and which would seem to me rather to lay the
foundations for it:   the thesis  of difference as the source of linguistic value.”); id. at 65 (“And as it  [the trace] is a
fortiori anterior to the distinction between regions of sensibility, anterior to sound as much as to light, is there a sense
in establishing a ‘natural’ hierarchy between the sound-imprint, for example, and the visual (graphic) imprin t?”).
210. Id. at 50.
211. Id. at 52.
212. Id. at 52S53.
213. Id. at 63.
and its determined signified would be ‘arbitrary.’”205  Thus, for example, there is no necessary
connection between the word “tree” and the thing that it signifies.206  Derrida contends that Saussure
is wrong in characterizing writing as an “image” of spoken language, because the relationship
between spoken language and written language is similarly characterized by arbitrariness:
The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign thus indirectly but irrevocably contests
Saussure’s declared proposition when he chases writing to the outer darkness of
language.  This thesis successfully accounts for a conventional relationship between
the phoneme and the grapheme (in phonetic writing, between the phoneme, signifier-
signified, and the grapheme, pure signifier), but by the same token it forbids the latter
be an “image” of the former.207
Thus, Derrida concludes that “we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech,
not being its ‘image’ or its ‘symbol,’ and more interior to speech, which is already in itself a
writing.”208
Derrida further demonstrates that speech and writing are characterized by différance.209
Drawing from Saussure, Derrida notes that “[f]rom the moment that there is meaning there are
nothing but signs.  We think only in signs.”210  Both speech and writing are thus systems of signs, and
like writing, speech “implies an originary writing”;211 in other words, speech, like writing, is
secondary. 212  
Saussure breaks speech down into  two parts:  “the ‘sound-image’ and the objective sound,”213
a distinction which Derrida describes as follows:
The sound-image is the structure of the appearing of the sound [l‘apparaître du son]
which is anything but the sound appearing [le son apparaissant].  It is the sound-
image that he [Saussure] calls signifier, reserving the name signified not for the thing,
to be sure (it is reduced by the act  and the very ideality of language), but for the
“concept,” undoubtedly an unhappy notion here; let us say for the ideality of the
sense. . . . The sound-image is what is heard; not the sound heard but the being heard
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214. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 63.
215. Id. at 52S53 & n.16.
216. Id. at 65.
217. Id. at 70.
218. Id. at 70S71.
219. Id. at 53 (“By definit ion, difference is never in itself a sensible plenitude.  Therefore, its necessity
contradicts the allegation of a naturally phonic essence of language.  It contests by the same token the professed natural
dependence of the graphic signifier.”).
220. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 69 (“This significat ion is formed only within  the hollow
of differance:   of discontinuity and of discreteness, of the diversion and th e reserve of what does not appear.  This hinge
of the sound.  Being-heard is structurally phenomenal and belongs to an order
radically dissimilar to that of the real sound in the world.214
Building on Saussure’s notion of difference (which posits that what gives each word meaning is not
sound, but the fact that the word can be differentiated from all other words),215 Derrida states that
[t]he unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [l‘apparaître et
l’apparaissant] (between the “world” and “lived experience”) is the condition of all
other differences, of all other traces, and it is already a trace.  This last concept is
thus absolutely and by rights “anterior” to all physiological problematics concerning
the nature of the engramme [the unit of engraving], or metaphysical problematics
concerning the meaning of absolute presence whose trace is thus opened to
deciphering.216
In this way, speech and writing share the trait of “receiv[ing] meaning only in sequences of
differences.”217  As signs, speech and writing can be understood only by reference to the way that they
differ from, and defer to, other signs:
The outside, “spatial” and “objective” exteriority which we believe we know as the
most familiar thing in the world, as familiarity itself, would not appear without the
grammè, without differance as temporalization, without the nonpresence of the other
inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship with death as the
concrete structures of the living present . . . . The subordination of the trace to the full
presence summed up in the logos, the humbling of writing beneath speech dreaming
its plenitude, such are the gestures required by an onto-theology determining the
archeological and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as parousia, as life
without differance:  another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name
holds death in check.218
Accordingly, neither speech nor writ ing can be seen as primary, fundamental, or more present
than the other.219  Derrida thus undermines the privileging of speech over writing by showing that
both are signs, forms of arche-writ ing, that always,  already derive their meaning from the ways in
which they differ from other signs.220
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[brisure] of language as writing, this discontinuity, could have, at a given moment within linguistics, run up against
a rather precious continuist  prejudice.  Renouncing it, phonology must indeed renounce all distinctions between writing
and the spoken word, and thus renounce not itself, phonology, but rather phonologism.”).




225. Id. at 6.
226. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 6.
227. Derrida also borrowed this phrase for use in the title of his essay, which was his keynote address and
contribution to a symposium on Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice.  Symposium, Deconstruction and the
Possibility of Justice, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1989).
228. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 13.
229. Id.
(iii).  Example:  Justified/Unjustified Force—Closer to home, in Force of Law:  The
“Mystical Foundation of Authority,” Derrida inverts the hierarchical opposition in law between
justified and unjustified force.  His deconstruction of this hierarchical opposition begins with an
expression of a fondness for the English idiomatic expression “to enforce the law.”  The French
equivalent of this expression is “appliquer la loi,” which, literally translated, means “to apply the
law.”221  As Derrida correctly notes, the French expression lacks a “direct, literal allusion to . . .
force,”222 whereas the English expression “remind[s] us that law is always a justified force, a force
that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from
elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable.”223  The expression “to enforce the law” further reminds us
that law and force are inextricably linked:  “Applicability, ‘enforceability,’ is not an exterior or
secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a supplement to law.  It is the force essentially
implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of justice as it becomes droit, of the law as
‘droit.’”224  What puzzles Derrida, however,  is how one can distinguish between the justified force
that is privileged in law and unjustified force—“the violence that one always deems unjust”:225
[h]ow are we to distinguish between the force of law of a legitimate power and the
supposedly originary violence that must have established this authority and that could
not itself have been authorized by any anterior legitimacy, so that, in this initial
moment, it is neither legal nor illegal—or, others would quickly say, neither just nor
unjust?226
Later in this essay, Derrida revisits the relationship between justified and unjustified force in
the context of Pascal’s pensées and a related phrase used by Montaigne:227  “fondement mystique de
l’autorité” (“mystical foundation of authority”).  Derrida finds in these pensées and in this phrase “the
basis for a modern critical philosophy, indeed for a critique of juridical ideology” that goes beyond
viewing law as a mere instrument of the “dominant power.”228  Derrida posits “a more internal, more
complex relation” between law and force:229
Justice—in the sense of droit (right or law)—would not simply be put in the service
of a social force or power, for example, an economic, political, ideological power that
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230. Id.
231. Id. at 14.
232. Id.
233. Id.
would exist  outside or before it and which it would have to accommodate or bend to
when useful.  Its very moment of foundation or institution (which in any case is never
a moment inscribed in the homogeneous t issue of a history, since it is ripped apart
with one decision), the operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying
law (droit), making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and
therefore interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no
justice and no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or
contradict or invalidate.230
This is how Derrida interprets what Pascal and Montaigne refer to as the “mystical foundation of
authority.”  This mystical foundation lies in “a silence . . . walled up in the violent structure of the
founding act.  Walled up, walled in because silence is not exterior to language.”231  Derrida continues:
Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t
by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a violence without
ground.  Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of
“illegal.”  They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment.  They exceed
the opposition between founded and unfounded, or between any foundationalism or
anti-foundationalism.  Even if the success of performatives that found law or right (for
example, and this is more than an example, of a state as guarantor of a right)
presupposes earlier conditions and conventions (for example in the national or
international arena), the same “mystical” limit will reappear at the supposed origin of
said conditions, rules or conventions, and at the origin of their dominant
interpretation. 232
Thus, Derrida inverts the hierarchical opposition in the law between justified and unjustified
force by demonstrating through his interpretation of Pascal and Montaigne that justified force is
actually founded on a force that, at the moment of its occurrence, is neither justified nor justifiable:
The structure I am describing here is a structure in which law (droit) is essentially
deconstructible, whether because it is founded, constructed on interpretable and
transformable textual strata (and that is the history of law [droit], its possible and
necessary transformation, sometimes its amelioration), or because its ultimate
foundation is by definition unfounded.233
Having undermined this privileging by showing that justified force depends upon an unjustifiable force
for its very existence, Derrida then pursues these thoughts about justified/unjustified force in the
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234. Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 29S57.
235. See Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 18, at 1672S74 (asserting that “deconstructive claims of
‘neither /nor  and both/and’ do not necessarily involve any abandonment of rationality”);  Derrida, Force of Law, supra
note 165, at 4 (“That is the choice, the ‘either/or,’  ‘yes or no’ that I detect in this title.   To this exten t, the ti tle is rather
violent, polemical, inquisitorial.  We may fear that it contains some instrument of torture—that is, a manner of
interrogation that is not the most just.   Needless to say, from this point on I can offer no response, at least no reassuring
response, to any questions put in this way (‘either/or,’ ‘yes or no’), to either party or to either party’s expectations
formalized in this way.”).
236. See, e.g., Ralph Z. Hallow, GOP Hopes to Paint Dean as the New McGovern, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2003, at A3 (“But Republican strategists say the Bush campaign will seek to portray Mr. Dean as a tax-and-spend
liberal who cannot be trusted on national-security issues.”); Michael Janofsky, The 2004 Campaign; Political Points,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug.  31, 2003, at 26 (“Consider how the Republican National Committee, on its Web site, describes the
would-be presidents:  . . . Bob Graham:  ‘A tax-and-spend liberal in moderate’s clothing.’”); Michael Powell,  Dean
a Tax-and-Spend Liberal?  Hardly; Candidate Stressed Fiscal Discipline in Vermont, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2003, at
A1 (the title says it all).
second half of the essay, where he undertakes a reading of a text by Walter Benjamin entitled Zur
Kritik der Gewalt [Critique of Violence].234
b.  Inversion of Hierarchies:  In Tax Expenditure Analysis— Through tax expenditure
analysis, Surrey and McDaniel have inverted a hierarchical opposition in much the same way that
Balkin and Derrida did in the examples discussed above.  The only difference is the choice of
hierarchical opposition; rather than focusing on identity/difference, speech/writing, or
justified/unjustified force, Surrey and McDaniel focus their attention on perhaps the most  basic
division of government activity:  taxing and spending.  Under this dichotomy, all government activity
is characterized either as related to (i) the collection of revenue or (ii) the disbursement of the revenue
that has been collected.  In common parlance, these two categories of government activity are viewed
as an inextricably linked “either/or”:  either the government is raising revenue through taxes or it is
spending that revenue as directed by our representatives in Congress.  Nevertheless, as we will see,
Surrey and McDaniel help us to  realize through their deconstruction of this dichotomy that taxing and
spending are not necessarily an “either/or”—they can also be a “both/and.”235
This categorization of government activity as either taxing or spending is so pervasive and so
commonly-accepted that it has even come to be used as a metaphor for government itself.  It is quite
common to hear Republicans deride Democrats for being “tax-and-spend” liberals.236  This epithet
is meant to convey the idea that Democrats strive for bigger government—a government with an
insatiable appetite for taxing that is used to fuel spending on an ever-increasing array of social
programs.  President Clinton attempted to distance himself from this image by declaring in his 1996
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237. Alison Mitchell, State of the Union:  The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A1 (“In an election-
year State of the Union Message intended far more for voters than for the Republican -controlled Congress, Mr.  Clin ton
separated himself from Democratic orthodoxy, twice pronouncing that the ‘era of big government is over.’”).
238. Paul Krugman, Support the Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at A21; see also ROBERT D. ATKINSON,
PROGRESS IVE POLICY INST., THE INNOVATION ECONOMY:  A NEW VISION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH IN  THE 21ST
CENTURY 6 (2003) (“Finally, even if the Bush administrat ion were to concede that their permanent tax cuts spur
neither work nor investment, they would still stay the course because of their simplistic view that public sector spending
is a drag on growth.  Tax cuts that ‘starve the beast,’ they believe, transfer money to the more productive private sector.
To be sure, there is waste in governmen t that should be cut, yet some of the most egregious examples of it are the
corporate subsidies that this administr ation has so vigorously defended.”); ED KILGORE, STARVING THE BEAST, 2003
BLUEPRINT NO. 3, available at http://www.ndol.org/blueprint/archive.html (last visited June 3, 2004) (“But one of the
leading strategists behind Bush’s secret war on government is more than happy to tell the world all about it.  His name
is Grover Norquist, and he is the nation’s leading advocate of ‘kill the taxes and you kill the government.’”).
239. Paul Krugman, The Tax-Cut Con, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, § 6, at 54; see also Jay A. Soled,
Refinancing America:  The Republican Antitax Agenda, 101 TAX NOTES 1235 (2003) (reviewing SHELDON D.
POLLACK, REFINANCIN G AMERICA:  THE REPUBLICAN ANTITAX AGENDA (2003)) (“However, behind closed doors,
some Republicans acknowledge that the party’s intent is to starve the beast—the federal government—ultimately
fostering a reduction of its size.”).
State of the Union message—not once, but twice—that the “era of big government is over.”237  And
this metaphor is used not only to tarnish Democrats; recently, it has also been used to explain the
Bush Administration’s overarching fiscal strategy.  As Paul Krugman explains, 
many analysts now acknowledge that  the [Bush] administrat ion never had any
intention of pursuing a conventionally responsible fiscal policy.  Rather, its tax cuts
were always intended as a way of implementing the radical strategy known as ‘starve
the beast,’ which views budget deficits as a good thing, a way to squeeze government
spending.238  
The metaphor is seen more directly in the following, rather colorful passage from a longer piece by
Krugman on the recent spate of tax cuts enacted by the federal government:
The other camp in the tax-cut crusade actually welcomes the revenue losses from tax
cuts.  Its most visible spokesman today is Grover Norquist,  president of Americans
for Tax Reform, who once told National Public Radio: “I don’t want to abolish
government. I simply want to reduce it to  the size where I can drag it into the
bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.”  And the way to get it down to that size is to
starve it of revenue.  “The goal is reducing the size and scope of government by
draining its lifeblood,” Norquist told U.S. News & World Report.239
(i).  The Privileging of Taxing over Spending in the Code—As a text, the Code is a
primary constituent part of this dichotomous metaphor because it purports to set forth the rules for
imposing, calculating, and collecting the taxes that provide the revenue upon which the government
(or beast, depending upon your perspective) counts for its survival.  References to taxing thus quite
naturally abound in the Code; in fact, a search for the word “tax” and its derivatives (e.g., taxing,
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240. I searched for occurrences of some form of the word “tax” by first downloading title 26 of the U.S. Code
in its entirety from the website of the Office of Law Revision  Counsel of the U.S. House of Representatives.  OFFICE
OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DOWNLOAD THE UNITED STATES CODE, at
http://uscode.house.gov/download.htm (last visited June 3, 2004).  I then  unzipped and opened the downloaded file
in WordPerfect. I selected “Find and Replace” from th e drop-down menus, and had WordPerfect search for and replace
all occurrences of “tax,” whether occurring as a whole word or as part of a word.  Upon completion of this task,
WordPerfect indicated that it had replaced 44,399 occurrences of “tax.”
241. Curran, supra note 162, at 16 (“The deconstruction ist technique is simi lar.  It  involves intense scrutiny
of all textual elements, including a study of textual presences by the evocation of textual absences.  It also involves the
derivation  of meaning through  the opposition  of textual componen ts to non-textual equivalents which the actual text
displaced and whose presen ce is evoked through their  differentiation  from the signs selected by the author for textual
presence.” (footnote omitted)); see also Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160 (“Deconstructive analyses look for what
is deemphasized, overlooked, or suppressed in a particular way of thinking or in a particular set of legal doctrines.
Sometimes they explore how suppressed or  marginalized principles retur n in new guises.”); Balkin, Transcendental
Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1134 (“Of course, from a deconstructionist’s standpoint,  what might  be most
interesting about this list are the articles that Derr ida did not choose to mention.”).
As Derrida has explained:
This design seems to us to be represented in the handl ing of the concept of the supplement.
Rousseau cannot utilize it at the same time in all the virtualities of its meaning.  The way in which
he determines the concept and, in so doing, lets himself be determined by that very thing that he
excludes from it, the direction in which he bends it, here as addition, there as substitute, now as the
positivity and exteriority of evil, now as a happy auxiliary, all this conveys neither a passivi ty nor
an activity, neither an unconsciousness nor a lucidity on the part of the author.  Reading should not
only abandon these categories—which are also, let us r ecall  in passing, the founding categories of
metaphysics—but sh ould pr oduce the law of this relationship to the concept of the supplement.  It
it [sic] certainly a production, because I do not simply duplicate what Rousseau thought of this
relationship.  The concept of the supplement is a sort of blind spot in Rousseau’s text, the not-seen
that opens and limits visibility. . . . And what we call production is necessarily a text, the system of
a writing and of a reading which we know is ordered around its own blind spot.  We know this a
priori, but only now and with a knowledge that is not a knowledge at all.
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 163S64.
242. For a description of the procedure that I used to identify all of the occurrences of the word “spend” and
its derivatives, see supra note 240.
243. See SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 3 (“One key reason for the value of tax expenditure analysis as an
exercise . . . is that it addresses the confusion in public policy debate that may occur when proponents of placing
particular allocative rules in the tax system exploit the common tendency to define ‘taxes’ and ‘spending’ entirely
taxable, and taxpayer) in title 26 of the U.S. Code returned over 44,000 occurrences.240  But, like so
many other deconstructionists, Surrey and McDaniel have found most interesting not what is present
in the Code, but what is absent from it.241  In contrast to the ubiquitous references to taxing,
references to spending—the other half of the dichotomy—are nearly non-existent in the Code.  A
search for the word “spend” and its derivatives (e.g., spendable, spending, and spent) in title 26
returned only a scant 63 occurrences.242
Through their work on tax expenditure analysis, Surrey and McDaniel have identified and
deconstructed the hierarchical opposition between this textual presence (i.e., taxing) and textual
absence (i.e., spending).  In the Code, the first term of this hierarchical opposition is privileged over
the second.243  Indeed, this privileging is immediately apparent in the unabbreviated title of the Code:
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formally, and yet to treat the categories as genuinely meaningful.”).
244. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986) (“The Internal Revenue
Title enacted August 16, 1954, as heretofore, hereby, or hereafter amended, may be cited as the ‘Internal Revenue Code
of 1986.’”).
245. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
246. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
247. See, e.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 65S68; Surrey & McDaniel,
Budget Reform Act, supra note 21, at 711S13; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 335S36; Surrey
& McDaniel, Identify and Control, supra note 22, at 616.
248. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108th CONG., R. X(1)(s) (2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/rules/108rules.pdf (last visited June 3, 2004).
249. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ABOUT THE COMMITTEE:  GENERAL
INFORMATION, at http://appropria tions.house.gov/ (last visited June 3, 2004).
250. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108th CONG., R. X(1)(b) (2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/rules/108rules.pdf (last visited June 3, 2004).
251. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXV(1)(i) (2000), available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt (last visited June 3, 2004).
252. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE HISTORY:  CREATION OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, at http://appropriations.senate.gov/commhistory/commhistory.htm (last visited June
3, 2004).
253. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXV(1)(b) (2000), available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt (last visited June 3, 2004).
“The Internal Revenue Code.”244  The roots of this privileging can be detected in the Constitution.
In a single clause (and a single thought), the Constitution confers upon the Congress the “Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”245   In this clause, mention of the power to tax
precedes mention of the power to spend—likely because the power to spend is generally perceived
to be derivative of the power to tax.
Moreover, despite linking the power to tax and the power to spend when granting them to
Congress, the Constitution elsewhere singles out exercises of the power to tax and imposes a unique
procedural requirement on them:  “All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”246
Congress is therefore required to treat bills for raising revenue differently from all other bills,
including, of course, spending bills.  In practice, and much to the consternation of Surrey and
McDaniel,247 revenue-raising and spending measures are considered by separate congressional
committees.  In the House of Representatives, primary jurisdiction over revenue-raising bills is
delegated to the Committee on Ways and Means,248 and, since 1865,249 primary jurisdiction over
spending bills has been delegated to the Committee on Appropriations.250  In the Senate, primary
jurisdiction over revenue-raising bills is delegated to the Committee on Finance,251 and, since 1867,252
primary jurisdiction over spending bills has been delegated to the Committee on Appropriations.253
(ii).  Inverting the Taxing/Spending Hierarchical Opposition—Surrey and McDaniel
have quite adeptly inverted this hierarchy, which is embedded both in the text of the Code and in the
process of creating that text.  They explore how provisions couched in tax terminology—that purport
to do no more than adjust a taxpayer’s tax liability—are really not tax provisions at all.  These “tax
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254. SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 3; see also Surrey & McDaniel, Budget
Reform Act, supra note 21, at 680; Surrey & McDaniel, Emerging Issues, supra note 22, at 228.
255.  FY 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 147, at 103S05, tbl. 6-1 (listing more than 130 tax
expenditures and their revenue effects); Heidi Glenn, JCT Tax Expenditure List Gets Longer, 102 TAX NOTES 21, 21
(2004) (indicating that Congress added “a number of new tax expenditures” in 2003, listing the five biggest tax
expenditures reported by the Joint Committee on Taxation, and noting that, from 2004 through 2008, the revenue loss
from the latter five tax expenditures ranged from $202.6 billion for the exclusion of capital gains at death to $602.7
billion for the exclusion of employer contributions for health care, health insurance premiums, and long-term care
insurance premiums).
256. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, supra note 18, at 1676.
257. The following is a passage from Derrida on the deconstructibility of such lines that nicely illustrates the
point:
This righ t imposes or supposes a bundle of limits which have a history, a deconstructable history,
and to the deconstruction  of which  psychoanalysis has not been foreign, to say the least.  This
deconstruction in progress concerns, as always, the institution of limits declared to be
insurmountable, whether  they involve family or sta te law, the relations between the secret  and the
nonsecret, or, and this is not the same thing,  between the private and th e public, whether they
involve property or access rights, publ ication or r eproduction  righ ts, whether  they involve
classi fication and putting into order:  What comes under  theory or under pr ivate correspondence,
for example?  What comes under system?  under biogr aphy or autobiography?  under personal or
intellectual anamn esis?  In works said to be theoretical, what is worthy of this name and what is not?
Should one rely on what Freud says about this to classify his works?  Should one for example take
him at his word when he presents his Moses as a “historical novel”?  In each of these cases, the
limits, the borders, and the distinctions ha ve been shaken by an earthquake from which no
classificational concept and no implementation of the arch ive can be shelter ed.  Order  is no longer
assured.
DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEVER, supra note 171, at 4S5 (footnote omitted).
preferences” are, in reality, no more than disguised spending provisions.  Under tax expenditure
analysis, tax preferences do not determine how much revenue is to be raised from each taxpayer.
Instead, tax preferences are no more than a shortcut—a netting of the revenue that otherwise would
have been raised from certain taxpayers against the amount that the government otherwise would
have spent on transfers back to them.
Thus, through tax expenditure analysis, Surrey and McDaniel demonstrate that the Code,
which privileges taxing over spending, actually contains a number of provisions that are the equivalent
of “government spending for favored activities or groups, effected through the tax system rather than
through direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.”254  In other words, they show
that what is true of spending provisions is also true of this significant (and growing) group255 of
nominally taxing provisions.  Surrey and McDaniel “reveal similarities where before we saw only
differences,” and allow us “to observe simultaneously the similarity and difference, the dependence
and differentiation, involved in [the] relation between [the] concepts” of taxing and spending.256
By inverting this hierarchy through tax expenditure analysis, Surrey and McDaniel have
revealed the constructedness of the distinction between taxing and spending.  They demonstrate the
arbitrariness of drawing the line between taxing and spending at the borders of title 26 of the U.S.
Code.257  Surrey and McDaniel engage in this deconstructive exercise because they feel that the line
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258. As Curran and Balkin have both explained, the application of deconstructive techniques to a text  is not
a random occurrence.  Curran states that
Derrida has made clear that deconstruction is applied in response to textual components:
“[Deconstruction is an] incision, precisely [because] it can  be made only according to lines of force
and forces of rupture th at are localizable in  the discourse t o be deconstructed.”  Moreover, in his
keynote speech at the 1990 “Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice” colloquium at Cardozo
Law School, Derrida again made clear that the deconstructionist exploration of meaning through
hierarchy reversal is not imposed randomly, but, rather, on those word combinations whose
juxtapositions draw the attention of the deconstructionist to the likelihood of rich interpretive
possibilities.
Curran, supra note 162, at 21 (quoting Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, in
POSITIONS, supra note 189, at 37, 41) (citation omitted).  Balkin agrees that “[w]e deconstruct  a particular  text because
we think that the text has a particular form of richness that speaks to us, either for good or for ill,” and, in considering
why one deconstructs Pla to or Saussure but not a laundry list  or the back of a cereal box, he furth er asserts  that “in  each
case, one deconstructs because one has a particular ax to grind, whether  it be a philosophical, ideological,  moral, or
political ax.” Balkin, Tradition, supra note 171, at 1626S27; see also J. M. Balkin, Being Just with Deconstruction,
3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 393, 399 (1994) [hereinafter Balkin, Being Just] (“So the target of deconstruction, and the way
that the par ticular  deconstruct ive argumen t is wielded, may vary with the moral and political commitments of the
deconstructor.”); Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1138 (“I shall argue that Derrida’s
encounter  with justice really shows that  deconstruct ive argumen t is a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different
purposes depending upon the moral and political commitments of the deconstructor.”); J. M. Balkin, Understanding
Legal Understanding:  The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105, 124S27 & n.34
(1993) (“One could engage in deconstruction of a legal text  without the desire to offer a normative a lternative, or
without a belief that the difficulties one found in the text were due to failures of substantive rationa lity . . . .  However,
the deconstruction  pract iced by legal cr itics is a lmost always rational deconstruction, because it seeks to criticize law
on the basis of some proposed normative alternative.” (citation omitted)).
Derrida has spoken to this issue as well:  “Taking a position in philosophy: nothing ‘shocks’ me less,  of
course.  Why engage in a work of deconstruction , rather than  leave things the way they are,  etc.?  Nothing here,
without a ‘show of force’ somewhere.  Deconstruction, I have insisted is not neutral.  It intervenes.”  Positions:
Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta, in POSITIONS, supra note 189, a t 37, 93 [hereinafter
Positions]; see also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 161S64 (explaining his “exorbitant” choice of certain
of Rousseau’s texts for deconstruction).  Thus, it should not come as a surprise that Surrey was motivated to employ
deconstructionist techniques “as a weapon of political combat” in an effort to realize a “broadening [of] the base of the
income tax so that high-income taxpayers would pay more, [which] had long been a personal cause of his.”  SHAVIRO,
supra note 21, at 26; see also id. at 4 (“Surrey, in promoting his version of tax expenditure analysis, undermined this
clarifying function by also enli sting the analysis as a weapon  in battles concerning what the government’s distribution
policy should look like—in particular, his support for progressivity and comprehensive income taxation.”); see also
JULIAN E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA:  WILBUR D. MILLS, CONGRESS, AND THE STATE, 1945S1975, at 309 (1998)
(“Ul timately, policymakers such as Mills and Surrey argued that  tax r eform was design ed to maintain a  modified
progressive tax structure that contained some economically efficient and politically necessary deductions, exemptions,
and exceptions.”).
259. See supra note 76.
between taxing and spending is more fruitfully drawn within the Code—at the point where the
normative income tax ends and tax preferences and penalties begin.258  Their purpose in this endeavor
is to ensure that policymakers reach educated decisions about how to implement government
expenditure programs.259  They argue that policymakers should consider both the positive differences
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260. See supra Part II.B, SC.1.
261. See supra Part II.C.1.
262. Noel Sargent, Bills for Raising Revenue Under the Federal and State Constitutions, 4 MINN. L. REV.
330, 345S49 (1920);  Thomas L.  Jipping, Comment, TEFRA and the Origination Clause:  Taking the Oath Seriously,
35 BUFF. L. REV. 633, 663, 665 (1986).  The House of Representatives nonetheless claims the right to originate general
appropriations bills.  CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. DOC. NO. 108-93, at 3 (2003).  The
Senate has, however, expressed its disagreement with this claim.  3 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661, at ch. 13, § 20.1 (1977) (describing Senate Resolution
414, passed in 1962, which  asserts the Senate’s power to originate appropriations bills); FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN
S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE:  PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at 153S54 (1992)
(indicating the Senate’s contrary viewpoint, and citing an 1881 House of Representatives report acknowledging the
ability of the Senate to originate appropriations measures).
263. John L. Hoffer, Jr., The Origination Clause and Tax Legislation, 2 B.U.  J. TAX L. 1, 2S11 (1984); J.
Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution:  A Comparative Survey, 23 TULSA L.J. 165,
170S72 (1987); Sargent, supra note 262, at 331S34; Jipping, supra note 262, at 648S62; Jonathan Rosenberg,
Comment, The Origination Clause, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the Role of the
Judiciary , 78 NW. U. L. REV. 419, 421S31(1983).
264. Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 421; see also Sargent, supra note 262, at 334S36.
265. Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 422.
266. Id. at 425; Hoffer, supra note 263, at 7S8, 16; Medina, supra note 263, at 170; Sargent, supra note 262,
at 331; Jipping, supra note 262, at 648, 654S55.
(e.g., the palatability of tax expenditures and the ability to take advantage of an existing administrat ive
framework)  and the negative differences (e.g., the upside-down distribution of deductions and
exclusions, the exclusion of non-taxpayers, and the involvement of the Department of the Treasury
in areas outside of its substantive expert ise) between tax expenditures and direct expenditures before
sett ling on a means for implementing a given program. 260  Furthermore, in tough economic times,
Surrey and McDaniel wish to ensure that policymakers interested in controlling government spending
take into account both direct spending and spending that is indirectly accomplished through the Code
when considering where cuts should be made.261
The constructedness of the taxing/spending hierarchical opposition is only underscored by its
historical origins.  As ment ioned earlier, the privileging of taxing over spending is found not only in
the Code, but also in the process prescribed by the Constitution for its enactment.  At the 1787
Constitutional Convention, the originat ion clause, which requires all revenue raising bills—and only
revenue raising bills262—to originate in the House of Representatives, played an important role in
shaping the allocation of power between the House of Representatives and the Senate.263  The
American colonies had borrowed this practice of originating revenue raising and appropriation bills
in the popular house of the legislature from England, where the practice dates back to the fourteenth
century.264  Accordingly, prior to the Constitutional Convention, “the origination of money bills in
the popular house had [already] become firmly entrenched both in [American] custom and in written
law as the proper enactment procedure.”265 
During the Constitutional Convention, the power to originate revenue raising and
appropriation measures was first granted to the House of Representatives in exchange for equal
representation in the Senate as part of the Great  Compromise on representation. 266  At this stage of
the debate, the origination clause did not permit the Senate to alter or amend revenue raising or
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267. Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 425 & n.37.
268. Medina, supra note 263, at 171; see also Hoffer, supra note 263, at 9S11, 16; Jipping, supra note 262,
at 648S49; Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 428, 429.
269. Rosenberg, supra note 263, at 423, 426S27; see also Hoffer, supra note 263, at 21; Sargent, supra note
262, at 336; Jipping, supra note 262, at 649, 655, 661.  The House of Representatives was thought to be more
accountable to the people because,  at the time of the Constitutional Convent ion, it was the only branch of Congress
directly elected by the people, it had a larger number of members, and its members had shorter terms.  Rosenberg,
supra note 263, at 423 n.27.
270. Medina, supra note 263, at 171.
271. Id. at 172 & n.28; Hoffer, supra note 263, at 11; Sargent, supra note 262, at 349; Rosenberg, supra note
263, at 429S30.
272. Medina, supra note 263, at 167 (tracing narrow construction of the origination  clause back to Justice
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, published in 1833); id. at 225 (remarking how “the
United States and its constituent states are unique [among countr ies that der ive their constitutional foundations from
Great Britain] in their restrictive and grudging construction of the revenue (supply) power embodied in the or igination
clause”).
273. Id. at 167; see also United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 495 U.S.
385 (1990) (indicat ing that “diminished con cern about the Senate’s lack of accountability has largely undermined the
clause’s rationale”); Sargent, supra note 262, at 352.
274. Medina, supra note 263, at 170.
275. Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW.
3, 6 (1987); see also 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS
¶ 1.2.2 at 1-14 n.5 (3rd ed. 1999) (“The Senate, however, appears not to be meaningfully restrained by this limitation
[i.e., the origination clause].”).
276. Now what can the “efficacity” of all this work, all this deconst ructive practice, be
on the “contemporary ideological scene”? . . . [W]hat is perhaps in the process of
being reconsidered, is the form of closure that was called “ideology” (doubtless a
concept to be analyzed in its function, i ts history, its origins, its transformations),
the form of the relationships between a transformed concept of “infrastructure,”
appropriation bills.267  The final version of the origination clause was, however, restricted to revenue
raising bills and permitted Senate amendment of those bills, these changes having “served as a trade-
off for the exclusive powers granted to the Senate:   the treaty and appointment confirmation
powers.”268  
The purpose of the origination clause appears to have been to repose the power to set the
legislative agenda in the branch of the legislature that would be most accountable to the people.269
Yet, “even during the period of the Constitution’s drafting and ratification, the value of the origination
clause was subject to question.”270  Some viewed the concession of the power of amendment to the
Senate as rendering the origination clause “virtually meaningless,” because the power to amend is, in
essence, the power to originate (i.e., the Senate could simply strike out every word of a bill except
“whereas” and substitute its own bill as an amendment).271
Two centuries of experience have proved these skeptics to be correct.  The origination clause
has been narrowly construed.272  In addition, contemporary commentators have described it as “an
historical anachronism,”273 “a constitutional backwater,”274 and “wholly without practical
consequences.”275  Thus, by identifying and deconstructing the Code’s privileging of taxing over
spending, Surrey and McDaniel have drawn our attention to the historical origins of this hierarchical
opposition and have helped to unmask its rather vacuous ideological underpinnings.276
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if you will—an “infrast ructure” of which the general text would no longer be an
effect or a reflection—and the transformed concept of “ideology.”  If what is in
question in  this work is a new defini tion of the relationship of a determined text
or signifying chain to its exterior, to its referential effects, etc. . . ., to “real ity”
(history, class struggle, relat ionships of production,  etc.), then we can no longer
restrict ourselves to prior  delimitat ions,  nor even to the pr ior concept of a regional
delimitation.  What is produced in the current trembling is a reevaluation of the
relationship between the general text and what was believed to be, in the form of
reality (history, politics, economics,  sexual ity, etc.), the simple, r eferable exter ior
of language or writing, the belief that this exterior could operate from the simple
position of cause or accident.  What are apparently simply “regional” effects of
this trembling, therefore, at the same time have a nonregional opening, destroying
their own limits and tending to articulate themselves with the general scene, but
in new modes, without any preten tion to mastery.
Positions, supra note 258, at 90S91; see also Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 744, 761S64 (discussing
how “deconstructive techniques can show how doctrinal arguments are informed by and disguise ideological
thinking”).
277. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1141 (“Transcendental deconstruction has
a goal;  its goal is not destruction  but rectification .  The deconstructor critiques for the purpose of betterment; she seeks
out unjust or inappropriate conceptual hierar chies in order to assert  a better order ing.  Hence,  her argument is always
premised on the possibility of an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but also more just, even if
the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to further deconstruction.”); see also id. at 1174 (asserting
that the purpose of deconstruction is reconstruction—otherwise “there is no point in deconstructing in the first place”);
Balkin, Being Just , supra note 258, at 393 (“I claim that decon structive analyses can be of no use to the pursuit of
justice unless deconstructive arguments assume the existence of an alternative which is more just than the one being
deconstructed, even if this alternative is subject to further deconstruction.”).
278. I would note that Surrey and McDaniel do, however, contemplate that where a given provision falls with
respect to this line may change over time, thereby necessitating the continual reassessment of the role th at each
provision plays in the tax system.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Part III.B.2.a.(i).
280. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 751; see also Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160.
(iii).  Serial Deconstruction:  Enter the Critics—The only quarrel that I have with
Surrey and McDaniel’s deconstruction of this hierarchical opposition is that it does not go nearly far
enough.  As ment ioned above, Surrey and McDaniel deconstructed the privileging of taxing over
spending because they believed that the operation of the government could be improved by
recognizing the general equivalence of tax expenditure and direct expenditure programs.277  But,
despite their good intentions, all that Surrey and McDaniel have done is to replace the current line
between taxing and spending (i.e., the boundaries of title 26 of the U.S. Code) with another line (i.e.,
the boundaries of the normative income tax) that they considered to be foundational in nature.278  In
developing tax expenditure analysis, Surrey and McDaniel lost sight of the lesson from Balkin’s
inversion of the identity/difference hierarchical opposition described above:279  neither of the terms in
a hierarchical opposition can be considered originary or foundat ional in nature “because both are
related to each other in a system of mutual dependences and differences.   Each is continually calling
upon the other for its foundation, even as it is constantly differentiating itself from the other.”280  As
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281. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 1179 (“A deconstruction of an opposition, however,
cannot by itself establish a new hierarchy in place of an old one, because the new hierarchy also could be
deconstructed.”); Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1178S79 (“Yet the decision to stop and
assess the conclusions of one’s argument, to state them as conclusions . . . leaves unspoken the many further steps that
could be taken.  These additional steps could lead to a partial or even a complete transformation of the conclusions just
arrived at.  Thus, from another perspective, the conclusion of a deconstructive argument is a conclusion in neither sense
of the word:  for it does not end the possible lines of deconstructive argument, nor does it lead to a fixed and
determinate result.”); Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 14 (“One can always turn what I am doing or saying
here back onto—or against—the very thing that I am saying is happening thus at the origin of every institution.”). 
As Derrida has explained:
What interested me then, that I am attempting to pursue along other lines now, was, at the
same time as a “general economy,” a kind of general strategy of deconstruction.  The latter is to
avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing within the
closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming it.
Therefore we must proceed using a double gesture, according to a  unity that  is both
systematic and in and of itself divided, a double writing, that is a writing that is in and of itself
multiple, what I called, in “La double séance,” a double science.  On the one hand, we must traverse
a phase of overturning.  To do justice to this necessity is to recognize that in a classical philosophical
opposit ion we are not dealing with  the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent
hierarchy.  One of the two terms governs the other  (axiological ly, logically, etc.) , or has the upper
hand.  To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment.  To
overlook this phase of overturn ing is to forget the conflictual  and subordinating structure of
opposition.  Therefore one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that in practice would leave
the previous field untouched, leaving one no hold on the previous opposi tion, thereby preventing any
means of intervening in the field effectively.  We know what always have been the practical
(particularly political) effects of immediately jumping beyond oppositions, and of protests in the
simple form of neither this nor that.  When I say that this phase is necessary, the word phase is
perhaps not the most rigorous one.  It is not a question of a chronological phase, a given moment,
or a page that one day simply will be turned, in order to go on to other things.  The necessity of this
phase is structural; it is the necessity of an interminable analysis: the hierarchy of dual oppositions
always reestabl ishes itself.  Unlike those authors whose death does not wait their  demise, the time
for overturning is never a dead letter.
Positions, supra note 258, at 41S42 (footnotes omitted).
282. For other examples, see the works cited by Bartlett, supra note 118, at 416S17 nn.26S37.
283. Andrews, supra note 49, at 312; see also id. at 314S15.
a result, all that Surrey and McDaniel have accomplished is to replace the old hierarchy with a new
hierarchy that can likewise be deconstructed.281
In fact , certain of Surrey and McDaniel’s critics seem to have recognized this, as they have
picked up where Surrey and McDaniel left off and have essentially deconstructed this new hierarchy.
For example, William Andrews and Jeffrey Kahn have both argued that items that fall on the spending
side of Surrey and McDaniel’s line are more akin to, and more appropriately classified as, items that
fall on the taxing side of the line.282  Andrews has argued that the deductions for charitable
contributions and medical expenses are “refinement[s] in our notion of an ideal personal income tax,
rather than . . . departure[s] from it.”283    He concludes that “there are substantial arguments in favor
of both these personal deduction provisions that are intrinsic arguments of tax policy germane to the
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284. Id. at 315.
285. Kahn, supra note 118, at 2.
286. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 21.
287. Id. at 21S23.
288. Id. at 22S23.
289. Id.
290. See supra Part II.A.
291. Andrews, supra note 49, at 334.
292. Id.
293. Id.
basic question of how to achieve a fair distribution of personal tax burdens.”284  Kahn has gone further
and has argued (on grounds independent from those offered by Andrews) that the deductions for
charitable contributions, medical expenses, theft and casualty losses, and home mortgage interest all
“conform to progressive income tax principles and therefore cannot properly by [sic] characterized
as governmental expenditures.”285  
To be more specific, consider the deduction for extraordinary medical expenses, which has
been discussed by all three of Surrey, Andrews, and Kahn.  Surrey contends that this deduction is
appropriately classified as a tax preference because most economists would agree that it is not part of
the “generally accepted definition of income”286 on the ground that it represents no more than one of
the ways in which income can be consumed.287   In Surrey’s view, burdensome medical expenses are
not a problem because they adversely impact  an individual’s ability to pay income tax; they are a
problem because they adversely affect an individual’s ability to pay for medical care that she needs.288
Phrased in this way, Surrey saw the problem as one that should be addressed by an appropriately-
designed government health insurance program,289 and Surrey considered the medical expense
deduction to be no more than a poor substitute for such a program.290
Andrews, however, disagrees with Surrey’s classification of the medical expense deduction as
a tax preference.  Andrews articulates two distinct reasons to justify his assertion that medical
expenses are appropriately taken into account when calculating income.  Andrews first maintains that,
because “treatment only puts the taxpayer back where others are who have suffered no injury,” the
taxpayer has “no taxable gain when he suffers an injury and receives treatment.”291   In support of this
assert ion, Andrews points out  that this theory explains why the government has not classified the §
104 exclusion for medical expenses reimbursed by a tortfeasor as a tax expenditure.292  Andrews then
argues that
[i]f we are willing to say that one has had no taxable gain when he suffers an injury and
then receives treatment, we should say it in every case, whatever the source of
payment for the treatment—whether or not the tortfeasor pays, whether or not there
is a tortfeasor, indeed whether the taxpayer’s malady is a traumatic injury or an organic
disease.293
Andrews’ second justification for taking medical expenses into account when calculating
income is premised on the idea that the tax base is intended “to provide an index of relative material
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294. Id. at 335.
295. Id.
296. Andrews, supra note 49, at 335.
297. Kahn, supra note 118, at 27.
298. Id. at 28.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 29.
301. “The ‘sufferance’ of deconstruction, what makes it suffer and what makes those it torments suffer, is
perhaps the absence of rules, of norms, and definitive criteria that would allow one to distinguish unequivocally
between droit and justice.”  Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, at 4.
302. See, e.g., DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 88S89 (“The distinction between phonetic and
nonphonetic writing, although completely indispensable and legitimate, remains very derivative with regard to what
may be called a synergy and a fundamental synesthesia. . . . ‘Phonetic’ and ‘nonphonetic’ are therefore never pure
qualities of certain systems of writ ing, they are the abst ract  character istics of typical elements, more or less numerous
and dominant within all systems of signification in general.”); id. at 120 (“the colloquial difference between language
and writing, the rigorous exteriority of one with respect to the other, is admitted”); DERRIDA, Structure, supra note
well-being on the basis of which to distribute tax burdens.”294  Andrews contends that “differences in
health affect relative material well-being.”295  Andrews admits that
[i]t would be impractical to t ry to include robust good health directly as an element of
personal consumption for those who have it, but the difference between good and poor
health can be partially reflected—or the failure to include the difference directly can
be partially offset—by also excluding or allowing a deduction for the medical services
that those in poorer health will generally need more of.296
  
Kahn, on the other hand, maintains that the medical expense deduction can be viewed as
implementing the principles of progressivity that are an integral part of our income tax system.297  Kahn
views the rate structure as (i) exempting from tax the income necessary for an individual to subsist and
then (ii) employing “a standardized utility curve as a reference for the tax rate schedule[, which] results
in applying graduated rates to income above the insulated amount , thereby reflecting the declining
utility of added amounts of income.”298  Kahn argues that the deduction for extraordinary medical
expenses can be conceptualized as “a rough adjustment to the rate schedule to reflect the greater utility
that the dollars so expended have for a taxpayer in that condition.”299  In other words, this deduction
adjusts the standardized utility curve in a situation where it is generally believed that application of that
curve would be “grossly inappropriate.”300  
Through their arguments, Andrews and Kahn have effectively inverted the new taxing/spending
hierarchical opposition devised by Surrey and McDaniel.  They have demonstrated that items that fall
outside of Surrey and McDaniel’s normative income tax actually have the attributes of items that are
included within their normative income tax.  By inverting this new hierarchical opposition, Andrews
and Kahn help to demonstrate the instability of the boundary between taxing and spending.301
I would emphasize that the point here is not that the distinction between taxing and spending
is completely indeterminate and incoherent; by inverting this hierarchical opposit ion, Surrey and
McDaniel have neither equated taxing with spending nor have they completely effaced the distinction
between these two concepts.302  Rather, they (along with Andrews and Kahn) have shown that the line
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180, at 280S81 (“There is no sense in doin g without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics.  We
have no language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single
destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic,  and the implicit postulations of
precisely what it seeks to contest.”); Derrida, Force of Law, supra note 165, a t 19 (“what i s currently called
deconstruction would not correspond (though certain people have an interest in spreading this confusion) to a quasi-
nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just and
unjust”); Semiology and Grammatology, supra note 194, at 20 (“. . . nor is it a question of confusing at every level,
and in all simplicity, the signifier  and the signified.  That this opposition or difference cannot be radical or absolute
does not prevent it from functioning, and even from being indispensable within certain limits—very wide limits.”).
Contra SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 2 (“The basic claim of tax expenditure analysis, that certain tax rules are ‘real ly’
spending, is not quite correct, because ‘taxes’ and ‘spending’ are not coherent categories to begin with.”).  
If, as Shaviro contends, these categories are truly incoherent, why did he need to revert to them in clarifying
his purportedly more “substant ive” suggested replacement?  Id. at 35S36 (“We presumably would not reclassify the
[weapons supply tax credit] as being part of the tax system after all, even though its motivation  would th en be
distributional.  After all, so reclassifying it would imply that, when interest groups strongly influence the enactment
of a preferential tax rule, the case for treating the rule as a tax expenditure is weakened.  Yet this presumably is the
opposite of what advocates of tax expenditure analysis have in mind, and no one would suggest reclassifying spending
as ‘really’ taxation when interest groups use it to line their pockets.”).  In fact, Shaviro’s entire discussion of the
weapons supply tax credit example in his paper makes clear that there are certain items that are indubitably spending
(or, conversely, indubitably taxes), and reveals his claim of incoherence as an overstatement.  Moreover, when this
discussion is considered in the context of the other examples that Shaviro explores, it becomes clear  that his perspective
is actually much closer to that expressed in the ensuing text above; in other words, his discussion demonstrates that
while certain items can easily be classified as either taxing or spending provisions, the classification of many others
will be more fluid and depend greatly on context.  See id. at 34S42.
303. See DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 90 (stating, in the context of discussing the distinction
between phonetic and nonphonetic writing, that “[t]he problem of the picture-puzz le (rébus à transfert) brings together
all the difficulties.  As pictogram, a representation of the thing may find itself endowed with a phonetic value.  This
does not efface the ‘pictographic’ reference which, moreover, has never been simply ‘realist ic.’  The signifier i s broken
or constellated into a system:  it refers at once, and at least, to a thing and to a sound.”).
304. See Curran, supra note 162, at 18S19 (“I believe that deconstruction is a methodology and that its
ideological or philosophical implications appropriately extend to a debunking of absolutism, and, equally appropriately,
apply to nonscientific fields, but that deconstruction does not deny the existence of truths or the value of logocentrism,
which, moreover, it adopts in its own discourse.”).
305. See Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1153 (“To deconstruct a conceptual
opposit ion is to show that the conceptual opposition is a nested opposition—in other words, that the two concepts bear
relations of mutual dependence as well  as mutual differentiation.  For example,  we migh t discover that they have
elements in common, which become salient in some contexts, but that in other contexts we note very important
differences between them, so that they are not the same in all respects.” (footnote omitted)).
between taxing and spending is not a fixed and immovable boundary that we can demarcate if only we
think with sufficient logic and clarity.303  Taxing and spending are not absolute, but constructed
categories.304  They stand in a relat ionship of both similarity and difference—they simultaneously
depend upon and differentiate themselves from each other.  In some contexts, the similarity between
them becomes salient (e.g., Surrey’s discussion of the deduction for extraordinary medical expenses),
while, in other contexts, the differences between them become salient (e.g., Andrews’ and Kahn’s
discussion of the deduction for extraordinary medical expenses).305  This serial deconstruction engaged
in by Surrey and McDaniel, Andrews, and Kahn unmasks “the common tendency to define ‘taxes’ and
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art3
22-Jul-04] A TAX CRIT IDENTITY CRISIS? 57
306. SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 3.
307. Balkin, Being Just , supra note 258, at 398 (“The goal of deconstruction is to reveal the contextual nature
of practical and theoretical judgment, and to critique acontextual or categorical judgments for their lack of sensitivity
to context.”); id. (“Our goal  is not to efface the distinction between them, but ra ther  to discover appropriate ways of
thinking about their similarities and differences.”); Balkin, Legal Career, supra note 18 (“[T]he point of deconstructing
conceptual oppositions is not to show that concepts have no boundaries, but rather than [sic] their boundaries are fluid
and appear differently as the opposition is placed into new interpretive contexts.  Deconstruction is not a mechanical
demonstra tion of total indeterminacy.  Deriving interesting results from deconstructive techniques is a skill that
requires sensitivity to changes in interpretive context.  Moreover, deconstructing a legal distinction does not necessarily
show that it is incoherent.  That is a  pragmatic judgement to be made by the interpreter.”); id. (“Deconstructionists
attacked the structuralist contention that there were universal and fixed structures of meaning that shaped all human
thought.  They argued that the structures of social meaning are always unstable, indeterminate, impermanent and
historically situated, constantly changing over time and accumulating new connotations.”).
This notion of contextuality can be seen in the following passage from Of Grammatology:
Gesture is here an adjunct of speech, but this adjunct is not a supplementing by artifice, i t is a re-
course to a more natural, more expressive, more immediate sign.  It is the more universal  the less
it depends on conventions.  But if gesture supposes a distance and a spacing, a milieu of visibility,
it ceases being effective when the excess of distance or mediation interrupts visibili ty:  then speech
supplements gesture.  Everything in language is substitute, and this concept of substitute precedes
the opposition of nature and culture:  the supplement can equally well be natural (gesture) as
artificial (speech).
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 235 (footnote omitted).  And in this passage, Derrida general ly describes
what follows the inversion of hierarchies:
By means of this double, and precisely strat ified, dislodged and dislodging, writing,  we must also
mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence
of a new “concept,” a concept that can  no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous
regime.  If this in terval, this biface or biphase, can be inscribed only in a bifurcated writing (and this
holds first of all for a new concept of writing, that simultaneously provokes the overturning of the
hierarchy speech/writing, and the entire system attached to it, and releases the dissonance of a
writing within speech, thereby disorganizing the entire inherited order and invading the entire field),
then it can only be marked in what I would call a grouped textual field: in the last analysis it is
impossible to point it out, for a unilinear text, or a punctual position, an operation signed by a single
author, are all by definition incapable of practicing this interval.
Positions, supra note 258, at 42 (footnote omitted).
308.  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.  PA. L. REV. 1479, 1498, 1506S11
(1987).
‘spending’ entirely formally,”306 and displaces it with the notion that the dist inction between taxing and
spending is fluid and will often depend on context.307
c.  Liberation of the Text from the Author:  Background—The liberation of the text
from the author is the other deconstructive practice singled out by Balkin.  Once described, this
practice should hopefully seem familiar to many readers, as it is broadly consistent with the dynamic
approach to statutory interpretation described by William Eskridge.308  Because the idea of the
liberation of the text from the author should be more familiar terrain for most tax academics, I will not
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309. Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:  Legislative History and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 845 (1991) [hereinafter Livingston, Legislative History].
310. 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 275, ¶ 4.2.1 at 4-17 (“Since all statutes are sisters under the skin, the
courts employ the usual tools of statutory construction to interpret the Code.”).
311. Livingston, Legislative History, supra note 309, at 845; see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:05 (6th ed. 2000); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 773 n.87;
Eskridge, supra note 308, at 1479S80.
312. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-1343, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3232,
at *11 (U.S. Apr. 28, 2004) (Scalia, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (“‘Statutory construction must begin with
the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose.’” (quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985));
see also Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation:  The Role of Purpose , 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492, 494S95 (1995)
[hereinafter Geier, Purpose] (discussing textualism); Geier, Textualism, supra note 18, passim (considering the
potential impact of Justice Scalia’s brand of textualism on interpretation of the Code); Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning,
the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771 passim (1997) (discussing the potential adverse
impact of employing a textualist approach when interpreting the Code); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law:
The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U.  COLO. L. REV. 115 passim (2004) (arguing that Just ice
Scalia’s textualism fosters unethical behavior and, contrary to its ostensible purpose, undermines the rule of law in
society).
313. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Intepretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.  CHI.
L. REV. 800, 817S22 (1983); see also Geier, Textualism, supra note 18, at 450S54 (discussing Justice Scalia’s thoughts
on originalism in statutory interpretation); Livingston, Legislative History, supra note 309, at 822 (mentioning
originalism).
314. See, e.g., Geier, Purpose, supra note 312, passim; see also Michael Livingston, Practical Reason,
“Purposivism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 passim (1996) [hereinafter Livingston,
Purposivism] (discussing Geier’s purposivism, but rejecting it in favor of a dynamic or practical reason approach to
statutory interpretation).
315. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 773S74.
316. Id. at 774.
elaborate on this practice to the same extent  that I elaborated on the inversion of hierarchies in the
previous sections of this Part.
To keep the idea of the liberation of the text from the author on familiar ground, I will describe
it in terms of the debate over the appropriate method(s) for engaging in statutory interpretation.  The
“modern consensus”309 is that the basic objective of statutory construction, including construction of
the Code,310 “is interpretation consistent with the intent of the enacting legislature.”311  There are, of
course, a number of different methods for ascertaining this intent.  Some (part icularly Supreme Court
Justice Antonin Scalia) advocate a literal or textualist approach that looks to the plain language of the
statute as the most accurate expression of legislative purpose.312  Others take an originalist approach
that looks to the intent of the enacting legislature.313  Yet others advocate a purposive approach that
looks to the purpose or structure of the statute as a whole when interpreting individual provisions
within the statutory framework.314  
Despite differences of method, these approaches to statutory construction do share at  least one
trait in common:  each of them implies that some readings of the Code will be correct (i.e.,  they will
reflect the intent of the legislature) while others will be incorrect (i.e., they will not reflect  the intent
of the legislature).315  The ostensible goal of statutory construct ion, therefore, is “to separate the
correct readings from the incorrect readings.”316  But like any other hierarchical opposition, this
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317. Id. at 774S75.
318. Id. (quoting JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER
STRUCTURALISM 176 (1982)).
319. Id. at 776.
320. Curran, supra note 162, at 17.
321. Id. (“Decon struction does not  take a  position as to whether truth exists.  It is, rather, a dialectical
understanding/misunderstanding privileging in the reading of statutes can be deconstructed to show
that understanding is merely a special case of misunderstanding.317
In discussing the deconstruction of this hierarchical opposition, Balkin quotes at length from
Jonathan Culler’s treatment  of this subject and, because I am in no better position than Balkin to
summarize Culler’s discussion, I will do the same:
“When one attempts to formulate the dist inction between reading and misreading, one
inevitably relies on some notion of identity and difference.  Reading and understanding
preserve or reproduce a content or meaning, maintain its identity, while
misunderstanding and misreading distort it; they produce or introduce a difference.
But one can argue that in fact the transformation or modification of meaning that
characterizes misunderstanding is also at work in what we call understanding.  If a text
can be understood, it can in principle be understood repeatedly, by different readers in
different circumstances.  These acts of reading or understanding are not, of course,
ident ical.  They involve modifications and differences, but differences which are
deemed not to matter.  We can thus say, in a formulation more valid than its converse,
that understanding is a special case of misunderstanding, a particular deviation or
determination of misunderstanding.  It is misunderstanding whose misses do not
matter.  The interpretive operations at work in a generalized misunderstanding or
misreading give rise both to what we call understanding and to what we call
misunderstanding.
“The claim that all readings are misreadings can also be justified by the most
familiar aspects of critical and interpretive practice.  Given the complexities of texts,
the reversibility of tropes, the extendability of context, and the necessity for a reading
to select and organize, every reading can be shown to be partial.  Interpreters are able
to discover features and implications of a text that previous interpreters neglected or
distorted.  They can use the text to show that previous readings are in fact misreadings,
but their own readings will be found wanting by later interpreters, who may astutely
identify the dubious presuppositions or particular forms of blindness to which they
testify.  The history of readings is a history of misreadings, though under certain
circumstances these misreadings can be and may have been accepted as readings.”318
This deconstruction of the understanding/misunderstanding hierarchical opposition does not render
all readings of a text (including a statute such as the Code) “equally legitimate, but rather . . . call[s]
into question the ways in which we decide that a given interpretation . . . is illegitimate.”319
For these reasons, deconstruction “eschew[s] authorial intention”320 and the attempt to unearth
the one true meaning of a text.321  While this disregard for authorial intention may run counter to the
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movement.”).
322. Livingston, Legislative History, supra note 309, at 832S38 (describing the tax legislative process); id.
at 842S44 (in light of the complexity of the Code, questioning whether Congress can “‘intend’ anything about a statute
that it understands incompletely or not at all”).  An oft-quoted exchange between Senators Dole and Armstrong during
the consideration of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 nicely illustrates the point:
Mr. Armstrong.  Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not he wrote the committee
report?
Mr. Dole.  Did I write the committee report?
Mr. Armstrong.  Yes.
Mr. Dole.  No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report . . . .
Mr. Armstrong.  Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas,  the chairman of the Finance
Committee, read th e committee report in its entirety?
Mr. Dole.  I am working on it.  It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.
128 CONG. REC. 16,918 (1982).
conventional approach to statutory interpretation (whether taking the form of textualism, originalism,
or purposivism), it has far greater descriptive power than the conventional approach because it
comports more closely with experience and reality.  When interpret ing statutes (and especially
something so arcane as a tax statute), how can one really speak of “authorial intent” when the author
is a body of 535 people who clearly could not all have understood the text to mean exactly the same
thing—if they understood it at all (or had even bothered to read it)?322  
In my Federal Income Tax course, I make this point in the context of discussing the elusive
search for an all-encompassing definition of “income.”  To do this, I choose several students to read
the different parts in the following excerpt from a discussion about the computation of gain from the
sale of a horse, which occurred in the Senate in the course of debate over the Revenue Act of 1913:
Mr. Cummins. [S]uppose ten years ago I had bought a horse for $900, and this year
I had sold him for $1,000, what would I do in the way of making a [tax] return?... 
Mr. Williams.  That thousand dollars is a part of the Senator’s receipts for this year,
and being a part of his receipts, that much will go in as part of his receipts, and from
it would be deducted his disbursements and his exemptions and various other things.
Mr. Cummins.  Would the price I paid for the horse originally be deducted? 
Mr. Williams.  No, because it was not a part of the transactions in that  year; but if the
Senator turned around and bought another horse that year,  it would be deducted . . .
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323. 50 CONG. REC. 3775S76 (1913).
324. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001 (2004) (today, the original cost of the horse ($900) would unquestionably
be deducted from the amount realized on the sale of the horse).
325. 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 275, ¶ 5.1.
326. Id.
327. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 777.
328. Id. at 779; see also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 91 (“Is it not evident that no signifier,
whatever its substance and form, has a ‘unique and singular reality?’  A signifier is from the very beginning the
possibility of its own repetition, of its own image or resemblance.  It is the condition of its ideality, what identifies it
Mr. Bristow.  Mr. President, I desire to ask a question, and see if I have this matter
clear in my mind.  As I understood the question of the Senator from Iowa, it was, if
he bought a horse ten years ago for $100– 
Mr. Cummins.  Nine hundred dollars. 
Mr. Bristow.  And sold it this year for a thousand dollars, whether or not that thousand
dollars would be counted as a part of his income for this year, regardless of what he
paid for the horse ten years ago. Is that  correct?  
Mr. Williams.  No; I did not say that.  It would be a part  of his gross receipts for the
year, of course, but it may not necessarily be a part of his net receipts, and therefore
not a part of his income that is taxable.
Mr. Cummins.  But I asked the Senator from Mississippi specifically whether, in the
case I put, the price that was originally paid for the horse could be deducted from the
price received. 
Mr. Williams.  The price paid ten years ago?  No; of course not.  How could it?  When
a man puts in his return for his income of the previous year in order to be taxed he puts
down everything he has received and everything he has paid out, subject  to the
exemptions and limitations otherwise provided in the bill.  Necessarily that is so.  To
answer the Senator, I want to read the precise language of the provision.323
Needless to say, this exchange elicits quite a few chuckles from my students, especially because, by
that time, we have already discussed how gain and loss are computed under the Code.324  Professors
Bittker and Lokken, to whom I am indebted for drawing my attention to this exchange,325 nicely sum
up the point for me when they state that “[a] deliberative assembly so confused about  the treatment
of a sale of a horse could hardly be expected to devote much attention to the more arcane aspects of
the term ‘income.’”326
In lieu of searching for an elusive (and, in all likelihood in the case of the Code, nonexistent)
authorial intention, deconstructionists embrace an idea that Derrida refers to as the “free ‘play’ of
text.”327  This idea is based on the notion that “a sign can only signify to the extent that it can signify
repeatedly, in a number of different contexts.  The essential property of the sign is its iterability.”328
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as signifier, and makes it function as such, relating to a signified which, for the same reasons, could never be a ‘unique
and singular reality.’”).
329. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 779.
330. Id. at 780.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 779; see also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 195 (“The architecture must find its
justification in the deep intention of the Essay.  It is for that reason that it interests us.  Yet we must not confound the
meaning of the architecture with the declared intention of the work.”).
333. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 778.
334. Id. at 781; Curran, supra note 162, at 17.
Following the appearances of the word “supplement” and of the corresponding concept or concepts,
we traverse a certain path within Rousseau’s text.  To be sure, this particular path will assure us the
economy of a synopsis.  But are other paths not possible?  And as long as the totali ty of paths is not
effectively exhausted, how shall we justify this one?
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 161.
335. Curran, supra note 162, at 17; see also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 158 (“There is
nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-texte].”); id. at 160S61 (describing the reader
as within her history and culture and that history and culture as within the reader).
Put differently, a word can only be used as a means of communication if that word is “public”—if it
can be used by others in different contexts regardless of the meaning that is attached to it when it is
uttered (or written).329  Accordingly, as Balkin explains,
[t]he structural precondition of the sign is its ability to break free from the author, and
to mean other than what the author meant.  The very act of “meaning” something
creates a chasm between the sign and the producer’s intention.  This detachability
makes iterability, and thus intersubjective meaning, possible.  The repetition of the sign
in the new context is simultaneously a relation of identity and difference; the repeated
sign is syntactically identical, yet semantically different.  The result is that the text, as
it is repeatedly understood, takes on a life of its own in a relation of différance with
the person who meant it . . . .330
In this way, at the moment that a text is created, it is liberated from its author to take on new meanings
in new contexts; this is the free “play” of the text.331  Derrida spends much of his time exploring this
“gap between what the author commands by her language and what the language performs—the
uncontrollable incongruity in human language and thought”332—searching for unintended connections
between words, unexpected difficulties, and contradictions in the text.333
Because meaning is determined by context, a single text is susceptible of a multiplicity of
meanings.334  As Vivian Curran has noted, “deconstruction valorizes the reader’s contribution qua
interpreter in creating the interpretation from the point of departure of the multitude of relations of
signification engendered by the text.”335  And, as Balkin points out, this notion that meaning changes
with context should not be foreign to lawyers.  We often encounter situations where “[t]he words in
a statute or in a case used as precedent take on new meanings in new factual contexts, and cannot be
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336. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 781.
337. I.R.C. § 61 (2004).
338. See 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 275, ¶ 5.1 (tracing the evolution in approach to defining
“income”); Livingston, Purposivism, supra note 314, at 701 (“The very definition of income, § 61, is almost entirely
a matter  of judicial precedent, the statute providing only that  ‘gross income means all  income from whatever source
derived’ and the legislative history being worthless or at least ignored.  Decisions in such areas regularly ascribe intents
or purposes to Congress that have little or no historical sanction and that may differ radically from the purposes that
earlier  courts ascribed to the very same provisions.  ‘Purpose’ is here a dynamic concept, to be derived from post-
enactment judicial and administr ative decisions and then applied to the decisions in new cases.”).
339. See supra text accompanying note 323.
340. See supra note 324.
341. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice, supra note 2, at 778S79 (pointing out how readings of the equal
protection clause have changed over time—although its authors may not have intended the clause to require equality
between men and women when it was written, constitutional law scholars and judges interpret it in  this way today).
342. Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172; Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,173 (June 21, 1977).
343. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
344. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
345. Bob Jones University is often cited as an example of the dynamic statutory interpretation  described by
William Eskridge; this approach takes into account “present societal, political, and legal context” when interpreting
a statute.  Eskridge, supra note 308, at 1479; see id. at 1482S97 (sketching the model for dynamic statutory
interpretation); see also Geier, Textualism, supra note 18, at 484 (indicating that Bob Jones University is “the tax case
most often cited in the literature as demonstrating dynamic statutory interpretation” (footnote omitted)); Livingston,
Purposivism, supra note 314, at 690, 699S701, 704 (describing Bob Jones University as an example of dynamic
statutory interpretation).  In the tax li teratur e, Michael  Livingston has advocated the adoption of Eskridge’s dynamic
approach to statutory interpretation (which Livingston refers to as a “practical reason” approach).  Livingston,
Purposivism, supra note 314, at 720S24.
346. Curran, supra note 162, at 22 (“Equally fallacious is the accusation that deconstruction valorizes all
interpretations.”).
confined to a limited number of meanings.”336  For most tax academics, the failed attempts at
fashioning an all-encompassing definition of the word “income”337—along with their later abandonment
in favor of a more ad hoc, fluid approach to defining income—readily come to mind as an example of
this phenomenon.338  In this vein, the contrast between the 1913 exchange on how to compute the gain
on the sale of a horse (quoted at length above)339 and the modern view on the same question340
provides a concrete illustration of this point.
Moreover, texts often take on new meanings over time as the surrounding circumstances
change and evolve.341  Consider in this regard how the notion of what constitutes a “charitable
organization,” as embodied in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3), has responded to changing times.  Its evolution
can be seen both in (i) the decision in the late 1970s to grant tax-exempt status to a gay and lesbian
organization342 and (ii) the introduction of the public policy limitation in the early 1970s343 (later
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. United States344), which resulted in  the
revocation of the tax-exempt status of an educational institution with a racially discriminatory
admissions policy.  This view of meaning as changing and evolving over time is consistent with a
dynamic or practical reason approach to statutory interpretation, such as that advocated by William
Eskridge.345
Even though a single text is susceptible of a multiplicity of interpretations, I would underscore
that this does not mean that deconstruction validates all interpretations.346  Derrida himself has noted
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To recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of
traditional criticism.  Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk
developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything.  But this indispensable
guardrail has always only protected, it has never opened, a reading.
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 158.
347. Positions, supra note 258, at 63; see also Curran, supra note 162, at 22.
348. Curran, supra note 162, at 22.
349. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 159.





355. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 20, at 2.
356. Id.
357. Id.
that although “[r]eading is transformational[,] . . . this transformation cannot be executed however one
wishes.  It requires protocols of reading.”347  As a result, deconstruction “engenders only a certain (or
perhaps, rather, uncertain) number of valid interpretations”348 because “our reading must be intrinsic
and remain within the text.”349
d.  Liberation of the Text from the Author:  In Tax Expenditure Analysis—As told by
Surrey, the story of the genesis of the tax expenditure concept is a tale of a text liberated from its
author.  Surrey recounts how, in the fall of 1967, President Johnson had proposed a 10% surcharge
on individual and corporate income taxes to reduce a budget deficit that was increasing as a result of
“[t]he combination of expanded domestic spending under the President’s Great  Society programs and
of increased Vietnam war expenditures.”350  The House of Representat ives’ Ways and Means
Committee thought that “the inflationary potential could better be controlled through a reduction in
Government expenditures, or that at  least a tax increase must be matched by a decrease in those
expenditures.”351  The Committee met with the Director of the Budget to consider ways to reduce
spending.352  But, during this meeting, the Committee and the Budget  Director only considered ways
to reduce the direct spending that was detailed in the federal budget.353  As Surrey explains, “[n]ever
once in its examination of the direct expenditures listed in the budget did the committee pause to
consider the dollars involved in the tax incentives and tax subsidies contained in the Internal Revenue
Code.”354
Although the members of the Ways and Means Committee were well aware of a number of tax
provisions that provide financial assistance to taxpayers, they “kept the financial assistance furnished
by these special tax provisions completely separate and isolated in [their] mind[s] from the task at
hand.  Indeed, the connection with that task simply did not occur to the members.”355  In other words,
the members of the Ways and Means Committee were thinking of taxing and spending as rigid, formal
categories.356  Because they were considering ways of reducing “spending,” it  only occurred to them
to look to the direct expenditures in the federal budget as a source of savings.357  They did not even
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358. Id.
359. Id. at 3.
360. SHAVIRO, supra note 21, at 23S26 (describing th is story as a “creation  myth,” and offering evidence that
Surrey had thought of the tax expenditure concept well before his alleged “illumination”).
361. See Positions, supra note 258, at 82 (“The incision of deconstruction , which is not  a voluntary decision
or an absolute beginning, does not take place just  anywhere, or  in an absolute elsewhere.  An incision, precisely, it can
be made only according to lines of force and forces of rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be
deconstructed.”).
think to consider tax expenditures as a source of savings because those provisions are addressed in tax
bills, not in budget bills.358  
During this meeting, Surrey, who was then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy,
had an “illumination”:
The scene in the House Ways and Means Committee suddenly illuminated many
questions:  Just what would a list of the special tax provisions that are comparable to
expenditure programs look like?  What would be the categories covered and the
groups benefited?  How many dollars would be involved and how would the amounts
compare with direct budget spending in those categories for those groups?  Given the
existence of such a list, other questions follow:  How do you go about comparing the
substantive results under the tax benefits with those under budget expenditures?  Once
it is determined to provide Government financial assistance to a particular group, how
does Government decide—and how should it decide—whether to use the tax route or
the direct budget route?359
Whether or not Surrey actually experienced a revelation during that meeting,360 it is clear that he had
detected a contradiction in the text of the Code (i.e., a number of taxing provisions that operated as
spending provisions) that had not  been recognized by its authors.361  All of these congressmen on the
House Ways and Means Committee—the elected representatives assigned the task of drafting and
revising the Code (and, moreover,  given the power under the Constitution to originate these additions
and changes)—had apparently not contemplated the existence of this contradiction when drafting and
re-drafting provisions in the Code.  
In explicating tax expenditure analysis in his early articles and books, Surrey was not in the
least concerned with ascertaining the intent of Congress when it enacted the tax preferences in the
Code.  Instead, Surrey, in Derridean fashion, was preoccupied with exploring the gap between what
Congress intended to say when it enacted the tax preferences and how those tax preferences actually
operated after their creation (i.e., once the Code, as text, had been liberated from its author,
Congress).  Surrey’s aim was to inform Congress—the institutional author of the text being
examined—about this contradiction in the text that it had written so that Congress could take the
contradiction into account when re-writing and re-working the text (i.e., when considering how to
design future spending programs).
3.  Summary—Thus, Surrey and McDaniel’s tax expenditure analysis bears the hallmarks of
deconstruction in both its colloquial and technical senses.  As evidenced by Surrey and McDaniel’s
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362. Infanti, supra note 167.
363. Although one might not think of exempt organizations as a marginal topic, the discussion in the text
below should amply demonstrate that the distinction between the marginal and the mainstream is not fixed and rigid
but constructed and contextual.  What may be mainstream in one circumstance may become marginal in another.
numerous works, tax expenditure analysis not only reads as a stinging criticism of the status quo, but
also employs the methods of Derridean (or, more accurately, Balkinian) deconstructive practice.  In
essence, Surrey and McDaniel employ tax expenditure analysis to bring to light and then to reverse
the privileging of taxing over spending in the Code.  Their approach to reading the Code is also
consistent with the Derridean idea of the free play of the text.  As originally conceived, tax expenditure
analysis in no way depended upon divining the intent of Congress in enacting the tax preferences in
the Code; rather, Surrey explored the actual operation of these tax preferences and, in doing so,
identified a contradiction that had not been recognized by the authors of the Code.
IV.  THE RETHINKING OF A COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
A. Deconstructing the Mainstream/Marginal Hierarchical Opposition
Having established that tax expenditure analysis can be reconceptualized as a form of
deconstructionist analysis, we can now explore—and, yes, deconstruct—a privileging that this
reconceptualization implicitly calls into question; namely, the privileging of “mainstream” over
“marginal” contributions to the tax policy discourse.
A quick story from my own personal experience will help to illustrate the privileging of
“mainstream” contributions to the tax policy discourse over “marginal” ones.  In addition to my
interest in critical tax theory, I have an interest in international tax and comparative legal theory.  A
few years ago, I wrote an article on the advisability of adopting a comparative approach to reforming
the U.S. international tax regime.362  Despite the potential cross-border aspects of nearly every
provision in the Code, international tax articles tend to focus on only a small subset of the universe of
potential issues, which creates a privileging of certain (mainstream) subjects over the remaining
(marginal) subjects.  This privileging manifested itself in the comments that I received about this art icle
while I was in the process of writing it.
One of the people who was kind enough to  read and comment on my article indicated that the
example that I had chosen to demonstrate how this comparative approach would work in practice
(viz., the rules governing the deductibility of cross-border charitable contributions)363 would not be
of interest to academics who write and/or teach in the area of international tax (with the sole possible
exception of Harvey Dale).  To remedy this problem, the reader made two alternative suggestions:
either I could turn this single art icle into two separate art icles (one that would appeal to international
tax folks and another that would appeal to exempt organization folks) or I could choose an example
that would appeal to those who write or teach in the area of international tax (in particular, he
suggested the corporate reorganization rules as a possible substitute).  
While I fully understood the point (and actually expected this reaction), I did not follow the
reader’s advice because I had chosen my example precisely because it was not a topic about which
academics studying international tax normally write.  Part of my purpose was to try to move the
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364. See supra note 13.
365. See supra notes 13, 19.
366. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and Identifying Tax  Expenditures:  A Rejoinder to Professor
Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 257, 261 (1991) (“Tax expenditure analysis is now firmly ensconced in th e tax policy
literature, in the law school curriculum and, via the Congressional Budget Act, in federal law.” (footnotes omitted)).
367. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
369. 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 275, ¶ 3.6.
370. See supra Part II.D.
371. See supra Part III.A.
372. See supra note 18; see also Balkin, Deconstruction, supra note 160 (“Hence, deconstructive arguments
and techniques often overlap with and may even be in service of other approaches, such as pragmatism, feminism or
critical race theory.”).
373. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
international tax discourse beyond the usual subjects.  Whether I succeeded (and whether anyone has
actually read the article), I do not know.  In any event, this story helps to demonstrate how mainstream
contributions to the tax policy literature are privileged over marginal ones.
As mentioned at the outset of this article, critical tax theory has been classified as “marginal”
by tax crits and their critics alike.364  When this classification is considered in light of the
mainstream/marginal hierarchical opposition in the tax policy discourse, it is no wonder that
mainstream tax academics at first ignored critical contributions to the tax policy discourse and, more
recently, have attempted to discredit them.365  Indeed, the “marginal” label—a label that members of
the mainstream branded upon tax crits without any demonstrable resistance from them—virtually
dictated this reaction to  critical tax theory.
But by reconceptualizing tax expenditure analysis as deconstructionist analysis, this rhetorical
move deconstructs itself by showing that what is true of the marginal is also true of the mainstream.
Tax expenditure analysis has been in the mainstream of tax policy thought for decades.366  As described
above, Stanley Surrey achieved congressional acceptance of tax expenditure analysis in the mid-
1970s,367 and descriptions of tax expenditure analysis can be found in many basic income tax
casebooks368 as well as in treatises on the subject.369  Although tax expenditure analysis has never
achieved universal acceptance, the fact that it has generated a lively, on-going debate in both academic
and political circles370 is evidence of the fact that it took its place in the mainstream of the tax policy
discourse long ago—a place that it continues to occupy today.  If, as discussed above,371 tax
expenditure analysis is no more than an application of deconstructionist techniques to the Code, then
deconstruction itself has been in the mainstream of the tax policy discourse for decades.  And
deconstructionist analysis, which is closely associated with contemporary crit ical thinking (particularly
with the critical legal studies movement and feminist legal theory),372 is undisputably a “marginal”
analytical technique in the legal academic literature.  What this means is that, for decades, a “marginal”
form of analysis has really been in the “mainstream” of tax policy discourse.
Furthermore, just as was the case with the understanding/misunderstanding hierarchical
opposition,373 the mainstream can be understood as no more than a special case of the marginal.  Both
marginal and mainstream contributions to the tax policy discourse are no more than ideas with or
without a following.  The only difference between the two is the size of the following (i.e. , how many
adherents an idea has at any particular moment).  A greater number of adherents can make a particular
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374. See Wetlaufer, supra note 148, at 8S59.
375. See 1 JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ B4.16[1] (2002); Michael
J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original” Intent of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1056 n.141
(1997).
376. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, ch. 18, §§ 222(a)(1), 238, 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080S81
(1919); Harvey P. Dale, The Reformed Foreign Tax Credit:  A Path Through the Maze, 33 TAX L. REV. 175, 179 n.22
(1978); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income:  Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 261 (2001); Karen V. Kole, The Status of United States International
Taxation:  Another Fine Mess We’ve Gotten Ourselves into, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 55 (1988).  See Graetz &
O’Hear, supra note 375, at 1043S54, for  the h istor ical background of,  as well as the impetus for, the enactment of the
foreign tax credit.
377. Dale, supra note 376, at 179; see also Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 375, at 1054; Kole, supra note 376,
at 55.
378. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 375, at 1054.
379. Id. at 1055.
380. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, §§ 222(a)(5), 238(a), 42 Stat. 227, 249, 258 (1921).
idea mainstream, while fewer can make the same idea marginal.  By definition, every idea begins its
existence in marginality because it has a following of one:  the person who originated the idea.  It is
only through dissemination and the passage of time that an idea draws further adherents.  At some
point, an idea that began its existence in marginality may become mainstream; however, there is no
clear line between what is marginal and what  is mainstream—in other words, there is no magic number
at which the marginal suddenly transforms into the mainstream.  There is likewise no fence preventing
an idea from migrating from one classification to join the other or from later returning to its original
classification.   As a result, over time, an idea that started out in marginality and that later became
mainstream may return to marginality once again.  There is an ebb and a flow that depends on the
currency of ideas in any given context.
The notion that the mainstream is merely a special case of the marginal comports with general
experience.  Consider, for example, the ebb and flow during the course of the twentieth century of the
different theoretical perspectives that have influenced thinking about  the law—from legal formalism
to legal realism to the legal process school to law and economics and on to critical thinking.374  To take
another example with particular relevance to tax academics, consider how the limit on the foreign tax
credit has come full circle over time:375  
As originally enacted in 1918,376 the foreign tax credit was unlimited, meaning that “foreign
income taxes could be credited against U.S. tax liabilities even when the foreign tax rate exceeded the
effective U.S. rate.”377  When the income tax rates fell at the end of World War I, it became apparent
that “an American with substantial investments abroad, particularly if made in a high-tax nation (or
nations), might eliminate his entire tax bill to the United States.”378  To prevent the possibility of abuse,
Congress enacted a limitat ion on the amount of foreign tax credits that a taxpayer could claim.379  
Beginning in 1921, taxpayers were able to claim foreign tax credits only against the U.S. tax
on their foreign source income (i.e., foreign tax credits would not reduce the U.S. tax on income from
U.S. sources).380  From 1921 until 1932, Congress allowed taxpayers to compute this limitation on an
“overall” basis, meaning that they could take into account all foreign source income and losses when
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381. Dale, supra note 376, at 180; Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 375, at 1055; Kole, supra note 376, at 55S56.
382. 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 375, ¶ B4.16[1] at B4-186.
383. Kole, supra note 376, at 56.
384. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, ch. 209, § 131(b), 47 Stat. 169, 211 (1932); Dale, supra note
376, at 180; Graetz, supra note 376, at 263; Kole, supra note 376, at 56.
385. 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 375, ¶ B4.16[1] at B4-186.
386. Kole, supra note 376, at 56.
387. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, § 904, 68A Stat. 287S88 (1954); Dale,
supra note 376, at 180, Graetz, supra note 376, at 263; Kole, supra note 376, at 56.
388. Kole, supra note 376, at 56S57.
389. Act of Sept. 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-780, § 1(a), 74 Stat. 1010, 1010 (1960).
390. Kole, supra note 376, at 57.
391. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1031(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1620S21 (1976).
392. Kole, supra note 376, at 57.
393. 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 375, ¶ B4.16[1] at B4-187.
computing the limitation.381  This overall limitation allowed taxpayers to average the different tax rates
applied by different countries or to different types of income.382  
With the advent of the Depression, Congress considered the complete repeal of the foreign tax
credit, but, in a political compromise, adopted a per country limitation instead.383  From 1932 until
1954, taxpayers computed the foreign tax credit limitation using the overall limitation or a per-country
limitation, whichever was less.384  The per-country limitation prevented the averaging of the different
tax rates applied by different countries,385 with the result that the total of the country limitations was
“often lower than the overall limitation.”386
In 1954, Congress eliminated the overall limitation and required taxpayers to use only the per-
country limitation.387  The reason for the repeal was 
that the overall limitation discouraged a company operating profitably in one foreign
country from going into another country where it might have expected to operate at
a loss for several years.  For example, if a company operated in two countries, and one
operation generated foreign source income but the other a loss, the loss could
effectively wipe out any utilizable foreign tax credit in the profitable operation  because
the numerator of the limitation could be reduced to zero.  Basically, the overall
limitation was repealed in order to encourage foreign investment.388
Beginning in 1960, Congress allowed taxpayers to elect either a per-country or an overall
limitation.389  When making this change, “Congress reasoned that the overall limitation would
encourage investment, and was more consistent with the way United States companies viewed their
operations.  In most cases, United States firms operating abroad think of their foreign businesses as
a single operation and set up their organizations on this basis.”390  
In 1976, Congress eliminated the per-country limitation.391  “Again, the reason given for the
change was that most United States companies viewed their foreign operations on an overall basis, not
on a country by country basis.”392  
In 1986, Congress reaffirmed its adherence to the overall limitation, indicating that the overall
limitat ion is “consistent with the integrated nature of U.S. multinational operations,”393 but enacted
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394. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1201, 100 Stat. 2085, 2520S28 (1986).
395. 1 KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 375, ¶ B4.16[1] at B4-187.
396. Livingston, Perspective, supra note 11, at 1792 (“Within the tax field, critical scholarship is likely to
appear radical, even a bit outrageous, in nature and may receive less attention than it would otherwise deserve.”).
397. The sociologists Verta Taylor and Nan cy Whittier have observed that out-groups often accept their
marginality as part of the process of constructing a collective identity:
Boundaries mark the social territories of group relations by highlighting differences between activists
and the web of others in the contested social world.  Of course, it is usually the dominant group that
erects social, polit ical, economic, and cul tural  boundaries to accentuate the differences between itself
and minority populations.  Paradoxically, however, for groups organ izing to pursue collective ends,
the process of asserting “who we ar e” often involves a kind of reverse affirmation  of the
characteristics attributed to it by the larger society.  Boundary markers are, therefore, central to the
formation of collective identity because they promote a heightened awareness of a group’s
commonalities and frame interaction between members of the in-group and the out-group.
a basket system394 that prevents the averaging of taxes on different types of income where it felt that
averaging would distort the foreign tax credit limitation.395
In this series of enactments, there is an ebb and flow of ideas as context changes:  what is
prevailing policy is replaced by a new policy (i.e, the mainstream becomes marginal); then the old,
jettisoned policy resurfaces to become the prevailing policy once again (i.e., the marginal returns to
the mainstream).
The reconceptualization of tax expenditure analysis as a form of deconstructionist analysis thus
leads us to the inversion of the mainstream/marginal hierarchical opposition.  As was the case with the
taxing/spending hierarchical opposition, this inversion reveals the constructed, unstable, and context-
driven nature of the boundary between mainstream and marginal contributions to the tax policy
literature.  It concomitantly demonstrates that mainstream and marginal contributions to the tax policy
literature stand in a relationship of both similarity and difference—they simultaneously depend upon
and differentiate themselves from each other.  When considered from this perspective, the advent of
a literature exploring feminist, critical race theory, and gay and lesbian perspectives on the Code can
be seen not as some radical shift in the tax policy discourse,396 but rather as part of its natural
progression.  Surrey and McDaniel’s tax expenditure analysis simply prepared the way for these later
critical contributions by surreptitiously introducing “mainstream” tax academia to critical thinking long
before its ostensible attempt at infiltrating the tax policy discourse.  
B. Reconsidering Our Collective Identity
This deconstruction built upon a reconstruction raises an interesting question:  if the distinction
between mainstream and marginal contributions to the tax policy discourse is constructed, unstable,
and context-driven, why do tax crits so readily accept the “marginal” label that virtually guarantees
their contributions will be ignored or trivialized by “mainstream” tax academics?  
At first glance, it’s not at all surprising that tax crits rally around their “marginality.”  Because
the critical tax movement is comprised of quite a diverse group of scholars—working in such areas
as feminist legal theory, critical race theory, and gay and lesbian legal studies—marginality or outsider
status is probably the least common denominator of both their work and their personal identities.397
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Verta Taylor & Nancy E. Whittier, Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY 104, 111 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) [hereinafter FRONTIERS]; see
Nancy Whittier, Meaning and Structure in Social Movements, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE
STATE 289, 303 (David S. Meyer et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter SOCIAL MOVEMENTS] (among other examples, stating
that, “[a]s those who write about lesbian/gay or queer organizing point out, mobilizing a constituency around an
identity that the dominant system has made salient can shore up the distinctions the movement is trying to undermine.”
(citations omitted)).  On this point, see also Mary Bernstein, The Contradictions of Gay Ethnicity:  Forging Identity
in Vermont, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra, at 85, 85 (citations omitted):
Many queer theor ists, poststructuralists, and feminists argue that to gain recognition for a
consti tuency, activists narrowly and naively rely on fixed or essentialist notions of identity.  By
advocating for rights based on  an identity such as “woman” or “gay,” identity movements reinforce
the identity on which the movement is based and, as a result, fail to recognize diversity, homogenize
and ignor e differences within the identity category, and in hibit the creat ion of a “polit ics of
commonality” among diverse groups.  En gaging in  polit ics based on identity categories shores up
the categor y itself and sets up invidious distinctions, rein forcing a normal-deviant dichotomy.
Cultural t ransformat ion is sacrificed for narr ow political gains.
(N.B.  In her piece, Bernstein recounts the formation of the lesbian and gay rights movement in Vermont, and argues
that the polit ics pur sued by this movement was not based on a fixed notion of identity but on one that was shaped by
“complex interactions with the state, the opposition, and with other social movements.”  Id. at 86.)
398. Brown & Fellows, Preface, supra note 12, at vii; see also Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1837S41 (“However,
largely absen t from these efforts has been examination of the role played by the taxation system in undergirding this
hierarchy [i.e., the white male power elite] , chiefly through i ts subsidization of wealth  acquisition and concen tration
(and its adjunct, social and political  power), while concurrent ly exacerbating the subordinate status an d relative
impoverishment of the remaining sectors of society.  Now change is afoot. This void in the catalog of taxation literature
is rapidly being filled with fresh studies and commentaries on the relationships between the taxation system and the
social, economic, and political standing of ‘traditionally subordinated groups.’” (footnote omitted)).
399. See supra note 397.
400. See supra note 11.
401. Alberto Melucci was one of the founders of new social movement theory, which originated in European
scholarship.  Enrique Laraña, Continuity and Unity in New Forms of Collective Action: A Comparative Analysis of
Student Movements, in IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY, supra note 11, at 209, 210; see also ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG,
FORGING GAY IDENTITIES:  ORGANIZING SEXUALITY  IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950–1994, at 7 (2002) (describing new
social movement theorists as “predominantly European”); Mueller, supra note 11, at 234 (referring to new social
But, once you get past this superficial commonality, it’s actually quite surprising that tax crits actively
and unthinkingly accept their “marginality.”  
Tax crits focus their scholarly energies on attempting “to strip the tax law of its claim to
objectivity and hold it accountable for its social and economic impact on traditionally subordinated
groups.”398  Yet , ironically,399 a group that dedicates itself to uncovering latent discrimination in the
Code has overlooked the fact that the mainstream/marginal hierarchical opposition—a hierarchical
opposition that the traditionally dominant group embedded in the tax policy discourse (after all, they
framed the discourse) and that tax crits accepted—is just another latent means of subordination that
can be used to control the flow and impact of ideas that are contrary to the interests of the mainstream.
Since some tax crits appear to view themselves as part of a movement (as do some of their
critics as well as some bystanders),400 I propose that tax crits remedy this oversight by taking a cue
from new social movement theory401 in the area of sociology.  New social movement theorists such
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movement theory as European).  Melucci also “was among the first writers to introduce the term ‘new social
movements’ into English.”  MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 204; Melucci, supra note 11, at 105.  He describes use of this
term as follows:
I am not opposed to the continued use of the term [i.e., “new social movements”], but—as Nomads
of the Present tries to explain—I have become dissatisfied with its reification and convinced of the
need to clarify and specify its meaning.  The term is often used loosely in a chronological sense to
refer to the growth, since the early 1960s,  of forms of action which diverged from the then dominant
types of collective action.   But th is sense of the term wrongly assumes that the “new” movements are
unified entities.  My main theoretical objection to the literature on “new social movements” is that
it fails to recognize their composite character.  It therefore neglects a vital question:  given the
differentia ted nature of contemporary social movements—the fact that  they contain  a plurality of
levels, including very traditional forms of action—do they nevertheless display novel types of action
which cannot be explained by the tradit ional an alyses of class conflict or poli tical struggle?
MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 204S05.
It is worth noting, however, that new social movement theory is just one paradigm for explaining and
understanding social movement organizations.  Whittier, supra note 397, at 289–90; see also ARMSTRONG, supra, at
5–13 (developing a hybrid cultural-institutional approach to examining social movements).  Theorists have begun to
integrate these different paradigms to create more complex understandings of social movement organ izations.
Whittier, supra note 397, a t 289-90 (“For  some time now, in fact, the conventional theoretical distinctions in the
field—between political process, resource mobilization, and new social movements theories—have been breaking
down.  Textbooks and literature reviews still invoke these approaches in their theoretical taxonomies, but far more often
than scholars actually employ them in distinguishable form.”).
402. Melucci also coined the term “collect ive identity,” Bert Klandermans, Transient Identities? Membership
Patterns in the Dutch Peace Movement, in IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY, supra note 11, at 168, 168, and has been described
as “the best exemplar  of those writing in this tradition” (i.e., “European writers who emphasize the centrality of identity
issues in . . . ‘new’ social movements”).  William A. Gamson, The Social Psychology of Collective Action , in
FRONTIERS, supra note 397, at 53, 56; see also Taylor & Whittier, supra note 397, at 104, 104S05 (stating that
“European analyses of recent social movements, loosely grouped under the rubric ‘new social movement theory,’
suggest that a key concept that allows us to understand this process is collective identity,” and citing as examples the
works of Melucci, Alessandro Pizzorno, Carl Boggs, Jean L. Cohen, Alain Touraine, and Barbara  Epstein).
403. MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 28; see also id. at 25 (“Social movements cannot be represented as
characters,  as subjects endowed with being and purpose, as acting within a scenario whose finale is predetermined.
Such misconceptions can be rectified only by rejecting the assumption of collective action as a unified datum.  Only
then can we discover the plurality of perspectives, meanings and relationships which  crystallize in any given  collective
action.”).
404. Id. at 25S26 (“Collective action is . . . the product of purposeful or ientations developed with in a field of
opportuni ties and constraints.  Individuals acting collectively construct their act ion by defining in cognitive terms these
possibilities and limits, while at the same time interacting with others in order to ‘organize’ (i.e. , to make sense of)
their common behavior.”); see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 398, at 7 (“These cultural approaches all treat interests
and identities as politically constructed . . . .”); Bert Klandermans, The Social Construction of Protest and
Multiorganizational Fields, in FRONTIERS, supra note 397, at 77, 80 (“In Melucci’s eyes, social movements are
themselves social constructions.”); Taylor & Whittier, supra note 397, a t 109 (“Sometimes labeled postmodernist, new
social movement perspectives are social constructionist paradigms . . . . From this standpoint, collective political actors
do not exist de facto by virtue of individuals sharing a common structural loca tion; they are created in the course of
social movement activity.”)
as Alberto Melucci402 do not view social movements as “a unified ‘subject,’”403 but rather as a social
construction404—“a composite action system, in which widely differing means, ends and forms of
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405. MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 28; see also Laraña, supra note 401, at 218–19 (“Another  problem in the
study of social movements comes from taking for granted that social movements have an internal unity, which is
manifested in the homogeneity of beliefs and values of actors, their consensus on demands, and the role of
organizations where stra tegic decisions are made.  . . . More recent research does not share the assumption of unity and
stresses the relevance of internal conflict as an important factor in  the emergence of, or a crisis in, a movement’s
collective identity.”  (citing Melucci, among others, in support of the latter statement)).
406. Melucci defines “collective identity” as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several
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constraints in which their action takes place.”  MELUCCI, supra note 11, at  34.  Taylor and Whittier, who have
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supra note 397, at 105; see also Klandermans, supra note 402, at 168 (“Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier suggest a
slightly different definition [from Melucci’s] that stresses ‘we’-feeling.”); Whittier, supra note 397, at 302 (“Collective
identity, thus, is an interpretation of a group’s collective experience:  who members of the group are, what their
attributes are, what they have in common, how they are differen t from other  groups, and what the political significance
of all this is.”).
407. E.g., MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 30S36; Mueller, supra note 11, at 236–37.
408. MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 34  (“Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires
continual investments.”); id. at 218 (“Collective actors invest an enormous quantity of resources in the on-going game
of solidarity.  They spend a great deal of time and energy discussing who they are, what  they should become and which
people have the right to decide that.  This on-going process of construction of a sense of “we” can succeed for various
reasons . . . [b]ut it can  also fail, in which case collective action disintegrates.”); Hank Johnston et al., Identities,
Grievances, and New Social Movements, in IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY, supra note 11, at 3, 15–16 (“This social
constructionist  definition has three dimensions that make collective identity an especially difficult concept to pin down
empirically.  First, it is predicated on a continual interpenetration of—and mutual influence between—the individual
identity of the participan t and the collective iden tity of the group.   Second,  by the very nature of the phenomena we
study, the collective identity of social movements is a ‘moving target,’ with different definitions predominating at
different points in a movement career.  Third, distinct processes in identity creation and maintenance are operative in
different phases of the movement.”); Belinda Robnett, External Political Change, Collective  Identities, and
Participation in Social Movement Organizations, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 397, at 266, 271 (indicating that
“participants in social movements constantly negotiate collective identities”);  Taylor  & Whittier, supra note 397, at
114 (“We see the development of consciousness as an ongoing process in which groups reevaluate themselves, their
subjective experiences, their opportunities, and their shared interests.”).
409. MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 34.
410. Gamson, supra note 402, at 56; see also Johnston et al., supra note 408, a t 10 (“The new social
movement perspective holds that the collective search for identity is a central aspect of movement formation.”).
411. Gamson, supra note 402, at 57; see also MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 73S74 (“This means that the
energies and resources that actors invest in the construction of their collective identity are an essential part of the
action, and not  simply an accessory or ‘expressive’ dimension.  The weakness of an  exclusively political  view centred
solidarity and organization converge in a more or less stable manner.”405  These theorists focus on the
manner in which the collective identity406 of a social movement is formed407 and continuously refined408
by its members, because “[t]he process of constructing, maintaining and altering a collective identity
provides the basis for actors to shape their expectations and calculate the costs and benefits of their
action.”409  Indeed, the process of constructing a collective identity has been characterized as “the most
central task of ‘new’ social movements”410—a task that is not only “instrumental to the success of
collective action but [also] a goal in its own right.”411  In keeping with this view of collect ive identity,
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on the ‘inst rumental’ dimension of action is that it considers as ‘expressive’ or residual the self-reflective investments
of the movements.  But these investments in self-reflection are crucial for understanding th e effects of movements on
the political system.  If what movements do to construct a sense of ‘we’ is not considered accessory or residual then
our understanding of concepts such as efficacy and success is correspondingly modified.”); Robnett, supra note 408,
at 279 (describing how collective identity transformation “became a central goal of the [Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee], since transcending racism through upward mobility was impossible for most blacks,
particularly the uneducated”); cf. Whittier, supra note 397, at 290 (indicating that while some groups “want to
construct  new collective identities that challenge subservient definit ions of the group,  . . . other s . . . construct new
identities as a means of promoting mobilization rather than  as a goal in themselves”).
412. Until now, the only reflections that I have seen by tax crits on the cr itica l tax movement have been
written in reaction to criticism of that movement.  The 1998 symposium on critical tax theory in the North Carolina
Law Review consisted of an article by Lawrence Zelenak critiquing a number of applications of critical tax theory in
recent scholarship (and praising a few others), followed by responses from those who had been criticized and reactions
from a number of other tax scholars.  Symposium, Critical Tax Theory:  Criticism and Response, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1519
(1998).  What I am proposing here is an active, rather than a reactive, shaping of the collective identity of the critical
tax movement.
413. See MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 64S70 (describing a research project in which  the groups being studied
“consciously activated their own internal relationships and concentrated on the process of constructing their sen se of
‘we’—which serves as the basis of collective action.  Self-reflection rendered th is process visible and contributed new
insights into the groups’ understanding of their action.  In the course of this self-reflection, the complex in teraction
of intern al and external relationships,  which are characteristic of collective action, also surfaced.”); Taylor & Whittier,
supra note 397, at 118 (“[W]e suggest two types of negotiat ion cen tral to the construction of pol iticized collective
identities.  First, groups negotiate new ways of thinking and acting in private settings with other members of the
collectivity, as well as in public settings before a larger audience.  Second, identi ty negotiations can be explicit,
involving open and direct attempts to free the group from dominant representations, or implicit, consisting of what
Margolis terms a ‘condensed symbol or display’ that undermines the status quo.” (citation omitted) (quoting Diane
Rothbard Margolis, Redefining the Situation:  Negotiations on the Meaning of Woman, 32 SOC. PROBS. 332, 340
(1985)).
414. Scott A. Hunt et al., Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of Movement
Identities, in IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY, supra note 11, at 185, 189 (“Melucci . . . also stresses the interactional
accomplishment of identity, arguing that ‘collective identity is an interactive and shared definition.’” (quoting
MELUCCI, supra note 11, at 34); Klandermans, supra note 404, at 81 (“To form a collective identity, a group must
define itself as a group, and its members must develop shared views of the social environment,  shared goals, and shared
opinions about the possibilities and limits of collective action.”); Robnett, supra note 408, a t 284 (“The extent to which
a social  movement organization allows for self-labeling and re-labeling is crucial to recruitment and to sustaining
commitment.  Redefined movement collective identities must resonate with participants’ own identities.”).
tax crits should consider in a deliberate and purposeful fashion412 how to deal with their
“marginality”:413  whether to (i) accept it with resignation, (ii) wholeheartedly embrace it and use it to
accentuate their differences from the mainstream, (iii) reject it on the ground that they are actually no
different than the mainstream, or (iv) reject it as an artificial construct that masks the complex web of
similarities and differences that characterize the relationship between tax crits and mainstream tax
academics.
The task of rethinking (and possibly reshaping) this aspect of the collective identity of the
critical tax movement will naturally require collective action—in the form of a give and take among
critical tax scholars.414  For this reason, you will not find a definitive description of what the
movement’s collective identity should or must look like in this article.  Rather, what I would offer by
way of closing comments is some food for thought.
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415. For a recent sociological perspective on the formation and evolution of the gay and lesbian movement
in San Francisco from 1950 through th e mid-1990s, see ARMSTRONG, supra note 398.
416. CHAMALLAS , supra note 153, at 168S69.  The first sentence of the second paragraph of this article, where
I come out to you, the reader, evidences the truth of this sta tement.   Each time I  encounter someone—whether  in person
or through my writing—I have to decide whether, when, and how much to share about my sexual orientation.
Drawing on these experiences seems even more appropriate once you realize that homosexuality was formerly
referred to as “sexual inversion” (i.e. , the inver sion of the normal sexual instinct).  2 SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 355 (1976).  (My thanks to Leandra Lederman for drawing this to my attention.)  This term
highlights another of the hierarchical oppositions that surround us; namely, the pr ivileging of heterosexual ity over
homosexuality in our society.
See also DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 221, where he discusses another perversion /inversion
in Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages:
The first two must be satisfied for the last to appear, Rousseau notes, but we have observed that the
second or secondary need [i.e., needs “that deal with ‘well-being’”] supplants each time, by force
or urgency, the first need [i.e., needs “that ‘deal with subsistence’ and ‘with preservation’”].  There
is already a perversion of needs, an inversion of their natural order.  And we have just seen included
among needs what is elsewhere named passion.   Need is thus permanently present within passion.
417. And if they do not make of it what they will, others will surely do the job for  them.  See Debra Friedman
& Doug McAdam, Collective Identity and Activism:  Networks, Choices, and the Life of a Social Movement, in
FRONTIERS, supra note 397, at 156, 166 (“And more important, the SMO [social movement organization] is likely to
find itself confront ing a var iety of other groups willing to construct the organization’s image.  It isn’t just the SMO
that has a  stake in defining th e group’s collective identi ty.  So too do movement opponents, rival SMOs, law
enforcement officials, and the media.”); see also Hunt et al., supra note 414, at 192–203 (maintaining that the
constr uction  of the identities of a movement’s antagonists as well as its audience (i.e., neutral observers) is just as
important as the construction of the identity of the movement’s protagonists); Johnston et al., supra note 408, at 18
(“Both individual identity and collective identity are affected by interaction with nonmembers and by definitions
In making these comments, I will draw upon my experience as a gay man in thinking through
both my own individual identity as well as my small part of the collective identity of the overall gay
and lesbian movement.415  I turn to these personal experiences because of the general relevance of gay
and lesbian experience to issues of identity formation:
The coming-out process of identity formation is clearly situational and relational; that
is, it occurs at a specific time or times, and in relation to specific people.  In this
respect, “coming out” is a decidedly postmodern phenomenon, where we can see
personal identity being constructed as part of an ongoing process. . . . As postmodern
scholars work more at the intersections of different kinds of oppression, the coming-
out process experienced by gay men and lesbians could become the model for
describing the process of identity formation generally.416
Through my comments, I hope to provide other tax crits with a perspective that may help them to
decide how their “marginality” fits (if at all) in the collective identity of the critical tax movement.  I
also hope to show that the contextuality of the mainstream/marginal categories can serve as an
advantage or a disadvantage (or both an advantage and a disadvantage), but more importantly, and
precisely because of this malleability, I hope to show tax crits that they have the choice to make of
their marginality what  they will.417
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imposed on movements by state agencies, counter-movements, and, especially in the contemporary movement
environment, the media.”); Laraña, supra note 401, at 220 (describing the student mobilizations against Selectividad
(the college entrance exams) in Spain and stating that “[t]his is one of the defining characteristics of this movement:
its public image was produced by a pol iticized group of university students that had a different status than the
movement’s constituency, that did not adequately express the movement’s motives or its demands, that did not use the
same language, and that had a different ideology”); Mueller, supra note 11, at 256 (“Through these devices, a collective
identity becomes public that has a  potential for political influence.  It is then subject to attempts at distortion and
marginalization  of state, media, and countermovements.”); Robnett, supra note 408, passim (indicating that the
collective identity of a social movement organization is shaped by both internal and external factors, and describing
how internal and external factors changed the collective identity of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee);
Whittier, supra note 397, at 293–94, 301–06 (also indicating that the col lective identity of a social movement
organization  is shaped by both internal and external factors, but stating that “how activists define their group is by no
means dictated by the dominant society.  Movements transform hegemonic collective identi ties and discourses when
they organize, and they continue to debate and redefine those group meanings as time passes”).
418. For a description of my experience of the closet, see Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 3, at 771S73.
419. See Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship:  Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the
Legal Academy, 83  CORNELL L. REV. 365, 384 (1998) (“There has been a smattering of critical tax
scholarship—Kelman’s work arguably qualifies—but critical scholars have generally shied away from the field,
perhaps sensing its mainst ream bias.   Many of those who star ted out in  the area (including Kelman himself) have left
it.” (footnotes omitted)).
1.  Going into the Closet— The first of the options in addressing their “marginality,” that of
resigned acceptance, would represent a step backward for tax crits.  This option reminds me of terrain
with which I am all too familiar:  the closet (and not the one that you hang clothes in).  I lived in the
closet until I was in my early twenties,418 and, take it from me, it was not a pleasant  experience.  The
closet can be an extremely isolating place.  It cuts you off from others, accentuates in your eyes the
ways in which you are different from the remainder of society, and creates a sense of despondency at
your plight that sets in motion a yearning for normality (as defined, of course, by those who have
marginalized you).  If tax crits resignedly accept their marginality, they will essentially consign
themselves to the closet  by acquiescing in their marginalization and, almost ineluctably, internalizing
that marginality.
When you acquiesce in your own marginalization, you give the mainstream (here, straight
society or mainstream tax academia, as the case may be) permission to ignore you, your needs, and
your desires.   For gays and lesbians, the closet renders you invisible.  Because there is no tell-tale sign
for identifying someone who is gay or lesbian, you can go into the closet and try to “pass” for
straight—either actively or by default (because in our heterosexist society, people are normally
presumed to be straight).  You continue to be gay and often to engage in homosexual behavior;
however, to the greatest extent possible, this activity takes place apart and away from straight society
so that it simply doesn’t register on the straight radar screen (or, if it does, can be dismissed as an
anomaly).
For tax crits,  resigned acceptance of their marginality would produce similar results.  Some
tax crits may stop (or never begin) writing in this area and instead retreat to more “mainstream” tax
topics.  Or they may simply abandon writing in tax at all because it is inhospitable to critical work.419
In either case, critical work would be banished from the mainstream radar screen.  And the few brave
souls who continued to make critical contributions to the tax literature would find that their work
would have little or no impact on the mainstream tax policy literature or on the way that mainstream
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420. See supra note 13.
421. See, e.g., Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 3, at 769S79.
422. Shurtz, supra note 11, at 1846.
423. See supra note 19.
424. Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 3, at 771S72.
425. See Brown & Fellows, Preface, supra note 12, at viiSviii (describing how, through a series of
conferences, “a group of tax scholars in which each of us who previously had felt isolated by the traditional tax analysis
that dominated the legal literature and tax conferences now had found intellectual kinship,” and expressing their hope
that TAXING AMERICA, supra note 9, would “pr ovide[] evidence that connection and interchange within a community
of scholars are essential”).
426. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1615S16 (describing ways in which critical tax theory and tax
crits are just like mainstream tax theory and mainstream tax academics); Nancy C. Staudt, Tax Theory and Mere
“Critique”:  A Reply to Professor Zelenak, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1582S85 (1998) (explaining how critical theory
actually fits the mainstr eam paradigm espoused by Professor Zelenak in his lead article in a symposium on critical tax
theory, and further explaining how Professor Staudt’s approach in a piece that she wrote, and which Professor Zelenak
tax academics think about tax policy issues, because, for the mainstream, it simply would not exist.
In fact, mainstream tax academics initially treated critical contributions to the tax policy debate in just
this way—they acted as if those contributions were invisible.420
The purpose for going into the closet is usually to avoid the treatment visited upon you by the
mainstream should your separate existence come to be publicly acknowledged.  For gays and lesbians,
this treatment ranges from discrimination (in housing, employment, etc.) to verbal denigration or
degradation to physical violence and intimidation.421  As expected, once the critical tax movement
“garnered new adherents and became impossible to ignore, mainstream scholars employed new and
varied strategies to devalue the content of critical commentary.”422  Tax crits who are out in the open
have experienced the academic version of gay bashing:  their work has been dismissed, devalued,
and/or discredited.423
But a far worse prospect is the possibility that, by going into the closet, you may become an
accomplice to your own subordination and suffering.  When I went into the closet, I was trying to
avoid being attacked by society because of my homosexuality.  I eventually came out of the closet
because I realized that the closet was really no escape at all.  As I have explained elsewhere:
Interestingly, denial became both a means of defending myself from attack and a proxy
for those attacks.  Through denial, I was able to try to fend off attacks from others, but
at the same time began to attack myself—questioning what was wrong with me, why
I was different, why I couldn’t change and be normal like everyone else.  By high
school, society had so successfully ingrained in me its hostility toward gays and
lesbians that, even when defending myself from its attacks, I was still being attacked.
I had simply traded one oppressor (society at large) for another (myself).  To cope
with the anguish created by this self-loathing, I redirected my energy and attention
toward studying [because] [s]chool work helped to  lessen the constant pain and
anguish . . . .424
Earlier, tax crits appear to have experienced a similar sense of isolation425 as well as a (conscious or
unconscious) yearning to be “normal.”426  More recently, however, tax crits appear to have emerged
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criticized, “is not pragmatism as Zelenak suggests (although it has practical feminist implications), but a theoretical
argument that easily fits within the traditiona l tax policy debates concerning the proper scope of the tax base”).
427. Brown & Fellows, Preface, supra note 12, at vii.
428. The most recent conference was held at Rutgers University Law School—Newark in April 2004.  Many
thanks to Neil Buchanan for organizing the conference, to Rutgers University Law School for hosting the conference,
and to Tax Analysts for it s financial support  of the conference.
429. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
430. Anthony C. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin:  A Step in the Right Direction for Gay Rights? , 4 LAW &
SEXUALITY 1, 2 (1994) [hereinafter Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin].
431.   Even with the advent of gay marriage in Canada and Massachusetts, there is still ambivalence among
many gay and lesbian couples on the question  whether to marry.  See Pam Belluck, Gays Respond:  “I Do,” “I Might”
and “I Won’t,” N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at A1.
432. These groups represent two of the corners in the triangular debate over same-sex marriage.  The
remaining corner of the triangle was (and continues to be) occupied by heterosexual opponents of same-sex marriage.
Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin, supra note 430, at 4.
433. See, e.g., Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
AND THE LAW 398, 400-01 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993); Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE:  THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 126, 126S31 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997)
[hereinafter MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE]; see also Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender:  A Feminist Inquiry,
1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 11 (1991) (“Proponents of a  campaign for marriage rights have framed their arguments largely
in terms of equal ity for lesbians and gay men . . . .  Opponents h ave rel ied on two primary arguments. . . . Second, these
activists have drawn on the politics of validating difference. . . .”).
from this isolation to form “a remarkable community of scholars.”427  This community is evidenced by
Taxing America, a book of essays by tax crits, and by periodic critical tax theory conferences.428
Because tax crits seem to be taking the first steps out of the closet, weathering the negative
treatment of the mainstream, and standing together and asking to be recognized and respected, the first
option—resigned acceptance of their marginality—would be a step backward for the critical tax
movement.
2.  Learning from the Same-Sex Marriage Debate—The other three options facing tax crits
lend themselves to discussion as a group.  Recall that these options are:  (i) wholeheartedly embracing
their marginality and using it to accentuate their differences from the mainstream, (ii) rejecting their
marginality on the ground that they are actually no different  than the mainstream, and (iii) rejecting
their marginality as an artificial construct that masks the complex web of similarities and differences
that characterize the relationship between tax crits and mainstream tax academics.  Together, these
three options remind me of the options that faced the gay and lesbian community in the wake of the
Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Baehr v. Lewin.429  The Baehr case represented “the first
victory for gay rights activists seeking to secure the legal right of marriage.”430  In the vigorous debate
over same-sex marriage that followed the Baehr decision, proponents of same-sex marriage and gay
and lesbian opponents431 of same-sex marriage took positions that, in substance, are strikingly similar
to the three options that face tax crits in dealing with their marginality.432
  In making their case (before and) after Baehr, proponents of same-sex marriage argued for
extending the right to marry on equality grounds, maintaining that gay and lesbian couples should be
afforded the right to marry because they are no different from straight couples.433  Gay and lesbian
opponents of same-sex marriage countered that “marriage will not liberate us as lesbians and gay men.
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434. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since when Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra
note 433, at 164, 165.  Nancy Polikoff has espoused a similar view, Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Ge t What We Ask for:
Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,”
79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993) (“I believe that the desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt
to mimic the worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the
promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism.”),  as have others, see John G. Culhane, Uprooting
the Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1119, 1123 n.21 (1999) (discussing the gay and
lesbian opposition to same-sex marriage), and Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin, supra note 430, at 6S7 (same).
435. Infanti, Baehr v. Lewin, supra note 430, at 7.
436. Ettelbrick, supra note 434, at 165; see also Polikoff, supra note 434, at 1549S50 (“Advocating lesbian
and gay marriage will detract from, even contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic
health care and other necessities available to all.  It will also require a rhetorical strategy that emphasizes similar ities
between our relationsh ips and h eterosexual marriages, values long-term monogamous coupling above all other
relationships, and denies the potential of lesbian and gay marriage to transform the gendered nature of marriage for
all people. I fear that the very process of employing that  rhetorical strategy for the years it will take to achieve its
objective will lead our movement’s public representatives, and the countless lesbians and gay men who hear us, to
believe exactly what we say.”).
437. See supra Part I.A.
438. See supra Part I.A.
In fact, it will constrain us, make us more invisible, force our assimilation into the mainstream, and
undermine the goals of gay liberation.”434  Underlying this counter-argument is “the notion that gay
relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships and that, in reality, an entire
spectrum of possible relationships exists.  To ape heterosexual marriage, simply to gain the benefits
that accompany it, is to sell ourselves [i.e., gays and lesbians] short.”435  
The idea that fundamental differences separate gay and lesbian couples from straight couples
permeates the following statement by Paula Ettelbrick:
Justice for gay men and lesbians will be achieved only when we are accepted and
supported in this society despite our differences from the dominant culture and the
choices we make regarding our relationships.  Being queer is more than setting up
house, sleeping with a person of the same gender, and seeking state approval for doing
so.  It is an identity, a culture with many variat ions.  It is a way of dealing with the
world by diminishing the constraints of gender roles that have for so long kept women
and gay people oppressed and invisible.  Being queer means pushing the parameters
of sex, sexuality, and family, and in the process transforming the very fabric of our
society.436
I must admit that, for me, Ettelbrick’s assertions did have a certain persuasiveness to them.  
Until recently, I was not a proponent of same-sex marriage because of my shared skepticism
about the wisdom of imitating heterosexual marriage.437  But what changed my view was the
experience of seeing my sister’s commitment ceremony through the eyes of the two elderly women
who had been watching from the hotel lobby.438  They drove home for me how same-sex marriage, no
matter how much it is disparaged as a drowning of our differences from the heterosexual majority, is
really a radical act that simultaneously demonstrates our similarity to the mainstream and our
differences from it.
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439. Ettelbrick, supra note 434, at 165S66.
440. See supra notes 182S188, 192, 193 and accompanying text.
441. Stoddard, supra note 433, at 401; see also Barbara J. Cox, A (Personal) Essay on Same-Sex Marriage,
in MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE, supra note 433, at 27, 27S29; Hunter, supra note 433, at 13–19.
442. Elisabeth Bumiller, Same-Sex Marriage:  The President; Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1.  The proposed constitutional amendment failed to garn er the suppor t of
even a majority of the Senate.  Carl Hulse, Senate Blocks Initiative to Ban Same-Sex Unions , N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2004, at A1.
The City of San Francisco issued more than 4100 marr iage licenses to same-sex couples before the California
Supreme Court ordered it to cease issuing such licenses, and an additional 2600 couples had made appointments for
a license before the order was issued.  Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
443. Thomas Crampton, Issuing Licenses, Quietly, to Couples in Asbury Park, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004,
at B5 (Asbury Park, New Jersey); Matthew Preusch, Oregon County, with Portland, Offers Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A26 (Multnomah County, Oregon); Marc Santora & Thomas Crampton, Same-Sex Weddings
To put it in deconstructionist terms, those (including Ettelbrick) who argue against same-sex
marriage on assimilationist grounds are sett ing up a hierarchical opposition by privileging difference
over identity.  In reaction to those who argue for the right to marry on the ground that gay and lesbian
couples are just like heterosexual couples (an argument that implicitly privileges identity over
difference), these opponents argue that we should not highlight our similarities to heterosexuals, but
should instead highlight our differences from them:
The moment we argue, as some among us insist on doing, that we should be treated
as equals because we are really just like married couples and hold the same values to
be true, we undermine the very purpose of our movement and begin the dangerous
process of silencing our different voices.  As a lesbian, I am fundamentally different
from nonlesbian women.  That’s the point.  Marriage, as it exists today, is antithetical
to my liberation as a lesbian and as a woman because it mainstreams my life and
voice.439
In making this argument, opponents of same-sex marriage have traded one privileging for another,
and, in the process, have embraced the hierarchical opposition set up by the heterosexual majority to
confer a marginalized, outsider status upon them.  But whether embraced by heterosexuals or
homosexuals, this hierarchical opposition can be deconstructed in much the same way that J.  M. Balkin
deconstructed the converse identity/difference hierarchical opposition that  Ettelbrick and others have
rejected as unsatisfying.440
Following my sister’s commitment ceremony, I came to agree with the proponents of same-sex
marriage who argue that extending the right to marry to gay and lesbian couples has the potential to
“transform it into something new.”441  There is still something quite radical about two men or two
women getting married.  After all, President Bush only announced his support for a constitutional ban
on same-sex marriage after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a decision legalizing
same-sex marriage and the City of San Francisco began to issue marriage licenses to a deluge of same-
sex couples.442  In the wake of that announcement of support, a number of municipalities reacted by
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples,443 ministers in New York solemnized same-sex
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in Upstate Village Test New York Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2004, at A1 (New Paltz, New York).
444. Thomas Crampton, Two Ministers Are Charged in Gay Nuptials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at B1.
445. Kate Zernike, Gay? No Marriage License Here. Straight? Ditto., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at A8.
446. Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1615.
447. Staudt, supra note 426, at 1582S83.
marriages in the face of criminal charges for doing so,444 and one municipality even stopped issuing
marriage licenses at all (i.e., both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples) until its state supreme court
issued a decision resolving the question whether same-sex couples are permitted to marry.445  Indeed,
although my current partner, Hien, and I had discussed the idea of getting married before all of this
occurred, the recent course of events has stiffened my resolve to do so.
I view same-sex marriage as allowing me to acknowledge both the ways in which I am like my
heterosexual counterparts and the ways in which I am different from them.  It is not a matter of
arguing that we are either the same or we are different, because we can be both the same and different.
This is not only a vaguely deconstructionist perspective of same-sex marriage, it  is also an entirely
realistic one.  My sister’s commitment ceremony was, in many ways, quite the same as a heterosexual
wedding.  But, at the same time, it was quite different from a heterosexual wedding because the two
people committing themselves to each other for life were of the same sex.  Paula Ettelbrick is not
wrong when she says that gays and lesbians are fundamentally different from heterosexuals.  What she
and others who ascribe to her viewpoint miss, however, is that, in many ways, we are also much alike.
And what  deconstruction tells us about her viewpoint is that ignoring our similarities to accentuate our
differences is really no better than ignoring our differences to accentuate our similarities.
3.  Returning to the Collective Identity of the Critical Tax Movement— By now, I’m sure that
you are asking yourself what all of this same-sex marriage talk has to do with tax crits and their
collective identity.  So, let’s return now to the remaining options from which tax crits can choose in
rethinking how their marginality fits in with their collective identity:  (i) wholeheartedly embracing it
and using it  to accentuate their differences from the mainstream, (ii) rejecting it on the ground that
they are actually no different than the mainstream, or (iii) rejecting it as an artificial construct that
masks the complex web of similarities and differences that characterize the relationship between tax
crits and mainstream tax academics.
Tax crits might choose the first of these three options, wholeheartedly embrace their
marginality, and use it to accentuate their differences from the mainstream.  In doing so, they would
essentially be choosing the path taken by Ettelbrick and other gay and lesbian opponents of same-sex
marriage.  Tax crits would be reifying the mainstream/marginal hierarchical opposition and acting as
if their differences from the mainstream were both real and their defining characteristics.  Like the gay
and lesbian opponents of same-sex marriage, tax crits would be embracing an easily deconstructible
hierarchical opposition and ignoring the reality that they are in many ways similar to mainstream tax
academics.  For example, Marjorie Kornhauser has pointed out that we are all interested in unraveling
the story behind tax provisions; we just go about it in different ways.446  Likewise, Nancy Staudt has
explained the importance of critical analysis to the formulation of workable legal reform, which is also
often a shared goal.447
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448. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1615 (“An important goal of tax scholarship, then, is to unravel the
story about that particular truth—to show that it is only a story and to reveal its origins and its effects, which may be
unintended.  This unraveling can be done in a number of ways, for example by philosophic or historical examin ations.
 Critical tax theory also does this by using non-tr aditional views and th eories to examine provisions frequently enacted
in far different times by people with world views not representative of all taxpayers back then (let alone now).”
(footnote omitted)).
449. See DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLO GY, supra note 2, at 89 (“And, indeed, one cannot say that each graphic
signifier  belongs to such and such a class,  the cuneiform code playing alternately on two registers.  In fact, each graphic
form may have a double value—ideographic and phonetic.  And its phonetic value can be simple or complex.  The
same signifier  may have one or var ious phonic values, it may be homophonic or polyphonic.  To this general
complexity of the system is added yet another subtle recourse to categorical determinatives, to phonetic complements
useless in reading, to a very irregular punctuation.”).
450. See Taylor & Whittier, supra note 397, at 111 (“For any subordinate group, the construction of positive
identity requires both a withdrawal from the values and structures of the dominant, oppressive society and the creation
of new self-affirming values and structures.”)
Or tax crits might choose the second of these three options and argue that  they should be
admitted to the mainstream because they are actually no different from mainstream tax academics.
This option suffers from nearly the same flaws as the previous option; it privileges the ways in which
tax crits are similar to mainstream tax academics over the ways in which they are different.  For
example, tax crits often use different methods (e.g., narrative, feminist, and minority perspectives) than
those employed by mainstream tax academics.448  Accordingly, were tax crits to choose this option,
they would again be embracing a hierarchical opposition that is easily deconstructible and that fails to
comport with reality.
Alternatively, tax crits might choose the last of these three options and reject their marginality
as an artificial construct that masks the complex web of similarities and differences that characterize
the relationship between tax crits and mainstream tax academics.449  I find this option to be more
appealing because it would open the possibility of breaking down the artificial barrier between
marginal and mainstream contributions to the tax policy literature while not suppressing tax crits’
distinct voice or dissolving the community that they have developed around the ways in which they
differ from the mainstream.450  
Once the mainstream/marginal hierarchical opposition is seen for what it truly is—not a reified
status but a constructed, unstable, context-driven boundary—there is no reason to attach quite so
much significance to it.  In fact, why attach any significance to it at all?   The existence of different
groups of scholars can surely be acknowledged without privileging one group over the other.  There
is, without doubt, room in the tax policy literature for all contributions, just as there is room in the
institution of marriage for all couples—neither inhabits a finite space.  Moreover, once critical
contributions to the tax policy literature are confronted on their merits and on appropriate terms
(rather than being ignored or trivialized because of their “marginality”), critical tax theory, much like
same-sex marriage, has the potential to transform the tax policy discourse for the better.
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451.  Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, supra note 170, at 1178S79.
V.  CONCLUSION?
With this food for thought, we have come to the formal end of this art icle.  But this end is
really not an end at all:  
[T]he decision to stop and assess the conclusions of one’s argument, to state them as
conclusions . . . leaves unspoken the many further steps that could be taken.  These
additional steps could lead to a partial or even a complete transformation of the
conclusions just arrived at.  Thus, from another perspective, the conclusion of a
deconstructive argument is a conclusion in neither sense of the word:  for it does not
end the possible lines of deconstructive argument , nor does it lead to a fixed and
determinate result.451
In this case, the further steps to be taken need not be left unspoken.  With the floor finally open, the
give and take among tax crits about  the shape of the critical tax movement’s collective identity and
how “marginality” fits into it can now begin . . .
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